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Abstract
Chapter 1 introduces the work, providing an overview of the
common themes underlying the research and outlining the focus
and approach particular to each project.
Chapter 2 proposes a game-theoretic model that shows how
moral preferences can emerge endogenously to promote material
outcomes and traces their relationships with the fundamentals
of the environment. The analysis indicates that the instilling of
moral values can act as a commitment mechanism that counter-
acts the detrimental effects of behavioural biases. The greater
the effect of such biases on the agents’ decisions (and, thus,
payoffs), the more expanded the scope for morality.
The study in chapter 3 tests the performance of a leading ac-
count of social preferences, namely the model of inequality
aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in tracking be-
haviour. It does so through an appropriately designed experi-
ment. The aim is to evaluate if the account can consistently
anticipate people’s behaviour. The results suggest that the
model performs well only with respect to people that exhibit
either very high or very low aversion to advantageous payoff
inequality.
The study in chapter 4 repeats the exercise reported in chapter
3, this time with respect to an account of social preferences that
builds on the idea of social norm compliance, in particular, the
one proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013). The aim is again
to evaluate if the model performs well in consistently tracking
people’s behaviour. The results do not offer much support for
the explanatory power of the model. The individuals that ex-
hibit the least concern about adhering to social norms and are
choosing the payoff-maximising options are the only ones the
actions of whom match the model’s predictions.
Chapter 5 summarises the findings of this thesis and concludes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General introduction
This thesis is a collection of three chapters, which report studies that con-
tribute to research in game theory and experimental economics. Chapter
2 is entirely self contained and can be read independently of the other two.
Chapters 3 and 4 are linked by section 3.3, but otherwise they are also
self-contained. All three of them, however, investigate different aspects of
the same subject matter, namely pro-social behaviour, and can, as such,
be viewed within a unified framework.
The focus on the overarching theme of pro-social behaviour is mo-
tivated by a large and expanding literature of experimental evidence on
strategic decision-making. While traditional game-theoretic accounts rely
on the assumption that players are solely concerned about their own ma-
terial payoffs, the choices of people in appropriately designed laboratory
experiments reveal that substantial proportions of them are willing to go
against their material interests, in order to uphold some social principles,
such as fairness, reciprocity, and altruism. In order to account for these
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behavioural patterns within the framework of rational choice, economists
have proposed a number of models of social preferences (see, e.g., Camerer,
2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003, 2006; Ga¨chter, 2007 for overviews of the
experimental data and the accounts proposed). On a parallel development,
the experimental findings have fuelled the discussion on the foundations of
rational-choice theory (see, e.g., Stigler and Becker, 1977; Hollis and Sug-
den, 1993; Dietrich and List, 2013; and the debate between Binmore and
Shaked, 2010, on the one hand, and Fehr and Schmidt, 2010, and Eckel
and Gintis, 2010, on the other).
Some concerns that are commonly expressed in this discourse relate to
the properties of preferences that are not exclusively expressed over one’s
own material payoff. The three studies reported in this thesis contribute
to the dialogue in two distinct ways. The first is the examination of some
conditions under which non-material preferences may arise in addition to
purely materialist concerns and the implications of their emergence for
public-policy design. The second is the evaluation of the performance of two
different models of social preferences in accounting for people’s behaviour.
The model proposed in Chapter 2 relates to the first of these two lines
of inquiry. It demonstrates that non-materialist preferences may in fact
be beneficial from a materialist point of view, if they are used to coun-
tervail a pre-existing bias. In doing so, it combines insights from different
strands of the game-theoretic literature, as well as notions related to the
psychology of decision-making. More specifically, it studies a process of
preference indoctrination in an intertemporal-choice setting, where there
is a discrepancy between the agents’ discount factors. This discrepancy
is caused by present-bias, a tendency to overweight present consequences
relative to future ones (see e.g. Ainslie, 1975, 1992; Laibson, 1997). The
concept of present bias is particularly appealing, because it can be shown
2
to have an evolutionary rationale (using a mechanism similar to that of
Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006). The character and degree of the resulting
non-materialist preferences are tied to the objective conditions of the en-
vironment. Thus, the setup yields important implications for the design of
public policies that aim to affect these preferences.
Chapters 3 and 4 report experiments that are designed to investigate
the performance of two different accounts involving pro-social preferences in
accurately tracking behaviour across a series of settings. This is a matter of
preference consistency, so long as preferences have been correctly identified
(which is an issue for each model itself). Consistency here requires that
every preference-ordering of the various alternatives made by the decision-
maker uses the same version of a parametrised model. Thus, preferences
are time-invariant and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Intuitively,
a model of social behaviour will provide meaningful predictions about an
agent’s social behaviour to the extent that the agent’s social sensitivities,
as defined by the model, remain stable or, at the very least, their variation
is accounted for.
Models with other-regarding preferences have been shown to be capa-
ble of organising the behavioural regularities commonly observed in many
laboratory experiments well (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006 for a review).
However, their ability to track individual behaviour across different set-
tings is questionable at best (see e.g. Blanco et al., 2011; Bruhin et al.,
2016). The two experimental studies reported in this thesis address pre-
cisely this question, using a design that allows for a more accurate distinc-
tion between social preferences and strategic considerations. The models
that are being evaluated have been shown to be very effective in accounting
for aggregate behavioural patterns in many stylised games and are, thus,
good candidates for the ‘stricter’ test of within-subject consistency. The
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first is the account of inequality aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). It postulates that, in addition to their personal material payoffs,
people prefer, to idiosyncratic extents, equitable distributions of payoffs
to non-equitable ones. The second is the account of social-norm adherence
championed by Krupka and Weber (2013). It posits that people care about
their own material payoffs and the degree to which their actions are deemed
socially appropriate.
Two crucial differences between these two models are important to
notice at the outset. The Krupka-Weber model allows for a more general
class of social maxims (other than payoff-equality) and for setting-specific
classifications of normative behaviour (by allowing the relative influence of
different norms to vary across settings). The Fehr-Schmidt model is more
restrictive in both these dimensions, but, accordingly, it is more specific and
imposes fewer epistemic requirements. The focus here lies on whether either
(or both) of these two accounts is able to trace individual behaviour through
a series of different games, in the absence of strategic considerations related
to other people’s choices. If a model exhibits consistently high performance
in doing so, this constitutes evidence that it captures some of the principles
underlying behaviour accurately.
1.2 Thesis outline
Chapter 2, titled ‘Endogenous moral preferences - A simple theoretical
analysis’, reports a theoretical account of endogenous preference formation
within a framework of Parent-Child interaction. Parents are assumed to
care solely about the material welfare of themselves and that of their chil-
dren. Their preferences are time-consistent. The children’s preferences, on
the other hand, are characterised by present bias, a tendency to overweight
4
present events relative to future ones. Each parent can, at a personal cost,
instil a direct preference for a particular type of behaviour into her child’s
preferences. The analysis demonstrates that in this setting even fully ma-
terialist parents may optimally endow their children with preferences for
certain behaviours. The study explores the relationship between such pref-
erences and the parameters in the environment, and enhances the analysis
by introducing a stochastic component. The results have interesting impli-
cations for the design of public policy. The design can also be applied to
intertemporal-choice problems of single individuals, under the interpreta-
tion of habit formation.
Chapter 3, titled ‘Endogenous moral preferences - The case of aversion
to advantageous inequality’, reports an experimental study designed to
evaluate the performance of the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequality
aversion. The subjects are asked to participate in a series of games that
do not involve strategic uncertainty, in the sense that they are aware of all
the actions taken by the other players upon making their decisions. With
this design it is possible to isolate the effect of their preferences on their
behaviour, since strategic considerations are removed. The study elicits the
individual-specific parameters of advantageous-inequality aversion (guilt)
based on their decisions in the first game (a variant of the dictator game).
It then uses the model to predict their behaviour in two other games (a
trust and a lying game). The results indicate that the performance of
the model in predicting people’s behaviour varies considerably with the
strength of their preferences. That is, it performs significantly better with
respect to the people who exhibit either very high or very low aversion
to advantageous payoff inequality. It appears that particularly selfish and
egalitarian types behave consistently so throughout, whereas people with
moderate concerns about payoff inequality appear confused with respect to
their preferences.
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Chapter 4, titled ‘The curious case of the rational homo sociologicus
- Consistency of normative preferences’, examines social behaviour from a
socially normative perspective. People’s strategic decisions appear sensi-
tive to changes in the environment within which they are expressed. One
way to account for such dependencies is to postulate that individuals are
intrinsically driven to comply with some socially determined rules, the rel-
ative prevalence of which differs across settings. This study evaluates the
ability of one such account, namely that proposed by Krupka and Weber
(2013), to consistently track behaviour. Their model is tested using the
data from the experiment in chapter 3, along with some additional data
that are particular to this investigation. The results offer little support for
the predictive power of the model. Individual sensitivities towards norm
compliance vary substantially across the three games. In addition, the
results obtained in situations where different norms are in conflict differ
markedly from those observed in situations where a single norm prevails.
Contrary to the narrative of the model, it appears that some people adhere
to specific ideals, which they hold on to even in situations where doing so
is considered socially inappropriate. The rest, for the most part, exhibit
non-stable degrees of sensitivity towards norm compliance.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises of the main points from Chapter 2
and the results of Chapters 3 and 4. It concludes by pointing out some
limitations of the analysis and suggesting avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous moral preferences
- A simple theoretical analysis
2.1 Introduction
Standard economic theory postulates that preferences are given and im-
mutable. Hobbes prompts us to think of humans as if they were mush-
rooms, attaining full development prior to engaging in any form of interac-
tion with each other (Hobbes, 1949). His position has been widely adhered
to by traditional economic approaches. In the view of Stigler and Becker
(1977) tastes tend to be relatively stable and qualitatively similar across
people. As such, they are prone to being considered as constant in the anal-
ysis of economic behaviour. This view of preferences can lead to important
insights into the causal mechanisms underlying behaviour.
However, the conception of stable, universal preferences is becoming
increasingly challenged in the economics literature. Bowles remarks that
thinking of preferences in this way does result in the simplification of the
task facing economists, but also compromises economic analysis in terms
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of explanatory power, relevance, and ethical consistency (Bowles, 1998).
Indeed, to the extent that preferences are, even partly, affected by the
environment where the individuals live and interact, the implications for
economic theory and the design of public policy can be quite significant.
Today there are many game-theoretic accounts of endogenous pref-
erence formation. Examples include the evolution of homo moralis (Al-
ger and Weibull, 2012,2013 - see also Hamilton, 1964a,1964b), history and
leadership (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2011), and parenting (e.g. Bisin and
Verdier, 2001a; Cosconati, 2009). Although often markedly different in
their founding principles and structure, they all propose ways in which
certain preferences emerge through the interplay among the individuals.
A major contribution to our understanding of preference formation
was made by Samuelson and Swinkels (2006). They deploy a setting where
Nature acts as a benevolent parent to maximise the utility of the agents
(humans). They show that if the agents’ prior understanding of the causal
and statistical structure of the world is imperfect, Nature will optimally en-
dow them with preferences for certain actions, so as to correct for marginal
errors that may ensue due to incorrect information processing. Building
on the same logic of preference indoctrination, Adriani and Sonderegger
(2009) propose a similar situation, where parents may endow their children
with pro-social preferences. Here the choice of each parent to instil such
preferences is dependent on the choices of the rest. Again, the fact that
certain pieces of information about the environment are available to the
parents but not the children implies that instilling values that are seem-
ingly in conflict with material welfare may actually be promoting it. Based
on these arguments, we ask how such values vary in response to changes in
the environment where they arise.
We address this question in a framework of rationality, through a se-
10
quential game. Following Adriani and Sonderegger (2009), we construct a
model in the spirit of Tabellini (2008), who applies the imperfect-empathy
setup of Bisin and Verdier (2001a) to the transmission of pro-social val-
ues across generations. This is a model of Parent-Child interaction. The
assumptions that they make are that a) parents can affect the deep prefer-
ences of their children and b) parents try to maximise a notion of utility of
their children that departs from pure material welfare. This general frame-
work of Parent-Child interaction (with alternatives to imperfect empathy)
is becoming increasingly popular as a means of explaining social dynamics
and cultural change (see e.g. Doepke and Zilibotti, 2007,2012).
A powerful feature of such models is that they facilitate preference
heterogeneity in the strategic interplay between the different agents and
institutions over time. For example, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2006) focus on
the issue of asymmetric information between the parents and their children.
In their context parents can intervene to affect the payoffs of their children,
so as to protect them from harmful choices. The tradeoff is that this limits
the children’s ability to learn from experience. Adriani and Sonderegger
(2009) also assume that parents are better informed than their children,
but they assume that the former can manipulate the deep preferences of
the latter, in order to promote their welfare.
In our model the children exhibit present-bias, which results in dis-
counting future consequences unreasonably heavily in favour of present
ones. Simply put, they assign a very high weight on present outcomes,
to the detriment of their future welfare. Present bias is an increasingly
popular notion in the economics literature.1 In sub-section 2.2.2 we dis-
cuss this feature of our model in greater detail. Parents do not suffer from
1See e.g. Meier and Sprenger (2010); Benhabib et al. (2010) for experimental stud-
ies of the phenomenon and Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001); Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) for formal accounts.
11
present bias, but exhibit semi-altruistic preferences: they care about the
joint maximisation of their own and their children’s material welfare. We
show that in this setup even materialist parents will opt for instilling moral
values into their children’s deep preferences. We then argue that mea-
sures of public policy that affect the parameters of our setup may crowd
out the parents’ private incentives, thus working against their stated goals.
Our conclusions are akin to those reported by Bohnet et al. (2001), who
analyse the non-monotonic effect of variations in contract enforcement on
(endogenously determined) trustworthiness.
We view our paper as closest to that by Adriani and Sonderegger
(2009), in that they focus on a different aspect (informational asymme-
try) and use the same mechanism to account for the problem. Another
setup that can be deemed as complementary to ours is the one proposed
by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), where altruist parents decide how much to
invest in their children’s upbringing, in order to influence their future effort
choices and, thus, the likelihood that they will need financial support.2 We
instead express the problem in terms of a bias that affects time-discounting
and allow for a more general interpretation of preferences attached on ac-
tions. Our model is also conceptually close to that of Bhatt and Ogaki
(2012), who propose an account of tough love. In their model children
are assumed to be more impatient the more they consume. We depart
from their setup in that we do not impose any assumptions that link the
agents’ preferences with their consumption and rely solely on present bias
to support our conclusions.
Abstracting from the literature on cultural transmission, our paper
also relates to time-inconsistent decision making (Laibson, 1997). Specif-
ically, it can be applied to situations where people choose to exert self-
2On the deployment of strategic bequests by altruistic parents, see also Bernheim
et al. (1985), Lindbeck and Weibull (1986), and Wilhelm (1996) among others.
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control. We introduce a direct preference for an action as a commitment
mechanism. We show that the tradeoff between the relative costs and
benefits of the ‘desirable, yet potentially harmful’ action has important im-
plications for the individual’s incentives and, thus, for the design of public
policy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 contains
the setup of our model, a discussion about some of its core features, and
the analysis of equilibrium. In section 2.3 we discuss policy implications
and consider a number of extensions and alternative readings of the model
analysed in section 2.2. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Parent - Youngster setup
Consider a two-player sequential game, G, spanning across three periods,
denoted by t ∈ 0, 1, 2. The first player, the parent (P ), is the first to move,
at t = 0. The second player, the youngster (Y ), observes the parent’s
move and subsequently makes his own, at t = 1. The youngster must
select an action, α ∈ {B,F} (smoke/do not smoke, be extravagant/be
thrifty, break/follow the law, etc.). Each of these two actions yields a
consumption payoff. The consumption payoff of action F is normalised
to zero.3 Selecting action B generates an immediate consumption benefit,
b1 ∈ R++, as well as a delayed cost, b2 ∈ R++.4
3This is without loss of generality. Given any piYt¯ (F ) and pi
Y
t¯ (B) in some t¯ ∈ {1, 2},
where piYt¯ (.) is the material-payoff function of agent Y in period t¯, subtracting pi
Y
t¯ (F )
from both will not alter Y ’s decision.
4The same relationship could have been achieved by restricting both b1 and b2 to be
negative. Indeed, the important element is that they are of the same sign. In section
2.3 we examine this alternative case, where a present loss is weighted against a future
benefit. We show that this scenario is a reflection of ours. Owing to the symmetric
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The youngster decides with the aim to maximise his utility, which
is given by the present discounted value of his consumption payoff over
periods 1 and 2, as well as a hedonic component, which is manipulated by
the parent (more on this later). There is no hedonic component associated
with actionB. By choosing F , on the other hand, the youngster experiences
a (net) degree of intrinsic gratification, denoted by n ∈ R+. We will refer
to n as the level of ‘morality’ player Y is endowed with.
Definition 2.2.1. Morality The degree of moral preference, n, for action
α is the level of intrinsic (non-material) utility player Y receives upon
choosing α. This is additional to the material payoff resulting from action
α, but relevant only to the ‘moral agent’, i.e. player Y .
For the ease of exposition, we will use a working example. Let action
F be labelled as ‘being frugal’ and action B as ‘being extravagant’ with re-
spect to one’s monetary expenditure. Then, his problem becomes clear. By
being frugal he can save some money in period 1, so as to be able to spend
them in period 2, augmented by the interest rate on savings. By being
extravagant, on the other hand, he increases his period-1 utility (by con-
suming more) at the expense of the additional augmented period-2 income
that would have resulted from his savings. We will use this interpretation
of actions B and F throughout our analysis. Note, however, that this is
only an example, designed to facilitate a more immediate understanding of
the problem. The domain of application of our theory is much more general
and includes all instances where one-shot decisions can have consequences
at multiple points in time.
An important difference between the parent and the youngster lies in
their degrees of patience. In particular, the youngster’s preferences are
presently biased, while those of the parent are not. Let δY = βδ represent
structure of the analysis, our results are invariant across the two.
14
the youngster’s discount factor, where 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1.5 Then,
his utility function can be written as:
UY =

b1 − βδb2 if α = B
n if α = F
(2.2.1.1)
It is worth noting that present bias is not a necessary assumption
within our framework. What needs to be the case is that the youngster
discounts the future more heavily than the parent does. We invoke the
assumption of present bias to reinforce the connection between this parent-
youngster framework and that of the intertemporal self, who has to antic-
ipate her/his future choices when making decisions in the present. Simply
assuming that the two agents have different discount factors might be plau-
sible in the case of the parent-youngster framework, but it does not appear
quite so plausible in the case of the intertemporal self. By invoking present
bias, we are able to readily adapt our analysis in both frameworks. In addi-
tion, present bias is theoretically appealing as a potentially robust feature
of preferences on evolutionary grounds (this can be seen in the context of
the framework proposed by Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006). We discuss
present bias and its implications in greater detail in sub-section 2.2.2.
As stated before, the parent moves first, at t = 0. Her objective is
to maximise the joint welfare of herself and the youngster. She does so by
determining the value of n, at a cost. This is captured by C : R+ → R+,
which associates each action available to the parent with a material loss she
has to incur to take that action. We postulate that no such loss occurs by
default, i.e. C(0) = 0. We also assume that this loss is increasing linearly in
the degree of the parent’s interference, i.e. that C
′
(n) = dC(n)
dn
= c > 0. The
5Here, δ is the standard discount factor, while β is an additional weight that the
youngster attaches on all future consequences. We say that the youngster exhibits
quasi-hyperbolic, time-inconsistent preferences.
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linearity assumption here is only imposed for simplicity. Our results would
be no different in a qualitative sense under an exponentially increasing cost
function.6 Let δP = δ represent the parent’s discount factor.7 Then, the
parent’s utility evaluated at t = 0 can be described as follows:
UP =

b1 − δb2 − C(n)δ if α = B
−C(n)
δ
if α = F
(2.2.1.2)
Notice that UP has been divided by δ, in order to maintain uniformity
and simplicity in the representation. This is necessary, because the parent
is deciding at t0 and, thus, she discounts the youngster’s future decision by
δ, whereas she has to incur C(n) immediately.
Importantly, the difference between the discount factor of the parent
and that of the youngster can create a conflict of interest. Intuitively,
our specification captures the notion that the youngster is more impatient
than the parent. Furthermore, the parent does not internalise fully the
youngster’s preferences, but instead applies imperfect empathy. That is,
she evaluates the youngster’s material payoff through the lens of her own
preferences (this is quite standard in the literature, see Bisin and Verdier,
2001). Hence, the conflict of interests arises: the parent would like the
youngster to be more patient than he actually is. To correct for this, given
her inability to address the youngster’s present bias directly, she can opt
instead to imbue him with some intrinsic (moral) preference for one of the
actions.
6Indeed, C(n) is assumed weakly convex for our proofs in the Appendix.
7We say that the parent exhibits time-consistent preferences by discounting the future
exponentially. Notice that her standard discount factor is the same with that of the
youngster. It is worth repeating that this does not need to be the case. So long as the
two players exhibit different degrees of patience, our analysis applies. In our framework
the youngster is not simply impatient (i.e. exhibits a lower discount factor). Instead,
he attaches a pronounced significance on present consumption.
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Equations 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2 highlight this potential for discrepancy
between the choice favoured by the youngster and the one the parent would
prefer. To see this, consider the following example, where n = 0. Here, P
would prefer Y to choose B iff:
UP (0, B) ≥ UP (0, F )⇒ b1 − δb2 ≥ 0⇒ b2 ≤ b1
δ
On the other hand, Y will opt for B iff:
UY (0, B) ≥ UY (0, F )⇒ b1 − βδb2 ≥ 0⇒ b2 ≤ b1
βδ
Thus, the youngster would switch from B to F at a higher threshold
value for b2. From the point of view of the parent that would be sub-
optimal. In the context of our working example, the parent would prefer
the youngster to behave frugally (choose action F ), provided that the return
to his savings (b2) is at least equal to
b1
δ
. In simple terms, she would like
him to be frugal, so long as the period-1 value of the return to his savings
surpasses the period-1 value of the amount he has to save. On the other
hand, the youngster would demand a return equal to at least b1
βδ
in order
to give up part of his period-1 expenditure. That is, he would be too
‘lavish’ (and short-sighted) in the parent’s opinion: due to his presently
biased preferences, he would assign an unreasonably high weight on his
period-1 utility. This situation, where the parent does not interfere with
the youngster’s preferences at all (n = 0), is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Suppose now that the parent chooses instead to instil a direct prefer-
ence for action F at t = 0. Let n > 0. That will induce the youngster
to lower his threshold for switching from B to F . Consider, again, our
working example. The parent is trying to instil a moral code in the young-
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0Parent
prefers action B
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action F
b1
δ
b1
βδ
b2
Figure 2.1: n = 0: no preference for a particular action
ster: to instruct him that he should behave frugally not because it yields
large material benefits, but because it is the right thing to do, in and of
itself. That is, she chooses to imbue action F with a moral content that
is additional to its material consequences.8 This does not affect the mate-
rial consequences implied by the choices available to the youngster or his
present bias, but it does affect his utility. In this way, it counteracts the
effect of his impatience and brings his preferences closer to those of the
parent. In other words, the youngster behaves more frugally not because
he has grown more patient, but because he is morally incentivised to do
so. The resulting situation looks like the one depicted in Figure 2.2.
0
Parent
prefers action B
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action F
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action F
b1
δ
b1
βδ
b1−n
βδ
b2
Figure 2.2: n > 0 assigned on action F
Notice that so far the magnitudes of b1 and b2 are both deterministic,
8Notice that in our characterisation the morality assigned to an action is dependent
on its material consequences. The level of n is chosen by the parent in order to account
for the youngster’s present bias and not because she actually believes that morality is
meaningful in any way. One way to think about this instrumentalist approach would
be to consider that virtually any action can be imbued with a moral content, so long as
the parent prefers it more than the youngster does. Note, however, that for the latter
morality is meaningful, in the sense that his utility increases by n whenever he chooses
the morally superior option. The appeal of such an extreme scenario is precisely that
even if people did think an act like this, there would still be scope for moral values to
arise.
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that is, there is no uncertainty associated with any of them. We start from
this case, in sub-section 2.2.3, because it is useful as a basis for comparison.
In 2.2.4 we consider a more realistic scenario, by allowing for uncertainty
over b2.
Finally, it is useful to summarise the timing of this game.
t = 0:
t = 1:
t = 2:
P makes her choice.
Y observes P ’s choice and makes his own.
The short-term outcome of Y ’s choice is realised.
The long-term outcome of Y ’s choice is realised.
Figure 2.3: Timeline of events
In period t = 0 the parent selects n so as to maximise the joint utility
of herself and the youngster, evaluated according to her preferences at that
time. The youngster observes the parent’s move and subsequently makes
his own, at t = 1. The youngster’s choice yields both a short- and a long-
term outcome. The short-term outcome is realised immediately upon his
choice, i.e. at t = 1. The long-term outcome is realised in the following
period, i.e. at t = 2. A timeline of the events is provided in Figure 2.3.
2.2.2 Discussion of the model
Before we continue with our analysis, we deem it meaningful to discuss
three features of our design in greater detail. The first is present bias.
Rational-choice theory models intertemporal decision making using expo-
nential discounting for future periods. In this way, the decisions made by
the individual are time-consistent. However, when choosing among alter-
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native options, people typically manifest a strong preference for present
outcomes, which leads to time-inconsistency. Following the seminal contri-
butions of Ainslie in the domain of temptation and self-control (see Ainslie,
1975, 1992), many experimental studies have documented the phenomenon
in economics (Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Benhabib et al., 2010 are two
recent examples). This led to a growing literature of formal accounts that
have established the phenomenon as a feature of people’s preferences (see
e.g. Laibson, 1997; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002).
In our parent-child context we incorporate present bias as a feature of
the preferences of the child, but not the parent. This distinction is main-
tained for its plausibility and to reinforce the connection with the relevant
literature, which highlights the discrepancy between the preferences of the
parents and those of their children. However, this particular preference
configuration is not essential for our results. Notice that the choices of
the parents correspond to future consequences, which are discounted alto-
gether. Thus, endowing the parents with present bias as well would not
have a qualitative impact on our results. Notice also that we could instead
have started from an impatient parent and a patient child and our conclu-
sions would be the same. Our choice of set-up demonstrates an intuitively
simple idea. That the anticipation of impulsive behaviour by the child may
affect the incentives of a parent who only has material-welfare concerns and
induce her to intervene.
Present bias also has a theoretical rationale as a feature of humans’
preferences in an evolutionary sense. If the information reception and pro-
cessing mechanisms of humans are imperfect (as in the context of Samuel-
son and Swinkels, 2006), then their uncertainty about the environment
may induce them to place a lot of weight on present consumption. Finally,
present bias allows our model to also be read from the viewpoint of the
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intertemporal self exercising self control, as we discuss in section 2.3.
It is critical for our account that the parent cannot address the young-
ster’s present bias directly. At first glance, this might seem arbitrary. Why
should the parent not simply invest in eliminating this feature from the
youngster’s preferences? One argument is that our model would still apply
in a situation where the parent could indeed influence β, but only to some
extent or at too high a cost. A stronger argument can be made about
the nature of each source of motivation. In our model we have described
present bias as an innate characteristic, an impulse similar to the drive for
profit. As we have argued in the previous paragraph, such an impulse may
emerge as an evolutionarily optimal feature of preferences under certain
conditions. By contrast, we have described the parent’s intervention as
cultural indoctrination. That is, the parent is still able to interfere with
the youngster’s preferences to some extent, but by instilling an element of
culture, rather than embedding an impulse. Even if she wanted to influence
the youngster’s discounting directly, she would have to teach the young-
ster the virtues of patience, not eradicate his innate impatience. Thus, our
model would still apply. As a final point, such constraints are common in
this literature (see e.g. Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006 on the constraints
in information processing).
The second feature of our model is our definition of morality. A remark
on our choice of terminology is important. A generic preference to act in
a particular way can be accommodated within various frameworks, that
are not necessarily compatible with each other. For example, what may
be construed as a moral motive may also be conceivable as a desire for
social conformity. Our aim here is not to provide a clear-cut distinction
on how to separate different sources of motivation. Rather, we are moving
in the opposite direction: Given the innate disagreements among these
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different sources of motivation, we are mapping a way in which they can be
thought to affect people’s behaviour. To do so, we focus on their effects on
preferences, by postulating that any non-material motive implies a direct
preference for a particular action.9 Consequently, the label morality in
definition 2.2.1 is merely illustrative of the type of motivation we refer
to and should not be taken as exhaustive. In principle, variable n refers
to any non-material increment that is added on the youngster’s utility,
irrespectively of its definition (so long as it is chosen strategically by the
parent).
Finally, a word of caution. In our framework we adopt the assumption
that parents can manipulate their children’s preferences at will. This claim
is quite contentious. There is a long-standing debate on the effectiveness
of parenting in shaping children’s preferences, which is part of the greater
debate between nature and nurture.10 Addressing this debate lies far out-
side the scope of this paper. In support of our approach, we advance two
arguments. The first is that this debate is still ongoing and the results from
the different studies cannot typically account for the whole spectrum of en-
vironmental influence (Pinker (2003), p.325). To the extent that parents
can have any effect on their children’s preferences (irrespective of parent-
ing style, which we do not specify), our model can be applied. The second
is that by ‘manipulation of deep preferences’ we do not refer to a radical
change in the behavioural traits towards an extreme. In technical terms,
9However, the moral imperative should not be viewed as an isolated prescription.
Instead, it should have a wider interpretation, in terms of a typology of behaviour. For
instance, a preference for fair allocations should be present not only when an individ-
ual is on the receiving end, but also when (s)he is called to allocate. These are not
merely different idle positions. They involve different actions, which have to be taken
strategically, and yet the same type of behaviour must emerge. More generally, such a
preference should be active in all cases where allocations are to be made, irrespectively
of their specifics.
10See e.g. Pinker (2003), pp.13-14 for an overview on parenting, pp.324-326 for a
refutation of environmental effects on behavioural traits - but notice potential causes of
bias in p.25. For conclusions in support of the opposite view see Heckman et al. (2006);
Algan et al. (2011).
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the deep preference for an action does not constitute an omnipotent ar-
gument in the child’s utility function. In fact, that would be sub-optimal
given our framework. Instead, it is instilled as a measure of choice, cap-
turing the extent to which the parent herself wants the child to adhere
to the relevant action. As such, it remains in conflict with the objective
magnitudes that define the payoffs (which one can readily generalise to re-
flect genetic pre-dispositions). The unconvinced reader may still want to
consider the alternative readings of our model outlined above.
We shall now proceed to characterise the value for n that constitutes
the solution to the parent’s problem.
2.2.3 Baseline
Some important remarks are in order. To start with, notice that the parent
would have no incentive to set n > (1 − β)b1, as that would not only be
more costly for her, but also counter-productive. Indeed, such a value for n
would induce the youngster to choose action F even in instances where the
parent would want him to opt for B. In addition, the parent would have
no incentive to instil a preference for action B instead.11 Doing so would
also be counter-productive, as it would increase the discrepancy between
the two players’ preferences.
Lastly, it can be easily shown that the sequences of actions in tables
2.1 and 2.2 would be reversed if it was the case that b1, b2 < 0. That is,
11In this paper we focus on positive values for n in an effort to determine the action
that will be chosen, as opposed to that which will be avoided. The two are equivalent
n our framework, where the youngster faces a binary-choice problem. However, in
a situation with three or more available actions assigning a negative n to an action
(aversion towards a certain type of behaviour) does not generally ensure that the desired
action will be chosen. A comparison between the cost of discouraging certain types of
behaviour and that of encouraging others is an interesting research project itself. We
leave this for the future and focus instead on positive education (encouragement of a
particular behaviour).
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if action B led to a present cost and a future benefit, then both players
would favour F for |b2| ≤ | b1δ | and both would choose B for |b2| ≥ | b1βδ |. For
|b2| ∈ (| b1δ |, | b1βδ |) they would disagree, with the parent favouring B and the
youngster choosing F . Then, the former would find it optimal to assign
n > 0 to action B. Taking these observations into account, we can form
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.1. In any equilibrium of game G, n ∈ [0, (1− β)b1)
Proof. Formally, this can be proved by contradiction. Consider first the
case where b1, b2 > 0 and, thus, P assigns n to action F .
i. Suppose n < 0: Then, ∀b2 ∈ [ b1βδ , b1−nβδ ) it would be true that b1−nβδ −
b2 > 0. Thus, Y would choose action B and P would have been
better off setting n = 0.
ii. Suppose n > (1 − β)b1: Then, ∀b2 ∈ ( b1−nβδ , b1δ ] it would be true that
b1−n
βδ
− b2 < 0. Thus, Y would choose action F , even though P would
prefer action B. Therefore, P would have been better off setting
n = (1− β)b1.
iii. Suppose n = (1− β)b1: For b2 ∈ [ b1δ , b1βδ ) Y would choose action F , in
line with P ’s preferences. If b2 =
b1
δ
, P would be indifferent between
actions F and B, as they would both result in UY = 0. Setting
n = (1− β)b1 would render Y indifferent between the two actions at
a positive cost to P . Thus, P would be better off setting n slightly
below (1 − β)b1, so as to avoid the unnecessary expenditure in the
case where b2 =
b1
δ
.
An equivalent argument holds in the case where b1, b2 < 0 and P attaches
n on action B.
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Proposition 2.2.1 describes the upper and lower bound for n. In simple
terms, it determines the values of n which it makes sense for the parent to
consider.
Consider, now, the situation outlined in sub-section 2.2.1 from the
parent’s perspective at t = 0. The parent knows that in period 1 the
youngster will choose based on:
n R b1 − βδb2 ⇒ b2 R b1 − n
βδ
If the future cost from action B is such, that the preferences of the
youngster are at odds with those of the parent, then the latter may find it
optimal to engage in some moral instilling. In other words, if b1
δ
< b2 <
b1
βδ
,
then P may optimally assign n > 0 on action F , so as to induce Y to
choose it at t = 1. This depends on the cost of inspiring that moral code. To
simplify the analysis, suppose that when the youngster’s preferences render
him indifferent between the two options, he always chooses action F . Then,
the various different cases are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.2. Given game G with b1, b2 > 0, P assigns n∗ to action
F such, that:
i. if b2 >
b1
βδ
, then n∗ = 0 and Y will choose action F .
ii. if b2 <
b1
δ
, then n∗ = 0 and Y will choose action B.
iii. if b1
δ
< b2 <
b1
βδ
, then n∗ =

b1 − βδb2 if C(b1−βδb2)δ < δb2 − b1
and Y will choose action F.
0 if C(b1−βδb2)
δ
> δb2 − b1
and Y will choose action B.
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Proof. The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Trying to maximise
their joint welfare, the parent compares the material gain that results from
n∗ with the cost of instilling it into the youngster. When they both agree
on which action the latter should take, there is no need for a value system
(n∗ = 0). When they do not, if n∗ > 0, then it is precisely such that it makes
the youngster indifferent between F and B (given the assumption stated
above, that in such cases the youngster opts for F ). Any higher or lower
value would incur an additional cost to the parent with no added benefit.
Thus. the parent has to compare what she gets by setting n∗ = b1 − βδb2
with the cost, C(b1 − βδb2), of doing so. If the benefit surpasses the cost,
then n∗ is set equal to b1 − βδb2, otherwise it is set equal to 0.
The content of proposition 2.2.2 may be best described by application
to our working example. Recall that this is a situation where the parent
knows the exact value of the material benefit the youngster can obtain in
period 2 by being frugal in period 1. If this material benefit is so low that
P herself would prefer Y to not be frugal, then she would not assign any
moral underpinning to parsimony. Equally, if the return to savings is so
large that Y will save some of his wealth anyway, then there is no use, and,
thus, no scope for a value function. Indeed, a moral connotation is relevant
only when the parent considers the investment worthwhile, whereas the
youngster’s impatience favours an extravagant behaviour. In that case,
provided that the cost is sufficiently low, the parent will engage in moral
indoctrination. Furthermore, she will set the utility from being prudent so
as to make the youngster precisely indifferent between acting frugally and
acting extravagantly. A higher or lower level of ‘moral’ utility will be costly
for the parent without adding anything to the youngster’s welfare.
The instrumental view of morality championed in our paper gives rise
to a rich structure of variations. Recall that the level of moral preference
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the parent optimally attaches onto an action is dependent on the material
consequences implied by that action relative to those implied by the other
actions available. In our simple scenario, the degree of moral inclination
towards behaving frugally varies with the net benefit/cost of being extrav-
agant. The latter is expressed as a comparison between b1 and b2. The
following corollaries summarize how changes in these two parameters affect
n∗.
Corollary 2.2.3. Consider game G with b1, b2 > 0 and n∗ assigned on
action F . The relationship between n∗ and b1 is non-monotonic. That is,
∃ b¯1 : n∗bˆ1 = 0 ∀ bˆ1 ≥ b¯1, n
∗
b˜1
< n∗
b˘1
∀ b˜1 < b˘1 < b¯1. In particular,
an increase in b1 will encourage the parent to increase the level of n
∗ at
a one-to-one rate, so long as b1 remains lower than δb2 − C(b1−βδb2)δ . If b1
becomes equal to or greater than δb2 − C(b1−βδb2)δ , the value of n∗ will drop
to zero.
Corollary 2.2.4. Consider game G with b1, b2 > 0 and n∗ assigned on
action F . The relationship between n∗ and b2 is non-monotonic. That is,
∃ b¯2 : n∗bˆ2 = 0 ∀ bˆ2 ≤ b¯2, n
∗
b˜2
> n∗
b˘2
∀ b¯2 < b˜2 < b˘2. In particular, an
increase in b2 past
1
δ
(
b1 +
C(b1−βδb2)
δ
)
will encourage the parent to decrease
n∗ at a rate lower than one-to-one (equal to βδ), unless n∗ is already equal
to zero. For b2 values lower than or equal to
1
δ
(
b1 +
C(b1−βδb2)
δ
)
, n∗ will be
equal to zero.
An increase in b1 implies that the temptation to behave extravagantly
is now higher for the youngster. Therefore, if the parent still thinks that
such behaviour is non-optimal, she will need to invest in a higher level of
moral indoctrination to prevent it. As b1 increases, there comes a point
where such an investment is sub-optimal from the parent’s point of view:
What the youngster gains by behaving frugally is not enough to justify
the cost of the moral education necessary to induce him to do so. From
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0b1 = βδb2
δb2 − b1 = C(b1−βδb2)δ
∂n∗
∂b1
given b2
b1
n∗
(a) Relationship between n∗ and b1
given b2 and C(n): so long as there is
conflict of preferences between P and
Y and the cost of indoctrination is suf-
ficiently low, morality gets stronger as
temptation increases.
0
δb2 − b1 = C(b1−βδb2)δ
βδb2 = b1
∂n∗
∂b2
given b1
b2
n∗
(b) Relationship between n∗ and b2
given b1 and C(n): given that there is
conflict of preferences between P and
Y and the cost of indoctrination is suf-
ficiently low, morality gets weaker as
the cost of temptation increases.
that point onward, the only sensible option for the parent is to not invest
in instilling a moral value at all. Similarly, a diminishing b2 implies that
the future cost of impulsive behaviour gets lower. Therefore, the parent
needs to increase her moral investment to ensure that the youngster will
remain prudent. As b2 keeps dwindling, however, there comes a point where
the material benefit of prudence does not cover the cost of her investment.
From that point onward, further reductions in b2 will be accompanied by an
equilibrium level of morality equal to zero. Figures 2.4a and 2.4b illustrate
these two cases.
We can describe the variations in n∗, the optimum level of morality,
as responding to variations in the parent’s total utility. Recall that her
utility depends on hers and the youngster’s joint material payoff. This, in
turn, is determined by her decision on n and the youngster’s choice between
actions F and B. Based on our previous analysis, the optimal value for n
will be either equal to zero or such that will render the youngster exactly
indifferent between F and B. This is true for any pair of values, b1 and b2,
preference parameters, δ and β, and linear cost function, C(n). We can,
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thus, describe the equilibrium level of morality, n∗, as a function of the
difference in P ’s utility between the following two combinations of choices:
dUP ≡ UP (n¯, F )− UP (0, B) = δb2 − b1 − C(n¯)
δ
, n¯ > 0 (2.2.3.1)
0
βδb2 = b1
δb2 − b1 = C(b1−βδb2)δ
dUP
n∗
Figure 2.5: Relationship between n∗ and dUP : morality is at its highest
when financial prudence (minus the cost of instilling it) is only marginally
more beneficial than improvidence.
Figure 2.5 illustrates how changes in dUP affect the optimal level of
morality, n∗. It is worth noting that moral indoctrination attains its highest
levels in our framework for dUP values close to zero. This is true when the
total cost from action B from the parent’s point of view is only marginally
higher than the cost of the moral education necessary to avert it. In other
words, a relatively high degree of morality is needed when action B is
sub-optimal, but only just so.
To clarify this point, consider again our working example. Our frame-
work implies that, given the cost of moral education, for the parent to be
willing to invest a lot in it, the return to frugality should be only slightly
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higher than the return to extravagance. It is in this case that temptation to
overspend and, thus, the need for strict moral discipline is at its highest. In-
tuitively, given the youngster’s degree of impatience, when the difference in
returns is sizeable, little self-control is needed to refrain from overspending.
As this difference shrinks, the youngster has to exercise progressively more
self-discipline to ignore his impulse. This requires a stronger commitment
to his moral position.
We now turn to examine the case where the parent does not know b2
ex ante, only that it follows a certain distribution, F(b2).
2.2.4 Probabilistic future cost
In this sub-section we allow for some information asymmetry to arise over
the value of b2, the future consequence of action B. Specifically, the parent
is now unaware of the actual value of b2 when she makes her decision. She
only knows that it follows a specific distribution, with a positive mean and
a certain variance. The youngster, on the other hand, knows its exact
value when he makes his choice. Suppose that b2 is normally distributed
in R+ and let F(b¯2, σ2) be the cumulative distribution function, with the
corresponding probability-density function represented by f(b2). Then, the
timeline of the events is akin to that in Figure 2.6.
This new structure enhances the generality of our results. To see this,
note that our framework accommodates cases where b2 is ex ante definite
as instances where σ2 = 0. In addition, we view it as intuitively plausible.
Indeed, the parent can be fairly certain about the degree of gratification the
youngster can expect instantaneously upon making a decision. However,
future consequences related to that decision are inherently compromised
by environmental volatility - changes in exogenous factors the parent may
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t = 0:
t = 1:
t = 2:
b2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ2)
P makes her choice.
b2 is realised.
Y observes b2 and P ’s choice and makes his own.
The short-term outcome of Y ’s choice is realised.
The long-term outcome of Y ’s choice is realised.
Figure 2.6: Timeline of events - b2 uncertain at t = 0
not even be aware of, let alone able to influence. In this sense, the young-
ster has an informational advantage simply by being closer to these future
consequences. In the context of our working example, the parent may well
be aware in period 0 of the amount of wealth the youngster will have at his
disposal in period 1. However, she is unlikely to be aware of the interest
rate that may accrue on the youngster’s savings. Thus, the material payoff
of the youngster will feature in her utility in expected terms.
UP =

∫∞
0
(b1 − δb2)f(b2)db2 − C(n)δ if αY = B
0− C(n)
δ
if αY = F
(2.2.4.1)
The youngster, on the other hand, will be offered a specific interest rate
before he makes his decision. Therefore, the parent’s information problem
is irrelevant to him. That is, his utility is still represented by equation
2.2.1.1. Taking equations 2.2.4.1 and 2.2.1.1 into account, the parent’s
problem can be stated as follows.
max
n
UP = piY − C(n)
δ
=
∫ b1−n
βδ
0
(b1 − δb2)f(b2)db2 − C(n)
δ
(2.2.4.2)
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Here, piY = piY1 + pi
Y
2 is the youngster’s total material payoff across
periods 1 and 2. The particular functional form of the distribution of b2 may
imply more than one local maxima for 2.2.4.2. To maintain simplicity, we
impose two technical assumptions, which jointly ensure that the maximum
is unique.
Assumption 2.2.5. Given game G, let f(.) denote the density function
according to which b2 is distributed. Then, f(.) is quasi-concave in b2.
Assumption 2.2.6. In any game G, β2δC ′(0) < [(1− β)b1]f( b1βδ ).
Assumption 2.2.5 implies that the marginal gain from n will not in-
crease again once it has started decreasing. Given that C(.) is increasing
in n, a unique maximum point is implied. Assumption 2.2.6 precludes the
possibility of a minimum. This would be possible if, for example, for n
sufficiently small, the cost of increasing it surpassed its additional benefit.
Assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 together ensure that P ’s problem attains a
unique optimum solution, which confers the maximum return to n.
Assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 are rather restrictive, but their purpose
is to maintain the analysis simple. Note that the set of values for b2 that
are relevant to P ’s problem is bounded: ( b1
δ
, b1
βδ
). Thus, a solution would
be attainable even with a different functional form for f(.). The additional
complication would be a comparison across all local maxima to determine
the global one(s). Moreover, the same would be true even in the presence
of local minima. We simply chose to sidestep these additional complexities,
in order to refrain from further obscuring our analysis.
Bearing the above in mind, we can now proceed to characterise the so-
lution to P ’s problem in the face of uncertainty. Proposition 2.2.7 presents
this result.
Proposition 2.2.7. Consider game G with f(b2) and C(n) in line with
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assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6. Then, the optimal n satisfies:
n∗ = (1− β)b1 − β
2
f( b1−n
∗
βδ
)
C
′
(n∗) (2.2.4.3)
The proof can be found in section A.1 of the appendix. The result is, by
construction, consistent with the analytical perspective of methodological
individualism: n will be assigned a positive value only if it is instrumental
to the achievement of P ’s goal, and only to the extent that it has a higher
rate of return compared to its cost. We, thus, see that the instrumental
character of morality does not change when uncertainty is introduced. The
solution to P ’s problem is qualitatively similar to the one in our baseline
version.
What about the youngster’s decision? In our baseline scenario the
value of n∗ would be such, that he would always be exactly indifferent
between actions B and F , and would eventually choose F in line with the
parent’s preference.12 In this new scenario, however, it is possible that the
youngster’s choice will not reflect the parent’s preference, even given her
investment in n.The reason is that the actual realisation of b2 may be so
low, that he may find it profitable to choose action B even after he has
considered his moral attachment to action F . Figure 2.7 illustrates such a
scenario.
To motivate this situation, we turn again to our working example.
When the parent invests in moral instilling the future return to savings
(the opportunity cost of lavish behaviour) is not necessarily known. Indeed,
12The same would be true in expected terms, if the cost of action B was uncertain
for both players. So long as P and Y had the same distribution of b2 in mind, Y ’s
choice would be anticipated by P : They would both form the same expectation about
b2. Thus, even if the actual value of b2 eventually proved to be different than what they
had expected, their choices would coincide.
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0Parent
prefers action B
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action B
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action F
Parent
prefers action F
Youngster
chooses action F
f(b2)
b1
δ
b1
βδ
b¯2
b1−n∗
βδ
b2
Figure 2.7: Misalignment of preferences Player P has optimally assigned
n∗ on action F knowing that b2 is drawn from F(b2), but the realised
value, b¯2, induces Y to opt for action B. The shaded area is the cumulative
probability of all such b2 values.
in forming a prediction on what the interest rate on savings will be when
the time comes for the youngster to make his choice, the parent may only
be able to observe past interest rates. In the next period, however, when
the youngster is called to decide, he will be given a definite one-period
interest rate. As a result, he will know precisely what the opportunity
cost of overspending is. That interest rate may indeed be drawn from the
distribution that the parent had in mind. However, this does not preclude
the possibility that its value will be too low to induce the youngster to be
frugal, even given his moral commitment.
Given that the possibility is now open for the youngster’s choice to
be different than what the parent would want, we can also assess how the
probability of this scenario varies with b1 and the distribution of b2. To do
so, we need to formally distinguish between cases where the choice of Y
agrees with P ’s preference and cases where the two differ.
Definition 2.2.2 (Compliance). The degree of conformity following P ’s
choice of nˆ∗ is the cumulative probability that Y ’s choice will agree with
P ’s preference given nˆ∗.
Using definitions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we now turn to examine how morality
and compliance are affected by changes in b1 and F(b2).
Corollary 2.2.8. Consider game G satisfying assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6.
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An increase in the value of b1, from b¯1 to bˆ1 may lead to a higher n
∗, so
long as assumption 2.2.6 remains satisfied. However, compliance may be
lower as a result of the increase in b1.
Proof. See section A.2 in the Appendices.
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
bˆ1−nˆ∗
βδ
b¯1
δ
b¯1
βδ
bˆ1
δ
bˆ1
βδ
b2
Figure 2.8: bˆ1 > b¯1: The immediate consequence from option B is rela-
tively larger and so is the level of n∗. If the mass of additional b2 values
that fall to the left of the first cut-off point as a result of the change is suf-
ficiently small, then the total proportion of b2 values for which Y ’s choice
will conform with P ’s preference will be lower.
Corollary 2.2.8 points out that there is potential for moral reinforce-
ment in the face of increased temptation. Suppose that b1 increases. This
implies that both players will be more inclined to opt for action B than be-
fore. However, the discrepancy between their preferences increases. To see
this, notice that the youngster’s switching threshold changes by a greater
margin than the parent’s one does. Therefore, the range of b2 values for
which their preferences are conflicting is now larger. As a result, if the
parent still prefers action F , then the previous level of n∗ is no longer op-
timal. In particular, the increase in b1 induces her to increase n, in order
to account for the additional appeal of action B relative to action F .
It is important to bear in mind that in adjusting n∗ to account for the
change, the parent is interested in its marginal benefit, not what she gets
out of it on average. It may well be the case that on average the youngster
will choose action B, contrary to the parent’s preference. However, it may
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still make sense for her to invest in instilling some degree of morality, so
long as what she gets from doing so (in expected terms) is more than what
she spends.
Figure 2.8 illustrates this situation, given a linear cost function and
a normal distribution for b2. In this scenario, an increase in b1 results in
a higher n∗, although compliance is lower under the new level of moral-
ity. In the context of our example, a relatively higher benefit from lavish
behaviour13 may result in stricter indoctrination about the moral value of
frugality, despite the fact that the youngster is more likely to make the
‘morally wrong’ choice.
Additionally, the positive relation between b1 and n
∗ implies that a
decrease in the youngster’s temptation will likely be followed by a reduction
in the level of morality. Intuitively, the decrease in b1 makes option B less
appealing and, therefore, encourages the parent to reduce the level of moral
education, so as to lower its cost. We, thus, observe a trade-off between
the exogenous incentive to opt for the option that the parent favours and
the endogenous deep preference she instils herself.
Corollary 2.2.9. Consider game G satisfying assumptions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6.
A parallel rightward shift of F(b2), which increases E[b2] from b¯2 to bˆ2,
where b1
δ
< b¯2 < bˆ2, may induce player P to invest less in morality. How-
ever, such a shift will always result in greater compliance.
Proof. See section A.2 in the Appendices.
An increase in the magnitude of the expected future consequence can
lead to a lower level of moral preference. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. As the increase in E[b2] renders option B less attractive,
13This can occur, for example, through a drop in the level of prices in period 1.
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the parent will eventually be discouraged from investing in n. The reason is
that the instrumentality of the moral preference dwindles. As the youngster
becomes more likely to avoid B anyway, investing in n and assuming the
cost of doing so gets progressively counter-productive.
b¯2 bˆ2
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
b¯1−nˆ∗
βδ
b¯1
δ
b¯1
βδ
b2
Figure 2.9: bˆ2 > b¯2: The expected future consequence is larger, the level
of n∗ is lower, and the probability of compliance is higher.
Thus, the increase in E[b2] may be partially crowded out by the de-
crease in the incentive to instil a given level of n. The same trade-off ensues
between the youngster’s extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to act in a par-
ticular way. In the face of higher exogenous motivation, his esoteric desire
to uphold certain values dwindles, because it is no longer relevant.
It is worth noting that this is also true when the magnitude of the
expected future consequence goes towards the opposite direction. The rea-
soning is the same as before. A reduction in E[b2] may induce the parent to
compensate by increasing n. However, successive reductions will eventually
discourage her from increasing n, as the preference discrepancy becomes
progressively less relevant.
In line with the previous arguments, the youngster’s degree of com-
pliance with the parent’s preference depends on the initial distribution of
b2. If E[b2] >
b¯1
δ
in the first place, then any subsequent increase will lead
to higher compliance. Figure 2.9 presents a situation where a higher E[b2]
results in both a lower n∗ and a higher degree of compliance.
Notice that the crowding out of the moral value by the material benefit
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is always accompanied by enhanced compliance. To see why, consider a
situation where the expected cost of lavish behaviour is such, that the
parent should optimally assign n∗ > 0 to action F . If E[b2] increases, then
the parent will only settle for a lower level of morality if it confers a greater
return that the previous one. Investing in moral education is not more
expensive than it was before. If anything, she could still invest in it to
the extent she did before. If she chooses to undercut her investment, it is
because this is the optimal response: she gets a higher return even with a
lower degree of morality.
Notice that Corollary 2.2.9 describes a variance-preserving switch.
That is, it refers to a shift in the distribution of b2 to a higher expected
value, but with the same degree of uncertainty. This is important for our
analysis, as our conclusion that the increase in E[b2] always results in an
increased degree of compliance does not necessarily hold if we allow for si-
multaneous changes in its variance. To see this, consider a situation where
an exogenous shift affects both b¯2 and σ
2. Since n∗ is affected by both, the
effects of this change may actually counteract each other. We explore this
possibility in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.2.10. Consider game G satisfying assumptions 2.2.5 and
2.2.6. Suppose that an exogenous shock changes the distribution of b2 to one
that has a higher mean and a higher variance. In other words, it increases
both the expected value of b2 and its degree of dispersion. Suck a shock
may induce player P to invest less in morality and may also lead to lower
compliance.
Proof. See section A.3 in the Appendices for a proof by example.
Proposition 2.2.10 highlights the potential conflict between two effects
that result from the distributional change. One of these effects comes as a
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b¯1−nˆ∗
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Figure 2.10: bˆ2 > b¯2, σˆ
2 > σ¯2: The expected future consequence is larger
and more uncertain. The level of n∗ and the degree of compliance are both
lower.
result of the higher expected future consequence. The other follows from
the increased uncertainty about that consequence. The net effect on n∗
and the degree of compliance can be surprising.
As it has already been argued (see corollary 2.2.9), an increase in E[b2]
may reduce the parent’s incentive to invest in n, thus resulting in a lower
level of morality in equilibrium. However, the parent’s incentive is crowded
out due to the fact that given the new E[b2] even a lower n makes the
youngster more likely to comply. Thus, the increase in E[b2] (given b1)
leads to a higher degree of compliance.
The increase in σ2, on the other hand, may induce n to fall even further.
The reason is that as the future consequence becomes more volatile, the
marginal return that the parent receives by increasing n gets progressively
lower. Intuitively, the increased uncertainty implies that the most likely b2
values are now less probable. As a result, it becomes difficult for the parent
to pinpoint a level for n that is highly likely to be optimal.14 Given that
the cost of providing n has not changed, the parent may find it better to
reduce n in the face of the increased uncertainty.
The final outcome may, thus, resemble the one illustrated in Figure
2.10. This is a case where a shift towards a higher but more volatile E[b2] re-
14Recall that the optimal level of n would render the youngster exactly indifferent
between options B and F .
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sults in a reduced probability of the youngster choosing in accordance with
the parent’s preference. Consequently, apart from crowding out ‘morality’,
as captured by n, the change also renders the youngster more susceptible
to present bias. This result is all the more striking when considered in
light of the intuition that a higher E[b2] on its own would have the exact
opposite effect.
We have thus far examined the changes in n∗ and the degree of compli-
ance induced by changes in b1 and the distribution of b2. As a final remark,
we note that n∗ varies monotonically with C
′
(.), to which it is inversely
related. That is, other things being equal, an increase in the marginal cost
of instilling morality always leads to a lower level of moral indoctrination
and vice versa. In particular, there is no crowding-out related to the par-
ent’s incentives: a reduction in C
′
(n) will render her unambiguously more
willing to provide a higher n∗. The same is true with respect to compliance.
2.3 Discussion
2.3.1 Policy implications
We now turn to examine some consequences of our analysis for the design
of public policy. Our aim is to demonstrate that, owing to the strategic
interplay analysed in section 2.2, the results of policy measures may be
very different from those originally expected. To do so, we use examples of
policies that may prove inefficient, given the policymaker’s stated goals.
Consider, thus, a policy aimed at encouraging more people to save
some of their income, e.g. an increase in the interest rate, taking effect at
t = 1. Such a policy will have an effect on the amount of period-2 con-
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sumption one has to forfeit in order spend more money in period 1. In the
context of our model, it amounts to an exogenous increase in E[b2]. Should
we expect that this policy will be successful, and to what extent? One fac-
tor that may limit the policy’s effectiveness is the change in the culture of
parsimony that its announcement initiates. As corollary 2.2.9 points out,
a greater E[b2] may induce parents to invest less in instilling an intrinsic
value for behaving frugally. Thus, even in the absence of additional effects
stemming from the announcement of the policy, the resulting increase in
the proportion of savers may not be as high as initially expected.
Suppose, now, that the government aims to discourage tax avoidance
while in the midst of an austerity programme. To do so, it imposes stronger
sanctions to perpetrators. However, owing to the need for austerity, it is
also required to cut back on audits. What does the resulting situation look
like? The announcement of stricter penalties (higher E[b2]) is set to increase
compliance, although it is also expected to discourage a culture of duty to
pay one’s taxes (lower n). The reduction in oversight, however, results in
these penalties being more unlikely than before. As a result, it mitigates
both moral education and compliance. Proposition 2.2.10 suggests that the
resulting effect on taxes may well be negative.
Lastly, consider a policy that aims to reduce carbon emissions. One
way of doing so would be to collect research on the adverse consequences
for the environment and, thus, the society’s future prospects. Then, this re-
search would be disseminated, perhaps in the form of short advertisements,
in a bid to increase environmental awareness among the population. Our
analysis shows that there may be a caveat in this reasoning. Specifically, if
the research appears inconclusive, so that many possible future scenarios
seem likely but none is deemed particularly probable, the policy may back-
fire. Furthermore, as proposition 2.2.10 points out, this can be true even if
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the additional information results in the situation appearing more dire on
average. Thus, our framework suggests that caution must be exercised in
the release of information as part of a policy measure.
The three examples outlined above highlight the tradeoff between peo-
ple’s (exogenous) material incentives and their (endogenous) intrinsic moti-
vation. By providing extrinsic incentives, public policies may end up crowd-
ing out private moral indoctrination. In doing so, they are compromising,
at least partly, their own effects. Our analysis indicates that caution needs
to be exercised when assessing the potential effects of a proposed policy
measure.
2.3.2 Extensions
In this sub-section we explore some elements of our framework that give
rise to additional features of interest. To start with, notice that although
we focused on situations with b1 > 0 throughout section 2.2, our results
hold more generally. In particular, even with b1 < 0 the same incentive
structure emerges, with the sole difference that n ∈ [0, |(1 − β)b1)| now
needs to be assigned to action B (instead of F ). To see this, recall that
the payoff from action F in each period t = 1, 2 is normalised to zero.
Consider, then, the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.1. Consider game G with b¯1 > 0, b¯2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ¯2), and n¯∗
assigned on action F . Let f(.) denote the probability density function of
distribution F(.). Suppose that b¯1 is replaced with −b¯1 and b¯2 with −b¯2.
Then, P assigns n¯ on action B in equilibrium and the degree of compliance
is the same as before.
Proof. Action B is compared to action F , the payoffs of which have been
normalised to zero. Notice that −b¯1 is symmetric to b¯1 about zero. Thus,
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the absolute magnitude of the difference in payoffs between action B and
action F is preserved. Owing to the change in the signs of b1 and E[b2], the
preferences of the players are reversed. Now, P would prefer Y to choose
B for a larger set of realisations of b2 than what Y is willing to accept.
Formally, P favours action B for every |b2| value higher than | b1δ |, while Y
only chooses B if |b2| ≥ | b1βδ |. Note that f(.) has not changed. To account,
then, for this discrepancy, P optimally assigns n¯ to action B, so as to
induce Y to chose B for |b2| ≥ | b¯1−n¯∗βδ |. Given f(.), the share of b2 values for
which Y ’s choice complies with P ’s preference is the same as before.
Intuitively, the change resulted in action B yielding an immediate
cost and a future benefit. Owing to his presently biased preferences, the
youngster discounts the future benefit more than the parent does. For this
reason, there are some values of b2 for which the youngster will choose F ,
while the parent would prefer him to choose B. This is why it now makes
sense for P to attach n on action B. Since the distribution of b2 and the
cost function of n have not changed, the change in the signs of b1 and b2
brings about a symmetrically opposite situation. Therefore, in equilibrium
the parent will attach n = n¯ on action B and the youngster will adhere to
the parent’s preference with the same probability as before the change.
So far we have analysed preferences for actions within a parent-youngster
framework. We can also evaluate the scope for such preferences under a
different perspective, namely that of the intertemporal self. To that end,
consider a game G that is being played among the various instances of the
same person, acting at different points in time. Then, our analysis focuses
on the action of her self at t = 0 and the choice of her self at t = 1. Sup-
pose that this person is initially characterised solely by preferences over
outcomes and that she also exhibits present bias. Suppose, further, in line
with our previous set-up, that while she knows about her bias, she cannot
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eliminate it per se. Then, in trying to maximise her intertemporal utility,
she would optimally set n ∈ [0, |(1− β)b1|).
How can such a result be interpreted? From the point of view of
the self at t = 0 it is (weakly) optimal to commit to preferring an action
over another. She knows that if she is equipped only with materialistic
preferences, then it is probable that in the face of temptation she will make
an ill-preferred choice. To reduce this probability, she may want to commit
to a particular code of conduct, so as to enhance the appeal of the other
option.
An appealing feature of this account of preference formation is its
general applicability. Note that the aforementioned code of conduct can
be grounded on various premises, such as moral principles, social norms,
reputation, and habitual or conventional decision-making. All such con-
cerns can be seen to be instrumental from a purely materialist viewpoint.
Thus, such preferences can also emerge through an evolutionary process,
assuming that present bias is also at play (through a reasoning similar to
Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006).
Finally, notice that present bias is essential for the intertemporal-self
interpretation of our model. In the parent-youngster set-up it is not neces-
sary that the latter suffers from present bias, only that his discount factor is
different than that of the former. In the intertemporal-self version the self
is the same across the different periods and has, thus, a single discount fac-
tor. Present bias allows us to create the internal conflict that corresponds
to two agents exhibiting different preferences.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
We propose a game-theoretic model of moral preferences, where parental
indoctrination is optimally counterbalancing presently biased preferences.
We build on the idea that preferences are, to a certain extent, malleable. We
then investigate the relationship between material incentives and intrinsic
motivation. Our analysis indicates that the relationship between the two is
non-monotonic. Our results are especially relevant in the domain of policy
analysis.
The theory presented here describes how the instilling of an intrinsic
value can be optimal from a materially rational perspective. We depict the
dialectics between parameter variations and individual incentives and show
how the effects of the former can sometimes crowd out the latter. These
effects are important, both with respect to cultural transmission and the
exercise of self-control. The effectiveness of a policy is demonstrated to
depend, at least to some extent, on it providing the right incentives to the
agents.
The paper does not consider the intergenerational dynamics that en-
sue in such a context. This is a fascinating research question in its own
right. Here, instead, we propose two main arguments: that preferences for
actions can be rationally instilled and that preference formation should be
taken into account when considering the effects of changes in the underlying
economic environment.
45
2.5 References
Acemoglu, D. and Jackson, M. O. (2011). History, expectations, and leader-
ship in the evolution of social norms. Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Adriani, F. and Sonderegger, S. (2009). Why do parents socialize their
children to behave pro-socially? an information-based theory. Journal
of Public Economics, 93:1119–1124.
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness
and impulse control. Psychological Bulletin, 82:463–496.
Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics: The strategic interaction of successive
motivational states within the person. Cambridge University Press.
Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., and Shleifer, A. (2011). Teaching practices and social
capital. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Alger, I. and Weibull, J. W. (2012). A generalisation of hamilton’s rule:
Love others how much? Journal of Theoretical Biology, 299:42–54.
Alger, I. and Weilbull, J. W. (2013). Homo moralis - preference evolution
under incomplete information and assortative matching. Econometrica,
81:2269–2302.
Andreoni, J. and Bernheim, B. D. (2009). Social image and the 50-50 norm:
A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. Economet-
rica, 77(5):1607–1636.
Arrow, K. J. (1994). Methodological individualism and social knowledge.
The American Economic Review, 84:1–9.
Becker, G. S. (1976). Altruism, egoism, and genetic fitness: Economics and
sociobiology. Journal of Economic Literature, 14(3):817–826.
46
Becker, L. C. (1999). Crimes against autonomy: Gerald dworkin on the
enforcement of morality. William and Mary Law Review, 40:959–973.
Be´nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2002). Self-confidence and personal motivation.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):871–915.
Be´nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The
Review of Economic Studies, 70(3):489–520.
Bendor, J. and Swistak, P. (2001). The evolution of norms. American
Journal of Sociology, 106(6):1493–1545.
Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., and Schotter, A. (2010). Present-bias, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs. Games and Economic Behavior,
69:205–223.
Bernheim, B. D. (1994). A theory of conformity. Journal of Political
Economy, 102(5):841–877.
Bernheim, B. D., Shleifer, A., and Summers, L. H. (1985). The strategic
bequest motive. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6):1045–1076.
Bhatt, V. and Ogaki, M. (2012). Tough love and intergenerational altruism.
International Economic Review, 53(3):791–814.
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics
of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Bicchieri, C. (2010). Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior. Politics
Philosophy Economics, 9:297–313.
Bicchieri, C. and Xiao, E. (2009). Do the right thing: But only if others
do so. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22:191–208.
Binmore, K. (1987). Modeling rational players: Part i. Economics and
Philosophy, 3:179 – 214.
47
Binmore, K. (1988). Modeling rational players: Part ii. Economics and
Philosophy, 4:9–55.
Binmore, K. (2010). Social norms or social preferences? Mind, 9:139–157.
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001a). The economics of cultural transmission
and the dynamics of preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97:298–
319.
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001b). The economics of cultural transmission
and the dynamics of preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97:298–
319.
Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., and Huck, S. (2001). More order with less law: On
contract enforcement, trust, and crowding. American Political Science
Review, 95(1):131–144.
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of
markets and other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 36(1):75–111.
Cosconati, M. (2009). Parenting style and the development of human cap-
ital in children. Job Market Paper, University of Pennsylvania, -:–.
Deci, E. L. and Koestner, R. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experi-
ments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.
Psychological Bulletin, 125(6):627–668.
Doepke, M. and Zilibotti, F. (2007). Occupational choice and the spirit of
capitalism. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Doepke, M. and Zilibotti, F. (2012). Parenting with style: Altruism and pa-
ternalism in intergenerational preference transmission. Technical report,
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit.
48
Dufwenberg, M. and Gu¨th, W. (1999). Indirect evolution vs. strategic
delegation: a comparison of two approaches to explaining economic in-
stitutions. European Journal of Political Economy, 15:281–295.
Ellickson, R. C. (1998). Law and economics discovers social norms. The
Journal of Legal Studies, 27:537–552.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 75(4):643–669.
Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory. The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 3(4):99–117.
Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and
Economic Behavior, 54:293–315.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2004). Social norms and human cooperation.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8:185–190.
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. K. (2006). A dual-self model of impulse
control. The American Economic Review, Vol. 96(5):1449–1476.
Ga¨chter, S. and Falk, A. (2002). Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences
for the labour relation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104:1–26.
Gershoff, E. T. (2002). Corporal punishment by parents and associated
child behaviors and experiences: A meta-analytic and theoretical review.
Psychological Bulletin, 128(4):539–579.
Gintis, H. (2009). The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification
of the behavioral sciences. Princeton University Press.
Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. (2001). Temptation and self-control. Econo-
metrica, 69(6):1403–1435.
49
H. Wold, G. L. S. S. and Savage, L. J. (1952). Ordinal preferences or
cardinal utility? Econometrica, 20(4):661–664.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964a). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. i.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7:1–16.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964b). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. ii.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7:17–52.
Heckman, J. J., Stixrud, J., and Urzua, S. (2006). The effects of cognitive
and noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and social behavior.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Herold, F. (2012). Carrot or stick? the evolution of reciprocal preferences
in a haystack model. The American Economic Review, 102(2):914–40.
Hobbes, T. (1949). De cive (the citizen)[1651]. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Hoffman, M. L. (1975). Moral internalization, parental power, and the
nature of parent-child interaction. Developmental Psychology, 11(2):228–
239.
Hollis, M. and Sugden, R. (1993). Rationality in action. Mind, 102(405):1–
35.
Hudson, J. L. and Rapee, R. M. (2001). Parent-child interactions and anx-
iety disorders: an observational study. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
39:1411–1427.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(2):443–477.
Lepper, M. R. and Cordova, D. I. (1992). A desire to be taught: Instruc-
tional consequences of intrinsic motivation. Motivation and Emotion,
16(3):187–208.
50
Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Blackwell Pub-
lishers, 2002 edition.
Lindbeck, A. and Nyberg, S. (2006). Raising children to work hard: Al-
truism, work norms, and social insurance. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(4):1473–1503.
Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J. W. (1986). Intergenerational aspects of public
transfers, borrowing and debt. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
pages 239–267.
Lizzeri, A. and Siniscalchi, M. (2006). Parental guidance and supervised
learning. Technical report, Discussion paper//Center for Mathematical
Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior.
Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(3):272–292.
McKelvey, R. D. and Parlfrey, T. R. (1992). An experimental study of the
centipede game. Econometrica, 60(4):803–836.
Meier, S. and Sprenger, C. (2010). Present-biased preferences and credit
card borrowing. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
2:193–210.
Nowak, M. and Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that
outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 364:56–
58.
O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. The American
Economic Review, 89(1):103–124.
Paternotte, C. and Grose, J. (2012). Social norms and game theory: Har-
mony or discord? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
0:1–37.
51
Pinker, S. (2003). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature.
Penguin.
Plant, E. A. and Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to
respond without prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
75(3):811–832.
Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
Ryan, R. M. and Deci, E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations:
Classic definitions and new directions. Contemporary Educational Psy-
chology, 25:54–67.
Samuelson, L. and Swinkels, J. (2006). Information, evolution and utility.
Theoretical Economics, 1:119–142.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. Courier Dover Publica-
tions, 1972 edition.
Shafer-Landau, R., editor (2013). Ethical Theory: An Anthology. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. & Blackwell Publishers Ltd, second edition.
Simon, H. A. (1976). From substantive to procedural rationality. In 25
Years of Economic Theory, pages 65–86. Springer US.
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, aﬄuence, and morality. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 1(3):229–243.
Siong, C., Brass, S. M., Heinze, H.-J., and Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Un-
conscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature
Neuroscience, 11(5):543–545.
Sobel, J. (2002). Putting altruism in context. Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, 25:275–276.
52
Stigler, G. J. and Becker, G. S. (1977). De gustibus non est disputandum.
The American Economic Review, 67(2):76–90.
Sugden, R. (1989). Spontaneous order. The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 3(4):85–97.
Sugden, R. (1993). Thinking as a team: Towards an explanation of non-
selfish behavior. Social Philosophy & Policy, 10(1):69–89.
Tabellini, G. (2008). The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123:905–950.
Wilhelm, M. O. (1996). Bequest behavior and the effect of heirs’ earn-
ings: Testing the altruistic model of bequests. The American Economic
Review, pages 874–892.
Zafirovski, M. (2003). Human rational behavior and economic rationality.
Electronic Journal of Sociology, 7:1–40.
53
Chapter 3
Consistency of pro-social
preferences - The case of
aversion to advantageous
inequality
3.1 Introduction
The experimental literature in economics abounds with studies on indi-
vidual behaviour in strategic settings. The results of those studies have
presented a strong case for the fact that people’s behaviour is not always
in line with the paradigm of the rational individual who is solely driven by
own-payoff concerns.1 Behavioural economists have engaged in various at-
tempts to change the conception of the representative economic agent, so as
to reconcile it with the experimental findings. A particularly popular class
1Fehr and Schmidt (2006), and Binmore and Shaked (2010) provide interesting
overviews and discussions on the concepts of own-payoff maximisation and selfishness.
They also analyse critically the refutations of these concepts in the experimental and
behavioural literatures.
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of such endeavours involves the concept of other-regarding preferences.
Models of other-regarding preferences do not attack the principle of
rationality, according to which an individual strives to maximise her/his
utility, but rather focus on the subjective nature of that utility. Specif-
ically, they posit that one’s preferences may well be driven by concerns
other than the maximisation of one’s personal monetary payoff. Further,
these concerns may be related to the distribution of payoffs among oneself
and other agents, or the actions required to attain those payoffs and the
underlying intentions, or both. Equality in the distribution of payoffs (e.g.
Bolton, 1991; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), reci-
procity (e.g. Rabin, 1993 ; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006), and altruism (e.g. Becker, 1976) are some examples of
models of other-regarding preferences.
The empirical validity of these accounts has been the focus of many
experimental studies. Methodologically, such studies attempt to evaluate
the performance of the models by testing their accuracy or consistency at
tracking behaviour. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) detail and review a large
body of related evidence from the experimental literature. Bruhin, Fehr,
and Schunk (2016) construct a structural model of preferences and conduct
an experiment to measure outcome- and reciprocity-based social prefer-
ences. They find that social preferences dominate in their sample and that
genuinely selfish preferences do not in fact emerge. In their study, all three
types of (endogenously emerging) preferences assign higher weights on the
payoffs of others when their own payoffs are higher than they do when their
own payoffs are lower. Additionally, they report that preferences over the
distribution of payoffs generally dominate reciprocity concerns.
A particular account of other-regarding preferences that has received
a lot of attention in the experimental literature is the model of inequality
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aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According to this, indi-
viduals are concerned not only about their own material payoffs, but also
about whether these are higher or lower than those of the people they in-
teract with. Specifically, people prefer, to some idiosyncratic extent, their
payoffs to be equal to those of others. This model is fairly straightforward
and parsimonious (preferences are expressed only over alternative outcome
distributions), while it has proved quite powerful in accounting for aggre-
gate behaviour in many classic games (see e.g. Gu¨th, Kliemt and Ockenfels,
2003; Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt, 2006).2
Blanco et al. (2011) test the model of Fehr and Schmidt through an
experiment involving four different one-shot two-player games. Each of
their subjects is called to provide a decision in each of the player-roles in
every game. They firstly elicit the subjects’ inequality-aversion parameters
by asking them to play in a modified dictator and an ultimatum game.
Specifically, they determine each subject’s values for the model parame-
ters based on the actions (s)he chose as a dictator3 and as a responder in
the ultimatum game. Subsequently, they derive the Fehr-Schmidt model’s
predictions about behaviour in the other games they deploy, based on the
elicited parameter values. Then, they use the decisions made in those
other games (the proposer in the ultimatum game, a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma, and a public-good game) to test for consistency. They find that
for the most part the model predicts fairly accurately the shares of people
that will choose the different actions (pro-social vs selfish). At the same
time, however, the model appears to have little explanatory power with
2Blanco et al. do mention that the model of Fehr and Schmidt has been shown to
fail at accounting for behaviour in some specific games (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). However, this does not change the fact that it does,
in fact, perform well in a wide variety of situations. Therefore, it is still of value to
investigate the reasons underlying its performance, so as to obtain an idea of how one
can improve upon it.
3The authors propose a modified version of the game that allows for the separation
of various parameter values - see section 3.2 for a discussion on the limitations of the
standard dictator game.
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respect to the behaviour of each single individual. They conclude that the
Fehr-Schmidt model is able to account for different behavioural motives
that are relevant to different games. On the other hand, these motives
are not necessarily correlated within each single subject and therefore the
model fails at the within-subject level.
What is of particular interest here is that the model’s failure to account
for people’s behaviour in Blanco et al. may be confounded the presence of
strategic uncertainty. By ‘strategic uncertainty’ we mean uncertainty that
is related to others’ beliefs (of any order) and actions (Morris and Shin,
2002).4 To see this, note that they elicited their parameter values in situ-
ations that do not involve strategic uncertainty.5 These elicited parameter
values, then, appeared to have no explanatory power with respect to be-
haviour in situations where such uncertainty is present. On the one hand,
this may, indeed, indicate a failure of the model to consistently account
for people’s choices. On the other hand, however, the model’s failure may
simply be a consequence of the additional uncertainty related to the other
player’s decision. In this sense, the variation in behaviour (and the conse-
quent failure of the model) may not be an issue of preferences, but rather
one related to beliefs about the other player’s actions. That is, a pattern
of choices that is interpreted as indicative of unstable preferences may in-
stead have resulted from volatile beliefs about what others think and plan
to do.6 Therefore,in such a setting any conclusions about the performance
of a model of preferences are sensitive to this confound.
Some evidence in support of this argument is provided by the study
4Bradenburger (1993) distinguishes ‘strategic’ from ‘structural’ uncertainty, the latter
referring to the fundamental causal and statistical structure of the situation at hand.
5Both a dictator and an ultimatum responder face no uncertainty with respect to
the decisions of the people they are paired with. In the dictator’s case the other person
makes no decision anyway, while in the ultimatum case the other person’s decision has
become common knowledge at the time the responder makes her/his own.
6Hofstadter’s (1985) term ‘reverberant doubt’ highlights the way in strategic uncer-
tainty expands from the slightest concern, leading to unexpected outcomes.
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of Blanco et al. itself. In particular, the single decision which the Fehr-
Schmidt model predicted well at the individual level is that of the sec-
ond mover in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, people’s
choices as second movers in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma were consis-
tent with the parameters elicited through their behaviour in the dictator
game. Thus, the model performed well at the individual level in a situa-
tion that removes strategic uncertainty, like the one used to measure the
subjects’ preferences. In addition, Yang, Onderstal, and Schram (2016)
find that the Fehr-Schmidt model performs well at the within-subject level
only if reciprocal options are unavailable. They report that the ability to
reciprocate others’ actions lowers considerably the model’s performance.
Significant choice-set effects are also being reported by He and Wu (2016),
while Dannenberg et al. (2007) also stress the importance of information
about the types of one’s co-players.
However, the performance of the model across player-roles that do not
involve strategic uncertainty has only been evaluated once, for a specific
pair of games. In this paper we expand the analysis by focusing exclu-
sively on such situations. To do so, we introduce a series of games in which
strategic uncertainty is absent from most player-roles. That is, in these
player-roles all uncertainty related to other people’s actions has been re-
solved at the time the decisions are made. Therefore, we can investigate
behavioural variations related to preferences isolated from those related to
beliefs about others’ choices.
Using an approach similar to that of Blanco et al. (2011), we con-
duct an experimental evaluation of the performance of the Fehr-Schmidt
account. Our experimental design features a number of different one-shot
pairwise interactions in which each participant is called to engage. Our aim
is to determine whether the Fehr-Schmidt model will succeed in tracking
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the behaviour of our participants across these situations.
For reasons of simplicity and clarity, we focus only on advantageous-
inequality aversion, i.e. aversion for one’s own payoff being higher than
those of others. We measure this aversion by deploying payoff structures
that imply either higher or equal payoffs to most player-roles with those of
their partners.
We deploy three different games, which are variants of the dictator,
the trust, and the lying game. The first two are akin to their traditional
versions, while in the latter an agent is asked to report a random outcome
truthfully. We describe each one in detail in section 3.3. These games share
some important qualitative characteristics. In particular, each person has
to make a distributive decision in all but one player-roles. Thus, almost all
decisions are about allocations of payoffs and are made in the absence of
strategic uncertainty. Our games differ mainly in two important ways.
The first is the process that leads a player to the position of making
a distributive choice. In the dictator game the recipient makes no decision
and, thus, has no way of influencing the dictator’s choice. In the trust game
the second mover (who effectively acts as a dictator) only gets to make a
choice if the first mover decides to trust her/him. In the lying game the
distributive decision of the single active player follows the observation of a
random draw.
The second refers to the additional motives that are relevant to each
game and is partly a consequence of the differences in process. The dictator
simply decides across various alternative payoff allocations. Thus, any
motives related to choices of the other player or exogenous outcomes are
unlikely to be relevant. In the trust game the second mover only gets to
play if the first mover trusts. Therefore, (s)he may be (partly) driven by
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an additional motive to reciprocate. In the lying game the decision maker
is asked to report truthfully an outcome of chance, so lying aversion is
likely to be relevant. In sum, each of the three games features a potentially
different motive structure.
We investigate whether and how such differences influence behaviour
in the absence of strategic uncertainty. Crucially, we can evaluate these
influences within a setting of consequentially similar decisions. Our results
suggest that the Fehr-Schmidt model fails to account for people’s behaviour.
It appears that the model’s predictions are broadly inconsistent with the
actions our subjects choose. We find, however, that the model’s failure is
not symmetric across all players. Instead, it performs considerably better
in accounting for the behaviour of people who exhibit a strong adherence
to their respective motives. These are the ones who seem solely concerned
about the maximisation of their own payoff and those who exhibit very
strong preferences for equality in payoffs. The choices of these people are
consistent with the predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model.
By contrast, people who manifest moderate aversion to payoff-inequality
do not do so consistently. Their patterns of choices also appear inconsis-
tent with a range of different pro-social motives. We therefore conclude
that there are two main ways to interpret their behaviour. The first is
that these people appear (moderately) averse to inequality, while in truth
they are driven by different motives (potentially not other-regarding). The
second is that the stability of people’s preferences depends on how strong
these preferences are. Individuals who are strongly motivated adhere to
their preferences more consistently than those who do not, irrespectively of
whether they are pro-social or entirely selfish. These two lines of reason-
ing are not mutually exclusive and bear important implications for future
research.
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3.2 Fehr-Schmidt utility
Consider an interaction among n players. The model of inequality aver-
sion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) champions the following utility
function for a representative player i:
Ui(si, s−i) = xi(si, s−i)− αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{xj(si, s−i)− xi(si, s−i), 0}−
−βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{xi(si, s−i)− xj(si, s−i), 0}
Here, si represents the strategy deployed by player i, s−i stands for the
collection of strategies of all the other players, and xk(si, s−i) denotes the
payoff accruing to player k from the strategy profile (si, s−i). Furthermore,
αi is the parameter that measures i’s aversion to disadvantageous inequal-
ity, while βi is the parameter that measures i’s aversion to advantageous
inequality. The term ‘disadvantageous inequality’ refers to situations where
player i’s payoff is lower than those of her/his counterparts. Conversely,
‘advantageous inequality’ refers to cases where player i receives a payoff
that is higher than those of the other players.
In the two-player case and focusing only on aversion to advantageous
inequality being experienced by player i, the expression above reduces to:
Ui(si, sj) = xi(si, sj)− βi max{(xi(si, sj)− xj(si, sj)), 0} (3.2.0.1)
Equation 3.2.0.1 simply states that player i receives positive utility
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from her/his own material payoff, but also suffers a utility loss equal to the
difference between her/his payoff and that of the other player weighted by
the idiosyncratic parameter βi. Note that the omission of αi from equa-
tion 3.2.0.1 is only meant to simplify the exposition given our focus on
βi and is not illustrative of any assumptions on the degree of aversion to
disadvantageous inequality experienced by the players.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) make a number of a priori assumptions re-
garding the distributions of their model’s parameters. The one that is
relevant to our investigation is that 0 ≤ βi < 1. The fact that 0 ≤ βi rules
out the possibility of an individual experiencing satisfaction from having
obtained a higher payoff than others. The restriction βi < 1 postulates
that no individual will burn part of her/his own payoff in order to reduce
payoff inequality.
Our experimental design is such, that we can obtain a measurement of
βi for each player. We compute these measurements based on our subjects’
behaviour in a modified dictator game. We then deploy two more games,
for which we form predictions about how individuals with given βi values
will behave. We evaluate the model’s performance by checking whether its
predictions are in line with people’s actual behaviour.
The game we deploy to elicit our subjects’ preferences is a variant of
the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994). As Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
pointed out, the traditional version of the game is not suitable for getting
a point prediction of the advantageous-inequality parameter. The reason
is that due to the linearity of the transfers between the dictator and the
recipient, subjects can only be categorised in two broad groups: those with
βi ≤ 0.5, who should choose to keep the whole amount to themselves, and
the ones with βi ≥ 0.5, who should choose the equal split. Such a coarse
classification of β does not allow for the formation of sufficiently detailed
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hypotheses. Therefore, the standard dictator game is unsuitable for our
analysis.
For this reason, we deploy a modified version of the game, which af-
fords us greater precision in the measurement of our subjects’ βi values.
In our variant each consecutive increase in the payoff of the recipient is
progressively more expensive for the dictator. That is, in order to increase
the recipient’s payoff further, the dictator has to sacrifice an ever-growing
amount of her/his own money. With this new payoff structure we are able
to characterise many more βi threshold values and, thus, pinpoint each
subject’s one more precisely.
To understand the mechanism of this classification, it is helpful to
consider an example based on our dictator game. In it the dictator has to
decide among ten possible allocations, ranging from the most selfish (keep
all the surplus) to the most egalitarian one (divide the surplus equally).
Again, the crucial feature of our variant is that the total surplus (the sum
of payoffs) varies across the ten actions. This allows for intermediate actions
to be optimal given certain βi values. By choosing one of the ten allocations,
the dictator expresses a weak preference for the chosen action over the rest
available. Thus, labelling xo and yo the payoffs accruing to the dictator
and the recipient respectively from action o, we can conclude the following,
regarding the immediately previous (o−1) and the immediately next (o+1)
action.7
Ui(xo)  Ui(xo−1)⇔ xo − βi(xo − yo) ≥ xo−1 − βi(xo−1 − yo−1) (3.2.0.2)
7Notice that since the actions range from the most selfish to the most egalitarian,
xo ≥ yo and, thus, max{(xa − ya), 0} = (xa − ya), ∀o.
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Ui(xo)  Ui(xo+1)⇔ xo − βi(xo − yo) ≥ xo+1 − βi(xo+1 − yo+1) (3.2.0.3)
Since βi is the same across both sides of each of the above inequalities,
3.2.0.2 and 3.2.0.3 imply, respectively, that:
βi ≥ xo−1 − xo
xo−1 + yo − xo − yo−1 (3.2.0.4)
βi ≤ xo − xo+1
xo + yo+1 − xo+1 − yo (3.2.0.5)
That is, with an appropriate payoff structure βi can be restricted
within these two bounds. Moreover, an appropriate payoff structure will
allow for this classification given any choice of the dictator. It is easy to
see that the common bound of two consecutive choices is the same, i.e. the
supremum βi corresponding to action o is the infimum βi corresponding to
action o+ 1.8 We deploy such payoff structures in our games, presented in
the following section.
3.3 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of three one-shot two-player games, a dictator, a
trust, and a lying game. The trust game is sequential and involves two
8In other words, the greatest value of βi for which player i will choose action o is the
lowest value of βi for which (s)he will choose action o+ 1.
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player-roles deciding, while in each of the dictator and the lying game only
one player-role is making a decision. We deploy a within-subject design.
That is, each subject participates in every one of our games. Furthermore,
participants are asked to provide decisions in both player-roles in every
game prior to learning their actual role (role uncertainty). Finally, in our
sequential game we use the strategy method to elicit people’s choices as
second movers.
As mentioned in section 3.2, the first game we use is a variant of the
dictator game. In designing it, we tried to remain as close to the traditional
version as possible.9 Our modified version is described in Table 3.1. It
features two players, A (the dictator) and B (the recipient).
Table 3.1
Dictator game - Payoffs and associated βi threshold values
A’s action A’s payoff B’s payoff βi-threshold
ONE £18.00 £0.00 1/10
TWO £17.80 £1.80 2/10
THREE £17.40 £3.40 3/10
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 4/10
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 5/10
SIX £15.00 £7.00 6/10
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 7/10
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 8/10
NINE £10.80 £8.80 9/10
TEN £9.00 £9.00
Table 3.1 contains all actions available to player A and the resulting
payoffs for both A and B in the first three columns. Each cell in the last
column contains the threshold parameter value of advantageous-inequality
9The modified version proposed by Blanco et al. (2011) involves each subject choosing
one in each of 21 pairs of allocations. In every pair, the left option always implies
£20.00 for the dictator and £0.00 for the recipient. The right option, on the other hand,
implies an equal payoff for both participants, ranging from £0.00 to £20.00. Their
modified game allows them to distinguish among several parameter values, because
the transfers between the dictator and the recipient are no longer linear. However, it
differs substantially in form from the standard version of the dictator game. Indeed, the
version of Blanco et al. involves an additional element of chance, that can be described as
Nature’s decision: the dictator does not know which of her/his 21 choices will eventually
be implemented.
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aversion for which a given player would be indifferent between choosing the
action on the same line and the immediately next one. Thus, for example,
the threshold value of 3/10 in the dictator game is the one for which a
dictator would be indifferent between action THREE and action FOUR.
Our variant is characterised by two appropriate modifications relative
to the standard version of the game. The first is that the ten available
actions proceed from allocating the whole of the sum to the dictator to
distributing it equally between the two players. The second is that every
additional amount transferred is more expensive for the dictator. This
feature allows us to compute meaningful threshold values for the parameter
measuring advantageous-inequality aversion, as discussed above.
It is important to note, however, that our estimates are prone to be
biased by concerns about social efficiency. To see this, notice that social
efficiency is maximised with actions FIVE and SIX, which correspond to
βi values in [0.4, 0.5] and [0.5, 0.6] respectively. The presence of concerns
about efficiency, then, will lead to overestimated βi values for subjects with
‘true’ βi lower than 0.4 and underestimated βi values for those with ‘true’
βi higher than 0.6. This confound is inevitable if linearity is broken, so
that more precise parameter thresholds can be computed. The reason is
that obtaining more than one parameter thresholds for switching from one
action to another requires each successive switch to be more expensive than
the previous one at the margin. In the context of our dictator game, this
implies that for each additional pound the recipient earns the dictator has
to part with a larger sum. Blanco et al. face the same problem in their
modification, where efficiency in the egalitarian option increases monoton-
ically across their pairs of choices. Thus, they may have ended up with
inflated estimates of all their subjects’ βi values, simply due to inequal-
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ity aversion and concerns about efficiency being mixed together.10 We do,
however, find some evidence that efficiency-related distortions are small.
We discuss this issue in the analysis of our results, in section 4.4.
Recall that we use our dictator game to estimate our subjects’ βi pa-
rameters. To evaluate consistency, we then deploy two more games, which
feature similar distributive choices. This allows us to provide a basis for
comparison with the behaviour in the dictator game, in line with our re-
search focus. Our games are such, that we can draw predictions about the
way our subjects will behave, based on our estimates of their βi parame-
ters. We then compare our predictions with their actual behaviour in each
of those games, to evaluate the performance of the Fehr-Schmidt model.
As mentioned previously, our three games share some crucial qualita-
tive characteristics. Specifically, they feature decisions that are defined over
alternative allocations of payoffs between the decision-maker and another
player. These decisions do not involve any uncertainty related to the other
player’s choices. The differences across our games are, instead, related to
the process that leads a player to make a distributive choice and the way
this choice is made. Thus, we can focus on the changes of behaviour in
response to additional other-regarding motives and procedural changes.
The second game used in our experiment is a version of the trust game
(Berg et al., 1995). This game is sequential. It is played by two agents,
X (the trustor), who moves first, and Y (the trustee), who moves second.
Crucially, the payoff structure corresponding to the choices available to
agent Y is similar to that faced by the dictator in our previous game.
Specifically, every increase in X’s payoff comes at a progressively higher
cost to Y.
10It is worth pointing out, as Blanco et al. (2011) do in footnote 20 of their paper,
that under an alternative utility specification higher concerns might instead lead to a
deflated estimate of a subject’s true βi, depending on how it compares with 0.5.
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Agent X has to decide between action IN (trust Y) and OUT (do not
trust Y). If X chooses OUT, then both agents get a payoff of £4.50. If X
chooses IN, then Y gets to choose one of four options, as outlined in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2
Trust game - Payoffs and associated βi threshold values
X’s action X’s payoff Y’s payoff βi-threshold
IN £? £? -
OUT £4.50 £4.50 -
Y’s action Y’s payoff X’s payoff βi-threshold
ONE £16.60 £1.10 2/10
TWO £15.75 £4.50 4/10
THREE £13.75 £7.50 6/10
FOUR £10.00 £10.00
Here, the computation of parameter values corresponding to the choices
of X requires additional assumptions regarding her/his expectations about
the preferences of Y. Thus, they are not unique within a give payoff struc-
ture and therefore we refrain from including them in Table 3.2. The payoff
structure following X’s choice of IN, however, is such that the actions avail-
able to Y can be classified according to threshold values similar to those of
the other two games.
It is important to notice that from the point of view of the second
mover this game is similar to the dictator game. If X chooses OUT, then
Y has no action to take anyway. If X chooses IN, on the other hand, then
a Fehr-Schmidt Y acts precisely like a dictator, as her/his concerns are
exclusively payoff-related. To the extent, however, that our participants’
concerns are not exclusively payoff-related, the different way in which the
game proceeds (relative to the dictator game) may have an influence on
their behaviour. In particular, Y here does not get to play a part, unless
X enables her/him to. Thus, upon deciding, Y knows what X has played.
68
This feature reveals intentions and allows them to play a role. For example,
Y can readily interpret a decision of X to play IN as a kind move and,
thus, may want to reciprocate. In this sense, Y’s preference for reciprocity
complements her/his aversion to advantageous inequality and may, thus,
result in a return higher than that predicted by the Fehr-Schmidt model.
Finally, our third game involves a distributive decision in a different
context. Its main difference with the dictator game is the way the decision-
maker attains each allocation. In particular, all decision-makers are asked
to report truthfully an outcome based on chance. On the other hand,
they are free to misreport, as there is no control of whether their report
is actually truthful. Their report itself is crucial, since it determines the
eventual allocation of payoffs between themselves and the persons they
are paired with. The aim here is to investigate how a change in the way
the decision is to be made (and the additional motives implied) affects
behaviour in an otherwise similar allocation problem. Due to this feature
of its allocation process, we term this the lying game.
Our lying game features two people, J (the reporter) and K (the de-
pendant). K is entirely passive in this situation. J is confronted with a
spinning wheel, divided in three sections of equal size and different colour,
namely red, blue, and green. J is asked to spin the wheel (by pressing a
‘START’ button). Upon activation, the wheel spins for a few seconds and
then stops. Subsequently, J is asked to report the outcome of the wheel-
spin, i.e. the colour the wheel has landed on. The report that J submits
determines the payoff of both J and K, according to the scheme in Table
3.3.
The basic structure of this game is similar to that of a dictator game
with a fixed initial surplus (equal to £17.00). The difference is in the
setting. Specifically, the report of J in our game is to be determined by a
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Table 3.3
Lying game - Payoffs and associated βi threshold values
J’s action J’s payoff K’s payoff βi-threshold
RED £17.00 £0.00 5/10
BLUE £8.50 £8.50
GREEN £0.00 £0.00 -
random draw. Notice that the motives of a pure Fehr-Schmidt person are
independent of the random draw. That is, such a person’s choice would
be exactly the same across all possible draws. Notice, further, that such
a person would never choose to report GREEN (hence the absence of a
relevant threshold value for the β parameter). Indeed, reporting GREEN
is dominated by at least one of the other two options for every value of
the parameter. However, again, the setting allows for a variety of other
motives to influence people’s behaviour. For example, to the extent that
our participants are concerned about reporting truthfully, we should expect
some deviation from the model’s predictions towards the actual outcomes
of the wheel-spin.
The experiment was conducted in pen-and-paper format, except for
part of the wheel-spin in the lying game, which was conducted in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). In particular, in the lying game subjects received the
instructions on paper (and also heard them aloud from the experimenter)
and also had to submit their decisions on the relevant decision sheets (i.e.
on paper). However, they had to activate and observe the spinning wheel
on their computer screens.
We chose this setup in order to address a potential issue related to our
lying game. Specifically, we wanted subjects to feel free to lie if they wanted
to, unhindered from considerations related to the possibility of them being
detected. On the other hand, we did need to know the true outcome of
the wheel-spin, as otherwise we would not be able to test for consistency.
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Thus, we wanted to downplay the notion that the experimenter would learn
the actual outcome of each wheel-spin, in addition to the corresponding
report. Therefore, we created a separation between the observation and
the reporting of the outcome in this manner. We asked the subjects to
spin the wheel on their computer screens (by pressing a start button),
observe the outcome, and then write it down on paper.
Each of the three games was presented to the subjects in a separate
section of the experimental session. At the beginning of each session the
subjects were introduced to the proceedings of the experiment. Afterwards,
the instructions for the first task (the dictator game), which had already
been distributed, were read aloud. Subsequently, decision sheets were dis-
tributed to the subjects. Each was asked to provide her/his decisions in the
role of the dictator on them and place them inside one of three envelopes
placed on their desk. Once everyone had done so, their envelopes were col-
lected and the instructions for the second task were then distributed. The
process remained the same for the following two tasks. The three tasks
were followed by a questionnaire.
The order in which the games were presented to the participants was
fixed. In every session, the Dictator Game was presented first, followed by
the Trust Game. The Lying Game was the third and last one always. We
deemed it necessary to maintain this order for two main reasons.
The first one pertains to the dictator game. Specifically, we use the
decisions made in it to locate the individual parameter values. Not only
it is the simplest one to understand, but also it provides the largest range
of actions and, thus, the finest parameter classification affordable in our
three games. For this reason, we wanted to eliminate any noise in our mea-
surements owing to them being obtained in later stages of the experiment.
This is why we opted for presenting it first to everyone.
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The second reason refers to the lying game. In particular, we did not
want any subsequent interactions, so that concerns related to further ex-
perimental stages would not prevent participants from lying if they wanted
to. Thus, we decided to present it after the other two in every session.
Each of our 178 participants played each game once and provided
decisions for all player-roles. That is, each subject provided four decisions
in total: one in the Dictator Game, two in the Trust Game (as first and
second mover), and one in the Lying Game. The participants were made
aware that they would be paired up and randomly assigned roles for a
randomly chosen game at the end of the experiment. The payoff of each
pair would be then determined by the decisions of the players in their
assigned roles. The participants received no feedback or payment until the
end of the experiment. In our games the joint payoff attainable for each
pair ranges between £17.00 and £22.00 within and across the games. Each
participant received an additional £2.00 show-up fee. Each session lasted
for approximately one hour and thirty minutes. The average payoff per
participant was about £10.50.
3.4 Results
In order to conduct our analysis, we first use the decisions made in the
dictator game to classify our participants’ βi values in their respective in-
tervals. The distribution of the βi parameter is summarised in Table 3.4.
Overall, the average βi value in our dictator game lies within the interval
[0.3, 0.5], with the median one positioned in [0.4, 0.5].
The distribution of βi values in our dictator game is quite similar
to both that of Blanco et al. and the one derived by Fehr and Schmidt
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Table 3.4
Distribution of β - Observations in our data vs Fehr-Schmidt (1999) assumptions and data in Blanco
et al.(2011)
Dictator βi intervals
Relative
βi Our data Fehr-Schmidt* Blanco et al.*frequencies
ONE βi ≤ 0.1 26% βi ≤ 0.2 30% 30% 29%TWO 0.1 ≤ βi ≤ 0.2 4%
THREE 0.2 ≤ βi ≤ 0.3 8%
0.2 ≤ βi ≤ 0.5 29% 30% 15%FOUR 0.3 ≤ βi ≤ 0.4 1%
FIVE 0.4 ≤ βi ≤ 0.5 20%
SIX 0.5 ≤ βi ≤ 0.6 19%
0.5 ≤ βi 41% 40% 56%
SEVEN 0.6 ≤ βi ≤ 0.7 6%
EIGHT 0.7 ≤ βi ≤ 0.8 6%
NINE 0.8 ≤ βi ≤ 0.9 2%
TEN 0.9 ≤ βi 8%
* Note: Recall that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Blanco et al. (2011) use 0.235 as their first threshold value
- see footnote 11 for more details.
(1999).11 This conclusion is supported by χ2 and Fisher’s exact tests.
Specifically, our data and the distribution assumed by Fehr and Schmidt ap-
pear similar at all levels of statistical significance (χ2 = 0.4409, d.f. = 2, p =
0.802; Fisher’s exact: p = 0.819). Regarding the comparison with the dis-
tribution in Blanco et al., the differences are more pronounced, but still
at most borderline significant (χ2 = 5.5289, d.f. = 2, p = 0.063; Fisher’s
exact: p = 0.062).
We deem it particularly important that our results are in agreement
with those of the other two aforementioned studies, for a number of reasons.
To start with, this comparison constitutes an instrument check. Our success
in replicating previous observations is crucial for the significance of our
analysis (see Andreoni et al., 2003). Furthermore, even though each of
the two previous studies agrees with the distribution observed in our data,
Blanco et al. report significant differences between their results and the
distribution assumed by Fehr and Schmidt. Our results lie somewhere in
11In the categorisation proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the βi threshold value
between the first and the second group is 0.235. This is also the threshold Blanco et al.
(2011) use to compare their own distribution with the Fehr-Schmidt assumptions. To
make our distributions comparable, we have to allocate our subjects who chose action
THREE in the dictator game either in the βi ≤ 0.235 or in the 0.235 ≤ βi ≤ 0.5 group.
We find that even under the most extreme allocations our distribution is statistically
similar (at least at the 5% level) to both that observed in Blanco et al. and the one
assumed by Fehr and Schmidt.
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the middle between the two. Importantly, the distributions are similar
despite the fact that our payoff structure is different from both that of a
traditional dictator game and the variant deployed by Blanco et al.
On the other hand, the distribution of βi values in our sample appears
quite dissimilar to that found by Yang et al. (2016) and the one in He and
Wu (2016). Indeed, χ2 tests on the proportions of subjects within certain
groups of parameter values indicate that our findings differ significantly,
at least at the 5% level.12 It is worth noting that both these studies use
elicitation procedures that extend the β-value space to include negative
values. Thus, the discrepancies between the distributions may be taken
as evidence of choice-set dependency. However, such inferences need to be
made cautiously: we are, after all, comparing games that differ in more
than one dimensions.
We now turn to the issue of consistency. Given our subjects’ parameter
values, it is possible to form predictions about their decisions in the other
two games. These predictions can then be compared with their actual
choices. We focus on each of the two games separately and form specific
hypotheses about people’s behaviour. We then test these hypotheses to
evaluate the explanatory power of the Fehr-Schmidt model. We conduct
non-parametric and regression analysis.
3.4.1 Consistency in the trust game
Consider the following hypothesis (payoffs accruing to each action in paren-
theses, payoff of Y first):
Hypothesis 1. Agent i as a second mover in the trust game will choose:
12Our tests return χ2 = 42.304, d.f. = 2, p = 0.000 for the comparison with Yang et
al. and χ2 = 7.4169, d.f. = 2, p = 0.025 for the comparison with He and Wu.
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Figure 3.1: 2nd-move responses and parameter values in the trust game
• Action ONE (£16.60 , £1.10), iff βi ≤ 0.2
• Action TWO (£15.75 , £4.50), iff 0.2 ≤ βi ≤ 0.4
• Action THREE (£13.75 , £7.50), iff 0.4 ≤ βi ≤ 0.6
• Action FOUR (£10.00 , £10.00), iff 0.6 ≤ βi
Our findings are summarised in Figure 3.1. The first column outlines
people’s choices, while the shares of the corresponding βi values are de-
picted in the second one. The third column presents the choices of each
β-group separately. Overall, we observe 31.5% of our participants choosing
action ONE, 23.6% choosing TWO, 23.6% choosing THREE, and 21.3%
choosing FOUR as second movers in the trust game. At the same time,
about 30% of them are characterised by βi ≤ 0.2, 9% by 0.2 ≤ βi ≤ 0.4,
39% by 0.4 ≤ βi ≤ 0.6, and 22% by 0.6 ≤ βi. Thus, there is a substantial
discrepancy between the distribution of choices expected according to the
Fehr-Schmidt model and that we actually observe. Simply put, we doc-
ument a significantly higher share of action TWO and a lower share of
action THREE than what the model has predicted. Our statistical tests
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Figure 3.2: Trust game - Propor-
tions of 2nd-mover decisions consis-
tent with model’s predictions across
all βi intervals
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and predicted probabilities of con-
sistency across all βi intervals
confirm this discrepancy. The difference between the two distributions is
statistically significant (χ2 = 18.357, d.f. = 3, p = 0.000; Fisher’s exact:
p = 0.000). Thus, the model fails to predict our subjects’ behaviour.
A feature of interest in the model’s failure is the fact that it is not
symmetric across the βi values. At a first level this is obvious in Figure
3.1. Specifically, among the people with βi values lower than 0.2 or higher
than 0.6 we observe substantially high rates of consistency with the model’s
predictions (79% and 63% respectively). By contrast, people with βi ∈
[0.2, 0.4] exhibit a consistency rate of 56%, while those with βi ∈ [0.4, 0.6]
an even lower one (45%). However, a direct comparison across those four
groups in terms of their consistency rates would be confounded by the fact
that they are asymmetric in size. That is, almost half of the parameter-
value intervals are concentrated in the same group (βi ≥ 0.5). In order to
take this into account, we proceed to a finer classification of the βi values,
namely the one afforded to us by the dictator game.
Figure 3.2 presents the proportions of consistent subjects for all dic-
tator actions. Recall that each of these ten actions is associated with a
specific β-value interval. One can easily see that the deviation rate forms
a U-shaped pattern. That is, people with very low (≤ 0.1) or very high
(≥ 0.9) degrees of aversion to advantageous inequality tend to be more con-
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sistent with their preferences than people with intermediate such concerns.
This finding is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
To test this hypothesis, we run a logistic regression. Recall that hy-
pothesis 1 outlines all patterns of choices that are consistent with the F-S
model. We consider the shares of consistent and inconsistent choices in the
trust game across all β groups (as defined in the dictator game) and try to
identify the model that provides the best fit to our data. That is, we eval-
uate the relationship between the probability of one’s trust-game choice
being inconsistent with one’s βi value and the βi value itself, through a
maximum-likelihood estimation.
Our results, presented in Figure 3.4, exhibit two main features of inter-
est. To start with, we observe a statistically significant association between
the magnitude of βi and the probability of behaving in accordance with the
F-S model. That is, the extent to which people are consistently inequality-
averse appears, indeed, related to the degree of inequality aversion they
manifest. Furthermore, a non-linear specification provides a significantly
better fit than a linear one does (χ2(1) = 16.06, p = 0.000). Thus, it turns
out that the change in the degree of consistency is not constant, but varies
with β. In addition, this variation is non-monotonic. In particular, consider
the probability that the trust-game choice will be inconsistent with the F-
S model, as estimated by the logit regression. This probability attains its
smallest values for the βi ≤ 0.1 and βi ≥ 0.9 groups and is maximised for
β ∈ [0.4, 0.6].13
Our analysis so far yields a number of conclusions. To start with, it
is clear that the F-S model leaves at least some part of the behavioural
variation unexplained, even when it performs well. This is evident by the
13The Table outlines the regression output, while the Figure depicts the estimated
relationship.
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Trust game (2nd mover) - Non-linear logistic regression of consistent behaviour on the βi groups
Dependent variable: Consistent βi
Number of obs. 178
LR χ2: 21.22
Log likelihood: -109.10215
Prob. > χ2: 0.000
Pseudo R2: 0.0886
Coeff. Std. Err. z Pr[> |z|] [95% Conf. Interval]
βi -0.954 0.222 -4.30 0.000 -1.388 -0.519
β2i 0.088 0.022 4.01 0.000 0.045 0.132
constant 2.297 0.507 4.53 0.000 1.304 3.290
The regression estimates the relationship between one’s βi value and the probability that one’s behaviour
is consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model. The quadratic term is taken as continuous.
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Trust game (2nd mover) - Predicted probabilities of consistency
Figure 3.4: Trust game - Estimated relationship between one’s βi value
and the probability that one’s decision is consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt
model
fact that all estimated probabilities of consistent decisions are significantly
different from one.14 Moreover, the performance of the model varies sig-
nificantly with the degree of advantageous-inequality aversion exhibited.
The pattern of this variation is in line with our initial hypothesis. That
is, people who exhibit very high (βi ≥ 0.9) or very low (βi ≤ 0.1) aversion
to advantageous inequality behave are indeed significantly more consis-
tent with their preferences. The variation in the degrees of consistency is
substantial and significant, as it is evident in our regression. To provide
additional support for this claim, we compare the distributions of consis-
tent/inconsistent trust-game decisions across all dictator-game choices. We
do so in a pairwise manner, using Fisher’s exact tests. Our results, which
can be found in Table 3.5, reaffirm our previous findings.
To summarise, the Fehr-Schmidt model broadly fails to account for
our subjects’ behaviour. This is primarily due to the fact that people with
intermediate βi values do not follow their preferences. That is, the model’s
performance varies with the strength of people’s aversion to payoff inequal-
ity. According to our results from the trust game, people who exhibit very
strong or very weak concerns for payoff inequality are doing so much more
consistently than people who are moderately so averse.
14This is true at least at the 5% level, see Figure 3.4.
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Table 3.5
Trust game - Statistical comparisons of differences in deviation rates across Dictator choices
ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN
ONE - 0.626 0.092 0.377 0.000 0.014 0.007 0.251 0.206 1.000
TWO - 0.656 1.000 0.018 0.438 0.335 1.000 0.576 0.574
THREE - 1.000 0.222 1.000 0.428 1.000 1.000 0.209
FOUR - 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.350
FIVE - 0.230 1.000 0.169 0.631 0.004
SIX - 0.491 0.729 1.000 0.049
SEVEN - 0.395 1.000 0.017
EIGHT - 1.000 0.350
NINE - 0.350
TEN -
Each action in the first column is compared to every action in the first row, in terms of number of
consistent and inconsistent participants. The null hypothesis is that the share of consistent participants is
the same across all actions. We test this hypothesis using Fisher’s exact tests. The p-value corresponding
to the test between the action in row i and that in column j is reported in cell cij . Darker shades
correspond to more significant differences. Thus, for example, the share of participants who are consistent
with the Fehr-Schmidt model differs significantly between actions ONE and FIVE.
How can we interpret the fact that people with moderate βi values
deviate from the model’s predictions at higher proportions? Perhaps the
most straightforward inference is that in reality the proportions of inconsis-
tent people do not really differ. Rather, it may be the case that deviations
from each prediction are randomly dispersed around that prediction. Then,
people in the middle of our βi-value space can deviate from the model’s pre-
dictions towards both directions, whereas people at the extremes can only
do so in one way. To see this, recall that there are four actions available to
the second mover in our trust game. People, then, with βi ∈ [0.2, 0.6] can
violate the model’s predictions by choosing either actions that are more
egalitarian than what the model has predicted or ones that are less so. By
contrast, people with very low (βi ≤ 0.1) or very high (βi ≥ 0.9) degrees
of aversion to inequality can only invalidate the model by changing their
behaviour in a single direction. In this sense, the pattern of deviations we
observe may simply be due to the fact that our action space is bounded.
However, our data are not in line with this interpretation. For such a
pattern to arise, people’s violations of the model’s predictions would need to
be random. What we find, instead, is that these deviations are indicative of
some patterns. In total, we observe substantially more deviations towards
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more selfish options than towards more egalitarian ones. It is true that the
deviations of people with βi ∈ [0.5, 0.6] appear randomly spread around the
mode’s prediction. However, most of the people with βi ∈ [0.4, 0.5] behaved
more selfishly than predicted. When we consider these two groups jointly,
we see that only 26% of those deviating did so towards action FOUR,
while 58% of them went for action TWO instead. Given that these two
groups together contain about 39% of our subject pool (and are by far the
most populated among the interior βi groups), we conclude that people’s
deviations from the F-S model’s predictions can not be rationalised as
randomly occurring.
Exploring the potential for different other-regarding preferences, we
argue that the observed pattern cannot be accounted for by reciprocity.
If subjects were motivated by such concerns, we should observe dispro-
portionately high frequencies of actions THREE and FOUR being chosen
relative to what the βi values suggest.
15 Instead, we find the opposite to be
the case: the highest share of inconsistent subjects is to be found among
those who should have chosen action THREE, many of whom opt for TWO
instead. That is, the pattern of inconsistencies is the opposite of what one
should expect if our subjects were reciprocal.
Remarkably, efficiency concerns do not help here either. Notice that
the most socially efficient option in our trust game is, in fact, action
THREE. Thus, efficiency concerns would result in action THREE being
chosen more frequently that expected according to the Fehr-Schmidt model.
Again, what we observe is exactly the opposite pattern. Action THREE
is in fact chosen less frequently than expected. Therefore, the pattern we
observe in our data goes directly against both reciprocity and efficiency
15These are agent Y’s actions that would endow agent X with a payoff higher than
what (s)he would have obtained had (s)he opted for OUT instead of IN in the first stage.
Thus, these are the actions that a reciprocal agent would choose in response to a kind
move by her/his partner.
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considerations.
What may be the case is that people who are classified as moderately
averse to payoff inequality are not in fact driven by such concerns. Instead,
they may be driven by a desire to maintain a certain self-image, while trying
to achieve as high a personal payoff as possible. People with such concerns
will opt for the payoff-maximising action, so long as that action is not
too ‘morally deplorable’, that is, it does not result in a too negative view
of oneself. If this is the case, then their threshold for what constitutes an
excessively deplorable action can be sensitive to many factors. For example,
the degree of ‘immorality’ they assign to a specific action may vary with
the other actions available. Additionally, their perception may be partly
shaped by the social norms that are prevalent in their environment. In
this sense, their views may be rank-dependent or socially determined (or
both). That would result, for example, in them choosing a particular payoff
allocation in one setting, but discarding a similar one in another.
At any rate, the Fehs-Schmidt model’s performance is notably better
with respect to extreme βi values. The shares of people with very weak and
very strong aversion to inequality are consistently predicted. In addition,
the behaviour of those people is consistently accounted for by the model
with a higher degree of accuracy relative to the behaviour of the moder-
ately averse ones. We therefore conclude that the model predicts well the
behaviour of some, but not all participants in our trust game.
3.4.2 Consistency in the lying game
We now turn our attention to behaviour in the lying game. We proceed
to form the following two hypotheses (payoffs accruing to each action in
parentheses, payoff of J first):
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Hypothesis 2. No player will ever report GREEN (£0.00 , £0.00), irre-
spectively of the value of her/his βi parameter.
Hypothesis 3. Irrespectively of the outcome of the wheel, player i as
individual J in the lying game will report:
• RED (£17.00 , £0.00) iff βi ≤ 0.5
• BLUE (£8.50 , £8.50) iff βi ≥ 0.5
We begin with hypothesis 2. We observe that 11.25% of our par-
ticipants reported GREEN. Thus, if we consider the model’s predictions
as deterministic, this hypothesis is confidently rejected (binomial test: p =
0.000). If, on the other hand, we allow for a probability of error in decision-
making, then the model’s prediction can be salvaged. Consider such a
trembling-hand specification, according to which individual i will choose
optimally given βi with probability p− = 1 −  and make a random er-
roneous decision with probability p = .
16 Then, the focus turns to the
magnitude of  necessary to confirm hypothesis 2. It turns out that for
our results to be rationalisable as random errors at the 10% level of signif-
icance,  would need to be at least equal to about 0.12. That is, in order
for our findings to be accountable for by this interpretation, our subjects
would have to err about 12% of the time. We view this minimum error
threshold as rather restrictive and implausible. Furthermore, the fact that
all GREEN reports were provided in cases where the true outcome of the
wheel-spin was GREEN (as we discuss below) indicates that they are not
16By random erroneous decision we mean here that the two non-optimal reports are
chosen with equal probabilities. Due to the fact that the options in the lying game
are not uniquely well-ordered, a uniformly random specification is the most reasonable
option. In addition, by restricting the random decision to the two non-optimal reports,
we provide a test that is favourable to the model: Had we allowed randomness across
all three of them, an even higher probability of error would be needed to account for the
number of GREEN reports we observe. We demonstrate that even under these more
favourable conditions  needs to be implausibly large.
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really random errors. We conclude that the model does not manage to
correctly predict the occurrences of GREEN reports.
We now proceed to test hypothesis 3. To be precise, we perform our
tests given each actual outcome of the wheel-spin separately. The reason
is that, as the hypothesis points out, the true colour the wheel has landed
on should have no effect on the report of a Fehr-Schmidt agent. Had
we tested across all wheel-spin outcomes, any effects of concerns about
truthful reporting could have been misinterpreted as evidence for inequality
aversion. By focusing on each outcome in isolation we can control for such
effects.
We refer to each actual outcome of the spinning wheel as a state, in the
sense that it is a product of chance that our participants find themselves
in. Figure 3.5 presents the distributions of responses, parameter values,
and responses conditional on parameter values within each state. We focus
first on the participants whose wheels landed on red. Among them, 64%
are characterised by βi ≤ 0.5, while 88.5% report RED. The distribution
of parameter values is significantly different from that of reports (χ2 =
10.178, d.f. = 1, p = 0.001, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.003). The same is true
for those whose wheels landed on blue. Among the people who found
themselves in that state 39.7% feature βi ≥ 0.5, while 79.4% reported
BLUE. Again, the distributions differ significantly (χ2 = 20.588, d.f. =
1, p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000). In addition, the absence of any
GREEN reports in these two states constitutes evidence against erroneous
decision-making by our subjects. Finally, looking at the subjects whose
wheels ended up on green, we observe 26% reporting RED, 37% reporting
BLUE, and 37% reporting GREEN, while exactly 50% of them exhibit
βi ≥ 0.5. We can confidently reject the hypothesis that the distributions
are similar in this state, too (χ2 = 25.164, d.f. = 2, p = 0.000, Fisher’s
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Figure 3.5: State-specific reports and parameter values in the lying game
exact: p = 0.000).
We can, thus, conclude that the Fehr-Schmidt model fails to account
for the behaviour of our subjects in the lying game. It seems that the actual
outcome of the wheel-spin exerts a strong influence on people’s behaviour.
The model appears unable to capture this influence, even when no one
reports GREEN (as is the case in states RED and BLUE). As a result, it
does not perform well in our within-state evaluations.
Given the model’s poor performance in accounting for our subjects’
choices, we examine again whether its predictive power varies across differ-
ent parameter values. To do so, we evaluate the consistency of behaviour
with the model’s predictions across the same β-groups we used for the trust
game. Thus, our results are readily comparable. Note that in state RED
we focus our attention to people with βi ≥ 0.5, as those are the ones who
would lie by reporting the Fehr-Schmidt prediction. For the same reason,
we investigate the behaviour of people with βi ≤ 0.5 in state BLUE. In
state GREEN all agents with Fehr-Schmidt type preferences would lie, so
we can use our β classification in its entirety. As before, we conduct pair-
wise comparisons and logistic regressions across our β-intervals within each
state. The estimated probabilities are reported in Table 3.6.
Starting from state RED, presented in Figure 3.5a, we find that about
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Table 3.6
Logit estimates of variation in degree of consistency with model’s predictions across
β-groups
State RED State BLUE State GREEN
Report BLUE Report RED Report RED Report BLUE
βi ≤ 0.1 - 0.496 0.774 -(0.128) (0.110)
β∈[0.1, 0.2] -
0.309 0.585
-
(0.166) (0.111)
β∈[0.2, 0.3] -
0.198 0.420
-
(0.161) (0.101)
β∈[0.3, 0.4] -
0.141 0.318
-
(0.100) (0.092)
β∈[0.4, 0.5] -
0.117 0.273
-
(0.082) (0.084)
β∈[0.5, 0.6]
0.152
- -
0.274
(0.124) (0.080)
β∈[0.6, 0.7]
0.215
- -
0.323
(0.127) (0.085)
β∈[0.7, 0.8]
0.285
- -
0.428
(0.186) (0.115)
β∈[0.8, 0.9]
0.355
- -
0.596
(0.175) (0.167)
0.9 ≤ βi 0.418 - - 0.784(0.186) (0.177)
Estimated probabilities of reports being consistent with the F-S model are reported next
to the relevant βi intervals and under their respective states (with standard errors in
parentheses). The differences among the probabilities are statistically insignificant in
states RED and BLUE. In state GREEN, on the other hand, they are highly significant
(at the 1% level).
36% of the people whose wheels landed on this colour exhibit βi ≥ 0.5.
Among them a non-negligible portion (27%) chose to report BLUE. Half of
those who did so belong in the βi ≥ 0.9 group, while the rest are uniformly
distributed across the remaining ones. We find that the probability of being
consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model is 2.75 times higher for the people
in the βi ≥ 0.9 group relative to those in the βi ∈ [0.5, 0.6] one. However,
this result is statistically insignificant, likely due to the low number of
people with such parameter values in this state and the dominance of other
concerns.17
Repeating the exercise in state BLUE, we find the same pattern, this
17Truthful reporting and self-serving bias are good candidates to be considered as
dominant concerns here.
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Figure 3.6: Lying game - Average predicted degrees of consistency across
the β groups in states RED and BLUE
time among those with βi ≤ 0.5. Figure 3.5b depicts the situation. Here we
observe about 60% of the people exhibiting βi ≤ 0.5. Of these, 29% chose
to report RED. Thus, the model failed to account for the behaviour of those
in the low-βi group, most of whom behaved in the exact opposite way. On
the other hand, people with β ≤ 0.1 appear more consistent with the Fehr-
Schmidt model than people with βi ∈ [0.4, 0.5]. The estimated probability
of being consistent with the model is 4.24 times higher for people in the
βi ≤ 0.1 relative to those in the βi ∈ [0.4, 0.5] one. However, this result is,
again, statistically insignificant.
Lastly, we turn to state GREEN, the only one in which we observe
GREEN reports. In contrast to the model’s predictions, the share of these
reports is non-negligible. Figure 3.5c summarises our results. As mentioned
before, 37% of the people in this state chose to report GREEN. The rest
are divided between another 37%, who reported BLUE, and the remaining
26%, who reported RED. With respect to their parameter values, 50% of
our subjects exhibit βi ≤ 0.5 and the other 50% feature βi ≥ 0.5. About
48% of the subjects in the βi ≤ 0.5 group opted for reporting RED. The
vast majority of these (69%) are in the βi ≤ 0.1 group. Among those
with βi ≥ 0.5 almost 44.5% reported BLUE. Interestingly, we observe a
substantially high proportion of inconsistent decisions among the people
with βi ∈ [0.5, 0.6], with only 29% of them reporting BLUE. Indicatively,
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Figure 3.7: Average predicted degrees of consistency and truthfulness in
state GREEN of the lying game
about 61% of those with βi ≥ 0.6 did the same (and thus were consistent).
In total, the people with extreme βi values are again significantly more
consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model than the moderate ones. The
highest estimated probabilities of consistent decisions correspond to those
with βi ≤ 0.1 and βi ≥ 0.9 (0.774 and 0.784, respectively). People with βi
in the [0.4, 0.6] range are again the least likely to behave consistently (with
an estimated probability equal to 0.273). This result, depicted in Figure
3.7a, is highly significant.
Overall, we find a strong propensity towards reporting truthfully. This
propensity is particularly pronounced in states RED and BLUE. In state
GREEN, predictably, truthful reports are less common, but still far from
scarce. Interestingly, preferences for truthful reporting appear to be strongest
for people with moderate βi values (in the range [0.4, 0.6]), i.e. those who
are the least consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model.18 Figure 3.7b depicts
the change in the estimated probability of reporting truthfully across the
18We observe this pattern in the GREEN state. This is the only state that allows
us to evaluate this hypothesis, as in it the two motives are always in conflict with each
other. The probability of a truthful report is estimated at 0.09 (0.26) for people with
βi ≤ 0.1 (βi ≥ 0.9) and at about 0.52 for those in the βi ∈ [0.4, 0.6] group. Additionally,
when we focus on the other two states, we see that people with higher βi values tend to
lie significantly more in the RED state and significantly less in the BLUE one. Thus, we
indeed observe the pattern of conflict between truthful reporting and inequality aversion
that we wanted to generate through this game
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different βi-value intervals we obtain from the dictator game.
So, what do our results actually mean? It appears that behaviour is
sensitive to a host of factors that the Fehr-Schmidt model cannot account
for. Blanco et al. (2011) argue that the apparent success of the model is to
be attributed to its ability to account for a variety of different behavioural
motives. This, in turn, implies that these motives are well-aligned, i.e.
they prescribe actions that yield similar payoff distributions. Indeed, when
we focus on situations where there is conflict among different motives, the
model appears unable to account for people’s behaviour in general.
In addition, concerns about efficiency do not appear to exert a signifi-
cant influence here, either. If anything, people who chose the most socially
efficient actions (FIVE and SIX) in the dictator game exhibit stronger
preferences for truthful reporting. That is, the share of subjects who re-
ported GREEN truthfully is significantly larger among those who had cho-
sen FIVE or SIX as dictators. Given that GREEN is the least efficient
option, preferences for efficiency do not appear to cause much distortion in
our measurements.
However, it is still the case that people with particularly high or low
degrees of inequality aversion are significantly more consistent with the
Fehr-Schmidt model than people with moderate such preferences. We ob-
serve a positive correlation between the degree of extremity in people’s βi
values and their rates of consistency with the model’s predictions in all
three states of our lying game. In state GREEN this correlation is highly
significant.
To summarise, our results indicate that in the lying game the state gen-
erally dominates responses. We find strong propensities towards reporting
truthfully, even when doing so is counter-efficient and detrimental for one’s
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personal payoff. Given this finding, however, we also observe that some
people remain consistent to their βi values. These people are primarily the
ones who exhibit very low (≤ 0.1) or very high (≥ 0.9) such values. This
latter result is in line with what we found to be the case in our trust game.
Thus, it lends support to the idea that the Fehr-Schmidt model performs
consistently well only for subjects with extreme βi values.
3.5 Conclusion
Our evaluation of the Fehr-Schmidt model yields two main findings. The
first is that the model appears generally unable to account for people’s
behaviour in a consistent manner. This is true even in the absence of
strategic uncertainty (and the consequent strategic considerations). The
second finding is that the rates of deviation differ across different types
of individuals. People who manifest strong preferences either for their
own material payoff or for equality in the distribution of payoffs do so
throughout the experiment. Remarkably, these people are also more likely
to lie to achieve their preferred payoff distributions. By contrast, those
who exhibit moderate aversion to advantageous inequality (according to
our parameter-value space) appear significantly less committed to their
preferences.
With respect to the model’s performance, our results differ from those
of previous studies. Specifically, we find that the model fails to account for
our subjects’ behaviour in both the trust and the lying game. By contrast,
Blanco et al. report that it has considerable predictive power at the aggre-
gate level (apart from the case of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma), while
Yang et al. even find considerable individual-level performance. We at-
tribute the differences in our findings to two main design features. Firstly,
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the second mover in our trust game has four available options. Accord-
ingly, Hypothesis 1 provides a stricter test for the model than the binary-
prediction hypotheses in Blanco et al. Secondly, our lying game may induce
a conflict of motives. For example, individuals that exhibit concerns about
truthful reporting in addition to inequality aversion may appear inconsis-
tent with the model’s predictions if these two motives prescribe different
actions.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do point out that ‘positive αi’s and βi’s can
be interpreted as a direct concern for equality as well as a reduced-form
concern for intentions. [...] As a consequence, our preference parameters
are compatible with the interpretation of intentions-driven reciprocity.’ In-
terestingly, we find that the model’s failure cannot be accounted for by
concerns about reciprocity. This finding also contrasts those of Blanco et
al. and Yang et al., who conclude that reciprocal motives can account for
at least some of the behavioural variation. Furthermore, the patterns of
behaviour we observe appear incompatible with efficiency concerns, too.
Regarding the substantially higher rates of consistency among peo-
ple with extreme (high or low) degrees of inequality aversion, our results
point towards the existence of types (similar to Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2006). We can thus discern between people who are very selfish or very
egalitarian, who are consistently so throughout, and people who are ‘in
the middle’ (in the model’s sense), whose behaviour is inconsistent with
inequality aversion. One interpretation is that this latter group is driven
by different motives, which are not always correlated with inequality aver-
sion. Another one is that they are unsure about their preferences and, thus,
sensitive to environmental cues that sway them towards one direction or
another. Both these interpretations are consistent with the observation
that people with moderate βi values (βi ∈ [0.4, 0.6]) exhibit the highest
90
degree of truthful reports in our lying game.
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Chapter 4
Consistency of pro-social
preferences - The case of
compliance with social norms
4.1 Introduction
Economic experiments have generated a large number of findings that con-
tradict the assumption that individuals are solely concerned about their
own material gain. Participants in dictator games (Forsythe et al, 1994)
transfer some of their endowments to anonymous recipients. They trust
others and honour others’ trust in them (Berg et al, 1995) They co-operate
in social dilemmas, when defecting would increase their material payoffs
(Ledyard, 1995). And they punish free-riders, even at a personal cost
(Ga¨chter et al, 2008).
An interesting feature of such pro-social behaviour is that it appears
sensitive to the setting in which it is expressed. Dictator-game transfers
vary with the degree of anonymity, the action space available, and the way
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the dictator is appointed (see e.g. Cherry et al, 2002; Krupka and Weber,
2013). Punishment can be pro- or anti-social, depending on the culture
in which it is administered (Hermann et al, 2008). A view that attempts
to account for such contextual effects posits that people are intrinsically
motivated to comply with social norms. A social norm is a collectively held
perception of a rule that prescribes appropriate behaviour and is applica-
ble to a particular situation.1 Individuals experience normative (dis)utility
when they act in ways that are socially (in)appropriate. The degree to
which a norm applies varies with the characteristics of the particular situ-
ation at hand. Therefore, differences in behaviour across different settings
can be accounted for by different norms being relevant to those settings.2
The influence of social norms on behaviour has been analysed and
documented in various settings. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005, 2010)
investigate how perceptions of social identity can influence economic be-
haviour. Chang et al. (2015) apply their framework in examining the
effects of political-identity priming on redistributive behaviour. They find
that the primed political identities (democratic or republican) of US citizens
determine the degree to which they perceive redistribution as socially ap-
propriate and can account for differences in their redistributive behaviour.
Using the same analytical framework on the topic of discrimination, Barr
et al. (2015) show that discriminatory behaviour is significantly weaker in
contexts where it is less socially appropriate.
1For extensive discussions on the concept of social norms see e.g. Axelrod (1986),
Bernheim (1994), Elster (2000), Bendor and Swistak (2001), Hechter and Opp (2001),
Bicchieri (2006), Young (2015). See also Kanazawa (2001) on the compatibility of social-
norm accounts with evolutionary psychology.
2A large body of literature in psychology (see e.g. Schwartz, 1973; Cialdini et al.,
1990) distinguishes among injunctive norms, which are prescriptions of what should be
done, descriptive norms, which describe what is regularly done, and personal norms,
which are one’s own ethical opinions. In the field of business organisation, Burks and
Krupka (2012) demonstrate that a misalignment between one’s own ethical opinion and
the normative perceptions of one’s peers or managers is associated with job dissatisfac-
tion and dishonesty for personal monetary gain. Our focus in this study lies on social
injunctive norms, i.e. shared beliefs about what one ought to do in specific situations.
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Conceptually, the idea of adherence to social norms offers a plausible
and testable interpretation of behaviour. Krupka and Weber (2013) report
that a simple specification of normative utility can track the differences
in transfers across different versions of the dictator game. In their model
people care about the extent to which their actions are socially appropriate.
They elicit the degree of social appropriateness pertaining to each action
by using incentivised coordination games. Krupka et al (2016) use the
same norm-elicitation protocol and report similar findings with respect to
dictator and Bertrand games. On the other hand, Ga¨chter et al (2013)
compare the model of social norms with a model of distributional pro-social
preferences and find that the latter outperforms in terms of explanatory
power. When considered together, the findings of these studies seem to
suggest that the normative model is better at capturing behaviour in some
games than it is in others.
A related aspect of the model’s performance is the degree to which it is
consistent in correctly anticipating people’s behaviour. What is meant by
‘consistent’ here is that the model should (in principle) be able to predict
correctly the choices of each individual across different games, given the
relevant information on the social appropriateness of the actions in each
game.3 That is necessary even if we restrict our attention to games in which
the model has been shown to perform well in accounting for aggregate
patterns of behaviour. This is important, because according to the model’s
narrative, although social norms may change across different situations,
3Consistency of performance can be defined in different ways. Blanco et al. (2011)
refer to aggregate and individual-specific patterns of behaviour. In their setup, a model
performs well at the aggregate level if it is able to predict correctly the proportions of
the different types of agents in each game. To perform well at the individual level, on
the other hand, the model has to predict the choices of each specific individual with a
sufficient degree of accuracy. As the authors state, given these definitions, consistency at
the aggregate level does not (in general) imply consistency at the individual one, and vice
versa. In our setup aggregate-level consistency follows more readily from consistency at
the individual level and we thus focus mostly on the latter, without explicitly referring
to it as such.
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each individual’s propensity to adhere to what is socially appropriate is
the same. It is due to people’s stable preferences that the model is able to
generate predictions about their behaviour in the first place.
In this study we investigate this aspect of the normative model’s per-
formance through an experiment. Our basic setup involves three games,
variants of the dictator, the trust, and a lying game. Using the norm-
elicitation method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013) we measure the
degree of social appropriateness pertaining to each of the actions involved
in each of these games. We then ask people in a different subject pool to ac-
tually play all three games. Each participant is called to provide a decision
in every node of every player role in each game. We evaluate the model’s
predictive power using the elicited measures of social appropriateness and
our participants’ revealed propensities to comply with social norms. Con-
ceptually, our study is akin to that by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016
a), who use a similar experimental setup and conclude that pro-social be-
haviour is the result of the rule-following propensities of individuals.4 We
depart from their framework mainly in three ways. Firstly, we only consider
decisions that do not involve strategic uncertainty.5 Secondly, we imple-
ment a more fine-tuned analysis, linked directly to the norm-elicitation
method of Krupka and Weber (2013). Finally, we observe the decisions of
the same subjects in three different games.
We have already argued about our choice of games in the previous
chapter of this thesis. The same arguments apply here, with the only differ-
ence that they are now to be viewed through the perspective of adherence to
social norms (rather than distributional preferences per se). Furthermore,
4See also Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016 b), for a complementary discussion on
eliciting desires for rule-following.
5By ‘strategic uncertainty’ we mean uncertainty that is related to others’ beliefs (of
any order) and actions - see Morris and Shin (2002), as well as the previous chapter of
this thesis.
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the Krupka-Weber model has been shown to perform well in accounting for
the behavioural variation in similar games (see e.g. Krupka et al, 2016).
An additional argument that can be made with respect to normative pref-
erences relates to our lying game. Specifically, this game involves the po-
tential for normative reinforcement or conflict. For example, to the extent
that norms of payoff-equality and truthfulness are relevant to it, they may
prescribe the same action or different ones. This is a very appealing fea-
ture, since it allows us to separate preferences for compliance with social
norms from preferences for adherence to specific ideals. It also allows us to
investigate the effectiveness of the Krupka-Weber norm-elicitation method.
Our results indicate that, in general, the Krupka-Weber model does
not perform well in anticipating the behaviour of our subjects. We find
that the proportions of people who manifest given preferences for norm-
compliance are not stable across our games. We also find that a lot of
our subjects do not exhibit stable norm-following propensities. Some of
our subjects appear to be motivated by strong selfish preferences. Some
others seem to firmly adhere to a principle of payoff equality, even when
the actions it prescribes are not judged as the most socially appropriate.
The behaviour of these two types is largely consistent with their respective
motives throughout the three games. Of them, only the selfish types can be
accounted for adequately by the Krupka-Weber model. Furthermore, the
behaviour of the rest is not suggestive of stable norm-following preferences.
In this sense, our findings contradict those of Kimbrough and Vostroknutov
(2016). In addition, we show that the model’s predictions are not always
determinate and that it sometimes ex ante precludes choices that prove to
be quite popular among our subjects.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2 we illus-
trate the Krupka-Weber model and our process of eliciting the individual-
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specific propensities for norm-compliance. In section 4.3 we present our
experimental design and discuss its features. In section 4.4 we describe
our results and assess the model’s performance. In section 4.5 we conclude
with a critical evaluation of our findings.
4.2 Norm-dependent utility
Krupka and Weber (2013) model adherence to norms as an individual-
specific feature of deep preferences. They argue that in choice environments
every option available to an individual is characterised by a certain degree
of social appropriateness. Then, all options can be ordered and compared
in terms of their degrees of social appropriateness, in the same manner that
they are in terms of the payoffs they lead to.
Consider game G featuring action set A = {a1, a2, ..., aK}. The game
is played by I ≥ 2 individuals. Each individual i ∈ I is concerned both
about her/his resulting monetary payoff and the social appropriateness of
the action (s)he chooses. Function pi : AI → R ascribes a monetary payoff
to each action chosen by player i, depending on the choices of the other
players. The degree of social appropriateness that corresponds to each ac-
tion is given by a function N : A → R. An individual-specific parameter
γi measures player i’s sensitivity to concerns about social appropriateness.
Effectively, γi ∈ R+ can be thought of as the weight that normative con-
cerns have on i’s utility function relative to concerns about her/his material
payoff.6 Thus, player i’s utility from action a can be written as:
6One can think of individuals with γi < 0 as anti-social (i.e. people who receive
satisfaction from violating social norms). In most of the situations we examine here the
behaviour of such individuals cannot be distinguished from that of people with γ = 0.
In those cases where we can discern between the two, we find that the proportion of
people with γi < 0 is very small.
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Ui(a
i, a−i) = pi(ai, a−i) + γiN(ai, a−i) (4.2.0.1)
It is useful to bear in mind what this specification implies. In partic-
ular, one may notice that both the payoff and the social-appropriateness
function are universal. In other words, all I individuals enjoy the same
level of utility from a given amount of material payoff and are in agreement
about the degree of appropriateness ascribed to each action. The fact that
they experience the latter differently is only due to it being weighted by
the individual-specific parameter γi.
For our experimental investigation we assume linear functional forms
for both the material payoff resulting from action ak and its degree of
social appropriateness. This postulate confers analytical simplicity with-
out rendering the account itself more restrictive.7 As far as our study is
concerned, we show in section 4.4 that, assuming accurate judgements,
non-linear functional forms for U(pi(.)) cannot account for our results.8
Of course, this does not imply that a linear utility function precisely
describes people’s preferences. However, in our experiment the differences
in payoffs across the games are relatively small. Therefore, utility over
money can be reasonably expected to be linear.9
With these in mind and given a−i, individual i chooses an action aˆi
7The reason is that any non-linear effects of social-norm adherence on utility can be
captured by function N(.). In fact, such a conception of function N(.) is very useful,
because it can also account for the existence of interior maxima in the strategy space.
Consider a generic set of options with elements in the interval [a, a]. Even if the payoff
function is linear, an interior maximum can still exist for 0 < γ <∞, so long as there is
conflict between personal payoff and social appropriateness. This is because perceptions
about social appropriateness need not be linear in the available options. And since
perceptions are elicited (using the Krupka-Weber, 2013 method), they can be applied
to generate an interior maximum with a linear normative-utility function.
8It is worth noting here that in their original paper Krupka and Weber use a more
general value function, V (pi(.)), to capture people’s material utility.
9If anything, we observe people for whom payoff variations should matter most ex-
hibiting the highest degrees of consistency.
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according to:
aˆi ∈ arg imax
a
Ui(a
i, a−i) = pi(ai, a−i) + γiN(ai, a−i) (4.2.0.2)
In a discrete choice set equation 4.2.0.2 implies that individual i will
choose the option that delivers the highest level of utility, given γi. Thus,
inferences about γi can be made based on the individual’s choice, tak-
ing into account all alternative choices. Specifically, a rational player will
choose action a1 over action a2 iff the former confers a (weakly) higher
utility than the latter does:
a1  a2 ⇒ Ui(ai1, a−i) ≥ Ui(ai2, a−i)⇒
⇒ pi(ai1, a−i) + γiN(ai1, a−i) ≥ pi(ai2, a−i) + γiN(ai2, a−i)⇒
⇒ γi R pi(a
i
1, a
−i)− pi(ai2, a−i)
N(ai2, a
−i)−N(ai1, a−i)
(4.2.0.3)
Provided that social appropriateness is in conflict with personal payoff
in the comparison between a1 and a2, a positive threshold value for γi
can be computed. This is the lower or upper bound of the set of possible
γi values player i can have, given her/his choice. We can extend this
reasoning to discrete choice sets with more than two actions. Consider the
set Γ1 ⊂ R+, which contains the threshold γi values that result from the
binary comparisons of the chosen action, a1, with all alternatives. Furhter,
let Γi be partitioned into Γ
L
1 and Γ
H
1 . Γ
L
1 contains all γi thresholds that
have resulted from the comparisons between a1 and each of the actions
that yield a lower degree of social appropriateness (and a higher personal
payoff). Conversely, ΓH1 contains all γi thresholds that have resulted from
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the comparisons between a1 and each of the actions that yield a higher
degree of social appropriateness (and a lower personal payoff). Then, the
lower and upper bound of the set of admissible γi values following the
choice of a1 are simply the maximum and minimum elements of Γ
L
1 and
ΓH1 , respectively. Then, the consistency of the account can be tested by
generating predictions about future behaviour given the elicited γi values.
4.3 Experimental design
Our study consists of two separate experiments. In the first one, labelled
‘behavioural’, we asked each of our 178 subjects to take part in three games.
These games are the ones we also used for the evaluation of the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion and are described in Chapter
2 (see section 3, pages 6-10). As a brief reminder, they are modified versions
of the Dictator Game , the Trust Game, and a Lying Game.
For our evaluation of the Krupka-Weber (2013) account of norm com-
pliance, we additionally needed to have a measure of the social appropri-
ateness of each action featuring in our games. It is worth repeating that for
our purposes this is ultimately an empirical matter. That is, we did not try
to derive the form of the N(.) function analytically, based on certain priors.
Instead, we used the norm-elicitation task developed by Krupka and Weber
(2013) to obtain people’s judgements about how socially appropriate each
action is.
We used a separate subject pool to elicit perceptions of social appropri-
ateness. This second experiment, labelled ‘normative’, was conducted using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Our 100 participants in the Krupka-Weber task
initially saw a description of each of our games on their computer screens.
Every game was presented as an interaction between two generic agents.
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Thus, the dictator game was played by Individuals A and B, the trust game
by Individuals X and Y, and the lying game by Individuals J and K. Our
participants in the normative experiment obtained information about each
game that matched the information available to those who engaged in it in
the behavioural experiment. This included the payoff structure, the order
of moves, the actions available to each player, and their starting positions.
After each description, they were asked to evaluate the degree of social
appropriateness of each available action on a discrete ordinal scale. This
scale is the one used by Krupka et al (2016). They could judge any one
of them as Very Socially Inappropriate, Socially Inappropriate, Somewhat
Socially Inappropriate, Somewhat Socially Appropriate, Socially Appropri-
ate, or Very Socially Appropriate. They provided their judgements on their
computer screens and in private. A screen-shot of the assessment table for
the dictator game is provided in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Table of normative assessments - Dictator game
It was made explicit to the participants that what is meant by ‘socially
(in)appropriate’ is behaviour that most people agree is the ‘(in)correct’ or
‘(un)ethical’ thing to do. That is, they were informed that it is not their
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personal views that are relevant for the task, but rather their perceptions
about the views of society as a whole. To ensure adherence to this rule,
they were incentivised to try to match the social view. Specifically, they
were informed that they would have the opportunity to receive a substantial
bonus in addition to their show-up fee. For this purpose, we would pair
them up and choose a game and an action randomly at the end of the
session. If a participant’s assessment for that action matched the one of the
person (s)he was paired with, they would both earn an additional £7.00
bonus. Otherwise, they would only receive the show-up fee, which was
£5.00.
In the trust game, for completeness, we elicit ratings of social ap-
propriateness for both player-roles. However, we mostly focus on those
corresponding to the second mover’s options to evaluate the model. The
reason is that the behaviour of the first mover can be partly attributed
to the presence of strategic uncertainty about the second mover’s choice.
Therefore, his propensity for behaving in a socially appropriate way cannot
be straightforwardly elicited.
In the lying game we elicit ratings for each report in every state (every
true colour the wheel has landed on). Thus, each participant has to assess
how appropriate it is to report RED given that the true colour is RED, how
appropriate it is to report RED given that the true colour is BLUE, and
how appropriate it is to report RED given that the true colour is GREEN.
We then ask them to assess the social appropriateness of reporting BLUE
and that of reporting GREEN in the same way. We do this to capture the
state-specific effect on the degree of appropriateness of each report.
The order in which the games were presented remained fixed through-
out the normative experiment. We chose this option to maintain a close
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correspondence with the behavioural experiment.10 We think that this
correspondence is important, because it allows variations in behaviour to
be aligned with variations in the normative assessments. That is, even
though the people in our behavioural experiment are different from those
in the normative one, a Krupka-Weber agent would make a choice based on
her/his own perceptions about social appropriateness. Thus, if that agent
had to face the three games in our fixed order, (s)he would also judge how
appropriate each of the actions is in the same order.
We ran ten experimental sessions in total, six for the behavioural and
four for the normative experiment. All our sessions took place at the Uni-
versity of Nottingham, in 2015. Of our behavioural sessions, three were
run on the 5th of June in the CRIBS laboratory and three on the 4th of
December in the CeDEx laboratory. Each of these sessions lasted for ap-
proximately one hour and 15 minutes and yielded an average payoff of
£10.50 for each of our subjects. Our normative sessions were all run in the
CeDEx laboratory, on the 28th and 29th of May, and on the 9th of Decem-
ber. Their average duration was 50 minutes and each participant received
approximately £7.00 on average.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Parameter estimation
In order to categorise the participants in terms of their norm-following
propensities, we use the results from our normative experiment. We start
by assigning numerical values to the ratings of social appropriateness. Our
10Recall that in the behavioural experiment the order had to be fixed, in order to
minimise the amount of noise in our measurements.
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Figure 4.2: Average Normative Assessments - Dictator Game
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assignment is similar to that of Krupka et al (2016). That is, we ascribe
the following scores to the ratings: -1 to Very Socially Inappropriate, -0.6
to Socially Inappropriate, -0.2 to Somewhat Socially Inappropriate, 0.2 to
Somewhat Socially Appropriate, 0.6 to Socially Appropriate, and 1 to Very
Socially Appropriate. We then compute the average degree of social appro-
priateness pertaining to each of the actions in our games, based on these
values.11 We interpret each degree as the value assigned by the normative
function, N(.), to the corresponding action. We then proceed to compute
the γ thresholds associated with that action, that is, the values of γi for
which someone is indifferent between that action and its closest alternatives
(in terms of payoff/appropriateness correspondence).
Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 depict the average assessments of social ap-
propriateness based on the responses in our normative experiment. In each
Figure the actions available in the corresponding game are listed on the
horizontal axis, followed by the implied payoffs to the participants. The
11It is important to remember that in assigning numerical values to the qualitative
statements used in the Krupka-Weber framework we assume equal distance between
the various categories. For instance, for our purposes the distance between the ratings
‘Very Socially Inappropriate’ and ‘Socially Inappropriate’ is exactly equal to the dis-
tance between the ratings ‘Somewhat Socially Inappropriate’ and ‘Somewhat Socially
Appropriate’. This is also in line with Krupka and Weber (2013).
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climax on the vertical axis measures the degree of social appropriateness,
spanning from -1 (Very Socially Inappropriate) to +1 (Very Socially Ap-
propriate).
An immediate feature to notice is that for every player-role the dis-
tribution of appropriateness ratings pertaining to the actions available is
single-peaked. Importantly, this does not preclude the potential for con-
flicting norms to arise (a situation we are particularly interested in), as the
assessments in the Lying Game indicate. Additionally, the average ratings
in the dictator and the trust game reveal an interesting relationship be-
tween changes in the payoff distribution implied by the different actions
and changes in their perceived appropriateness. In particular, the data
seem to suggest that a deviation from the most appropriate action is more
costly (in a normative sense) from a same-step deviation from a less appro-
priate one (towards the same direction). This is consistent with the notion
of discontinuity around the norm, widely observed in experimental settings
(see e.g. Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). To see this, let the norm in both
the decision node of the dictator and that of the second mover in the trust
game be the equal split. This is conferred by action TEN in the dictator
game and action FOUR in the trust game. In the former, the difference
between the average assessment of action TEN and that of action NINE
is significantly higher that that of any other two neighbouring actions (all
Wilcoxon’s sign-rank tests yield p-values lower than 0.01). The same is
true for the difference between actions FOUR and THREE in the trust
game (again, all Wilcoxon’s sign-rank p-values are lower than 0.01). This
pattern is all the more significant when examined in light of the fact that
our payoff structure in both these games points towards the exact opposite
direction: Increasing deviations from the most socially appropriate action
return progressively lower marginal material benefits. Regarding the Ly-
ing Game, the average report ratings across states seem to point towards
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Figure 4.3: Average Normative Assessments - Trust Game
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conflicting norms, as will become clearer below.
The pattern of appropriateness ratings in the dictator game is in line
with those in the various versions of the game analysed in Krupka and We-
ber (2013). Note, again, that in our variant the most egalitarian outcome
results from the last action (action TEN). Thus, the qualitative proper-
ties of the normative function appear to be maintained across the different
games.12
It is important to note here that social-efficiency concerns do not seem
to have a substantial effect on appropriateness.13 Indeed, we find no evi-
dence that the difference in average degrees of social appropriateness (the
slope of the line in Figure 4.2) changes as we move towards and away from
the most efficient options (FIVE and SIX). This finding can be interpreted
in different ways. For example, it may be the case that people didn’t
actually realise that social efficiency varies across actions. On the other
hand, maybe people do indeed disregard it and focus on equality when
12This qualitative similarity can be viewed as evidence in support of the robustness
and suitability of the Krupka-Weber elicitation method, given that changes in the ratings
do, in fact, occur across different versions.
13By social-efficiency concerns we mean considerations about the maximisation of the
joint payoff.
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Figure 4.4: Average Normative Assessments - Lying Game
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assessing social appropriateness. These two scenarios are not conflicting
with the normative account, since what we are interested in are people’s
judgements, irrespectively of their rationale.
The assessments of the actions available to the second mover in the
trust game are similar to those of the dictator’s options. In particular,
we observe that social appropriateness is increasing monotonically as one
moves from the most selfish to the most egalitarian action. Interestingly,
people deemed the OUT option, available to the first mover, as significantly
less socially appropriate than its alternative, IN, which gives the second
mover the opportunity to play (Wilcoxon’s sign-rank p-value: 0.002).
With respect to the lying Game, we observe that the state generally
dominates in the assessment of social appropriateness. That is, people
seem to consider truthful reports as the most socially appropriate in every
instance, irrespective of the ensuing degree of efficiency or distribution of
the resulting total payoff. It is also true, however, as is evident in Figure
4.4, that the pro-social option of reporting BLUE is always characterised
by positive degrees of appropriateness on average. This is not true for the
other two options, of which the one (RED) dominates in terms of own-
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payoff considerations, while the other (GREEN) exhibits the same degree
of payoff equality with BLUE, but is less efficient.
We may thus argue that normative conflict can be generated in our
lying game primarily between two principles, egalitarianism and truthful-
ness. We find evidence that both are at play from two indicative patterns.
On the one hand, there is the fact that reporting BLUE is never socially
inappropriate (on average) irrespectively of the true colour of the wheel.
This constitutes evidence that a norm of payoff-equality is present. On the
other hand, the report that is dominant (on average) in terms of social ap-
propriateness is the one that matches the state. This points towards a norm
of truthful reporting, which dominates concerns about payoff-equality.
Notice that payoff equality does not appear to be important purely
in itself. If it were, then reporting GREEN would be just as appropri-
ate as BLUE is. Instead, the comparison between the average ratings of
these two options indicates that, to some extent, efficiency matters to our
subjects. At the same time, however, social efficiency does not appear to
matter much in the absence of payoff equality. To see this, notice that
the average degree of social appropriateness of reporting GREEN14 when
the state is GREEN is not statistically different from that of reporting
RED in state RED (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p = 0.154). On the other
hand, reporting RED in state GREEN appears less appropriate than re-
porting GREEN in state RED. Their difference is significant at the 10%
level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p = 0.054). Thus, there is some tentative
evidence that truthfulness notwithstanding, payoff equality is perceived as
a more important norm by our subjects than social efficiency. This result
is all the more striking when one takes into account the large difference
between the aggregate payoff induced by reporting RED and that which
14Recall that a GREEN report is the socially inefficient option in this game.
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follows a GREEN report.
An important element in the assessments that we obtained is that
the social consensus is not equally strong across the actions in each game.
That is, the degree of dispersion of the normative assessments varies across
actions. As we will see in sub-section 4.4.3, this variation raises a crucial
issue for the validity of our conclusions. We examine it in detail in that
section and argue that it cannot be the sole justification for our findings.
4.4.2 Evaluation of norm-following behaviour
So far we have analysed the perceptions of the participants in our normative
experiment on how socially appropriate each action is in our games. We
now use these normative assessments to characterise the behaviour of the
participants in our behavioural experiment.15 To do so, we start by taking
the average assessment pertaining to each action to denote its degree of
social appropriateness (the value of the N(.) function for that action). Us-
ing these averages, we then compute the γ threshold values as described in
section 4.2. Each of these thresholds is a value for γi that renders a norma-
tive agent i indifferent between two options (see, e.g., Table 4.1). In each
game, these thresholds define a set of parameter groups. Each parameter
group is a collection of all γi values that prescribe the same choice. Finally,
we classify our participants in the behavioural experiment in those groups,
based on their decisions in the dictator game. This classification allows us
to draw predictions about their behaviour in the other two games. We test
these predictions to evaluate the model’s performance in accounting for the
behavioural variation in our sample.
15Recall that the two experiments involve different participants.
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4.4.2.1 Choices in the dictator game
Out of the 178 people that participated in our behavioural experiment,
around 26% chose action ONE in the Dictator game (giving nothing to
their Recipients). On the opposite side, the equal split (action TEN) was
chosen by about 8% of them. What is worth noting is that actions FIVE
and SIX, which are the ones that maximise social efficiency, were chosen
quite often (namely, by 20% and 19% of the people respectively).
We allocate our participants into different categories, based on the
relative strength of their normative preferences. In this way, we have a
profile of ‘types’ of players, defined according to their γi values. Table 4.1
summarises our results. Out of our 178 subjects 30% are characterised by
γi ≤ 2.439, while 41% exhibit γi ≥ 5.725 and the remaining 29% are spread
in the middle. The average γi value in our dictator game lies in the interval
[4.545, 5.682].
Table 4.1Threshold values for the γ parameter - Dictator game
Action Own Payoff Av. N.A. γ-threshold Data
ONE £18.00 -0.9 1.389 26%
TWO £17.80 -0.756 2.439 4%
THREE £17.40 -0.592 4.545 8%
FOUR £16.80 -0.46 4.545 1%
FIVE £16.00 -0.284 5.682 20%
SIX £15.00 -0.108 5.725 19%
SEVEN £13.80 0.076 - 6%
EIGHT £12.40 0.268 - 6%
NINE £10.80 0.44 - 2%
TEN £9.00 0.94 8%
Threshold values for γ based on the average normative assessment scores.
Each threshold is the value of γ at which a player is indifferent between
the action at the same line and the immediately next undominated one
(hence why there is no threshold value in the same line with action TEN).
Where threshold values are missing, the corresponding actions are strictly
dominated based on the theory and the observed average degrees of social
appropriateness.
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An intriguing feature of our dictator game depicted in Table 4.1 is that
not every action is optimally chosen by people with some γi. Specifically,
there are three actions (SEVEN, EIGHT, and NINE) that should never
be opted for by a norm-following agent, irrespectively of her/his parameter
value. To see why this is so, consider the case of equality in relation 4.2.0.3.
Given any two actions, the threshold value for the γi parameter is the
one for which player i will be indifferent between them. A higher (lower)
γi value would render one action or the other more attractive. At some
point the marginal gain from the next more socially appropriate choice
is so small, that only agents with substantially higher γi values would be
willing to incur the payoff loss. But these agents may find it optimal to
choose an even more appropriate action, if what they gain in terms of social
appropriateness exceeds the additional payoff they have to forgo.
This feature of the model may at first seem counter-intuitive, but it
is rather appealing. To see this, consider a choice environment with more
than two options. Effectively, given the structure of payoffs and degrees
of social appropriateness some options may confer a trade-off between the
two that is never optimal: At least one other option confers a better trade-
off. In our dictator game this is easy to see. Notice that from action
SIX every subsequent option decreases the dictator’s payoff exponentially.
Their social appropriateness, however, increases in a linear fashion up to
action TEN, at which point it jumps up substantially (see Figure 4.2). As
a result, a norm-following agent that is willing to incur a payoff-cost to
opt for an action higher than SIX will find it optimal to go all the way to
the most socially appropriate action.16 One of the implications is that the
16In our dictator game the threshold for being indifferent between actions SIX and
TEN is lower than that between actions SIX and SEVEN. That is, every person with
a γi high enough to prefer action SEVEN from SIX will also prefer action TEN from
SEVEN. Additionally, for some γi values a person will prefer action TEN from SIX, but
not action SEVEN. Conversely, the threshold for being indifferent between actions SIX
and TEN is higher than that between actions NINE and TEN. That is, every person
with a γi low enough to prefer action NINE from TEN will also prefer action SIX from
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empirical pattern of discontinuity around the norm acquires a theoretical
rationale, at least with respect to our dictator game.17 Another one is that
the restriction of the set of admissible choices constitutes itself a testable
proposition. Consider the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. No player should choose action SEVEN, EIGHT, or NINE
in the dictator game, irrespectively of the value of her/his γi parameter.
We find that more than 14% of our participants opt for one of the ac-
tions precluded by hypothesis 4. This frequency is not easily reconcilable
with the model’s prediction. We might be tempted, for instance, to as-
sert that people’s behaviour is largely consistent with the model, but with
some positive probability they make random errors. But in this case, the
probability required to generate the frequencies of dominated choices we
observe would need to be substantially high. To see this, note that the 14%
rate is a lower bound for the probability of error necessary to generate this
pattern of choices (assuming that people are equally likely to err in either
direction). Thus, the model’s prediction that actions SEVEN, EIGHT, and
NINE will never be chosen is falsified by our data. The pattern of discon-
tinuity around the norm, however, seems to be present in our data. Action
TEN, which is the most socially appropriate one, is also substantially more
popular than action NINE. Notice that this is all the more striking given
our payoff structure, where a deviation from action NINE to TEN is the
most expensive in terms of personal monetary payoff.
The falsification of hypothesis 4 notwithstanding, the behaviour of
people who choose dominated actions cannot be rationalised by the model.
NINE. Additionally, for some γi values a person will prefer action SIX from TEN, but
not action NINE. The same is true for action EIGHT. As a result, there is no parameter-
value interval such, that any of actions SEVEN, EIGHT, and NINE is preferred against
all alternatives. For every (weakly positive) γi they are dominated by at least one other
option.
17An analysis of dictator games with different payoff structures would be necessary to
assess the robustness of this claim.
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Therefore, we do not consider them in our evaluation of its consistency in
correctly predicting people’s choices. A distinction needs to be made here
between two different indicators of performance. On the one hand, there
may be people whose choices cannot be accounted for by the model. These
are the people for whom no admissible γi value exists. Consequently, they
cannot be accommodated within the framework and no predictions can be
made about them. On the other hand, there may be people whose choices
can be accounted for by the model, but not in a consistent manner. These
are the ones for whom γi values exist, but are not stable across different
games. These two different aspects of performance are equally important
in the model’s evaluation.
4.4.2.2 Consistency in the trust game
We proceed to examine whether the Krupka-Weber account can describe
the behavioural regularities in our data in a way that is consistent across
the different games. We focus firstly on the relationship between parameter
values elicited in the dictator game and second-mover choices in the trust
game. Recall that for our analysis of consistency we exclude all participants
who chose the dominated actions (SEVEN, EIGHT, and NINE) in the
dictator game. Consider the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5. No player should choose action THREE as second mover
in the trust game, irrespectively of the value of her/his γi parameter.
Hypothesis 6. Player i as second mover in the trust game should choose:
• Action ONE (£16.60 , £1.10), iff γi ≤ 1.932
• Action TWO (£15.75 , £4.50), iff 1.932 ≤ γi ≤ 3.949
• Action FOUR (£10.00 , £10.00), iff 3.949 ≤ γi
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There are four alternative actions available to the second mover in
our trust game. Table 4.2 contains the γ thresholds associated with these
actions and the proportions of our sample that opted for them.18 We see
that action THREE is also dominated according to the model and the
elicited ratings of social appropriateness. This instance is harder to ratio-
nalise as discontinuity around the norm. It is true that action FOUR is
the most appropriate on average and can, thus, be considered the norma-
tively prescribed option. However, the action space is considerably smaller
than that in our dictator game and, as a result, choices are much more
concentrated. On the empirical side, it turns out that more subjects chose
action THREE than action FOUR. If we focus our attention only to those
who did not choose dominated options in the dictator game (152 people),
23% of them opted for THREE and only about 16% chose FOUR.19 Thus,
hypothesis 5 can be confidently rejected.
Table 4.2Threshold values for the γ parameter - Trust game (2nd mover)
Action Own Payoff Av. N.A. γ-threshold Data
ONE £16.60 -0.94 1.932 35%
TWO £15.75 -0.5 3.949 26%
THREE £13.75 -0.024 - 23%
FOUR £10.00 0.956 16%
The table presents the threshold values for γ based on the average
normative-assessment scores. Each threshold is the value of γ at which
a player is indifferent between the action at the same line and the imme-
diately next undominated one. Where threshold values are missing, the
corresponding actions are strictly dominated based on the theory and the
observed average degrees of social appropriateness. The proportions refer
to the 152 people who made consistent choices in the dictator game.
Regarding hypothesis 6, we also find little support for the model. Re-
member that to test for consistency we can only consider those participants
that did not make a dominated action in either the dictator or the trust
game. There are 117 participants that satisfy this criterion and are thus
18These proportions are relative to the total of 152 participants who chose non-
dominated choices in the dictator game.
19Out of the total sample of 178 people, 24% chose THREE and 21% chose FOUR.
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Table 4.3Parameter values and returns in the trust game - Total of sub-
jects with no dominated choices in the dictator and trust game
γi Frequency %Predicted choice
Choices observed %
ONE TWO FOUR
γi ≤ 1.389 39.3% ONE 80.4% 13% 6.6%
γi ∈ [1.389, 2.439] 6% ONE/TWO 71.4% 28.6% 0%
γi ∈ [2.439, 4.545] 9.3% TWO/FOUR 27.3% 72.7% 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 4.545] 0.9% FOUR 0% 100% 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] 18.8% FOUR 13.6% 77.3% 9.1%
γi ∈ [5.682, 5.725] 13.7% FOUR 18.7% 31.3% 50%
γi ≥ 5.725 12% FOUR 14.3% 0% 85.7%
The table lists the relative frequencies of actual choices in the trust game (2nd
mover), as well as the prediction(s) of the Krupka-Weber model for each γi
group. The percentage reported in each cell of the last three columns is relative
to the corresponding γi group. The table includes our 117 subjects that made
non-dominated choices in both the dictator and the trust game. The modal
choice within each group is highlighted in boldface.
eligible for this analysis. Of them, about 39% would be expected to choose
action ONE and 46% action FOUR. There is also a 6% that may consis-
tently pick either ONE or TWO, while the remaining 9% would be expected
to choose between TWO and FOUR. For these two latter groups there is
some overlap between the parameter intervals suggested by the dictator
game and those relevant to the trust game. This is why their behaviour
would be consistent with more than one choices.
What we observe, instead, is that a higher proportion of our sample
opted for action ONE and a lower one for action FOUR than what the
model had anticipated. Specifically, more than 45% of our subjects chose
ONE, less than 22% selected FOUR, and about 33% went for TWO. Even
if we assume that the 16% whose choices are not completely determinate
opted for action TWO,20 the difference between the expected and the ob-
served distribution is significant at the 1% level (χ2(2) = 15.649; p = 0.000,
Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000).
Our results are depicted in Table 4.3. Consider our 117 subjects that
20This assumption is the most forgiving for the model.
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did not choose a dominated option in any of the two games. We see that
the choices of people in the first three parameter groups are to a large
extent consistent with their γi values. However, a large proportion of those
in the last group, who were expected to choose action FOUR, deviated to
action TWO instead. As a result, we find a much higher proportion of
choices of TWO and a much lower one of choices of FOUR than we would
theoretically anticipate. The difference between the observed distribution
of choices and the one expected by the model is significant at the 1% level
(χ2(2) = 18.283, p = 0.000; Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000). We conclude that
the Krupka-Weber model is not able to capture accurately the behavioural
variability across our dictator and trust game. In addition, the model is
unable to account for 34% of our subjects (61 out of our initial sample of
178 participants), each of whom made at least one dominated choice.
An interesting feature of the model’s failure to predict our subjects’
choices accurately is that it is not uniform across their γi values. This is
evident in Table 4.3. To start with, most of those who should have chosen
action ONE actually did so. Similarly, among those with γi ≥ 5.725 about
86% chose action FOUR, in line with the model’s prediction. By contrast,
among those with γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] only about 9% went for action FOUR
(more than 77% opted for TWO instead). Furthermore, half of the people
with γi ∈ [5.682, 5.725] preferred actions ONE and TWO.
Figure 4.5:
Trust game (2nd mover) - Non-linear logistic regression of consistent behaviour on the γi
groups
Dependent variable: Consistent γi
Number of obs. 117
LR χ2: 26.28
Log likelihood: -63.804
Prob. ¿ χ2: 0.000
Pseudo R2: 0.1708
Coeff. Std. Err. z Pr[> |z|] [95% Conf. Interval]
γi -2.164 0.500 -4.33 0.000 -3.143 -1.185
γ2i 0.253 0.065 3.91 0.000 0.126 0.380
constant 3.781 0.759 4.98 0.000 2.294 5.268
The regression is run on the 117 subjects that make non-dominated choices in both the dictator
and the trust game.
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Figure 5b: Trust game (2nd mover) - Predicted probabilities of consistency
Figure 4.6: Trust game - Estimated relationship between one’s γi value
and the probability that one’s decision is consistent with the Krupka-Weber
model
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Thus, our results are suggestive of a non-monotonic relationship be-
tween the strength of one’s commitment to do what is socially appropri-
ate and one’s consistency in doing so. A logistic regression confirms this.
The predicted probability of making a decision that is consistent with the
Krupka-Weber model depends on one’s γi value in a U-shaped manner.
The quadratic specification fits the pattern of our data significantly better
than a linear one (χ2(1) = 15.26, p = 0.000). The two parts of Figure 4.6
detail and depict this relationship between the predicted probability that
one is consistent with the model and one’s choice in the dictator game.
4.4.2.3 Consistency in the lying game
We now turn to our participants’ behaviour in the lying game. Table 4.4
presents the parameter thresholds associated with the available options in
every state and the proportions of our participants that chose them.21 The
social appropriateness of each action in this game is heavily dependent on
the state, i.e. the actual outcome of the wheel-spin. In state RED the
most socially appropriate action is to report RED. Thus, since there is
no conflict between one’s own material payoff and social appropriateness,
a Krupka-Weber agent will always report RED, irrespectively of her/his
γi value. Every other report is dominated. In state BLUE, where BLUE
is the most socially appropriate report to give, RED is still the option of
agents with sufficiently low γi values. Here the only completely dominated
option is GREEN (as it both implies the lowest payoff and has a very
low degree of social appropriateness). Finally, in state GREEN it is the
GREEN report that dominates in terms of social appropriateness, with
BLUE being the second most appropriate choice. As a result, no option
is entirely dominated: For every report R there exists an interval [γR
i
, γRi ]
21These proportions are, again, relative to the total of 152 participants who chose
non-dominated choices in the dictator game.
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such, that agent i will report R iff γi ∈ [γRi , γRi ].
Table 4.4Threshold values for the γ parameter - Lying game
State Report Own Payoff Av. N.A. γ-threshold Data
RED
RED £17.00 0.628 32%
BLUE £8.50 0.336 - 3%
GREEN £0.00 -0.464 - 0%
BLUE
RED £17.00 -0.72 5.170 9%
BLUE £8.50 0.924 27%
GREEN £0.00 -0.736 - 0%
GREEN
RED £17.00 -0.612 12.143 9%
BLUE £8.50 0.088 18.640 9%
GREEN £0.00 0.544 11%
Threshold values for γ based on the average normative assessment scores. Each threshold
is the value of γ at which a player is indifferent between the action at the same line and the
immediately next undominated one. Where threshold values are missing, the corresponding
actions are strictly dominated based on the theory and the observed average degrees of social
appropriateness. The proportions refer to the 152 people who made consistent choices in the
dictator game.
We begin our analysis of the lying game by examining whether choices
that are deemed dominated by the model are indeed avoided by our par-
ticipants. Afterwards, we exclude the participants who have made such
choices and evaluate the performance of the model in anticipating the be-
haviour of the rest. We initially focus on each state separately and then
consider the game as a whole.
We start with state RED. Here there is no conflict between personal
payoff and social appropriateness. Consider, thus, the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7. In state RED of the lying game every player should report
RED, irrespectively of the value of her/his γi parameter.
Out of the 61 people who found themselves in this state 54 are eligible
for our analysis (based on their dictator-game choices). Most of these 54
(91%) reported RED. Those who deviated (9%) reported BLUE instead.
This degree of deviation from the model’s prediction may be the result
of random errors in decision-making. A Fisher’s exact test between the
distribution we observe and the one we theoretically anticipate indicates
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that the two are not statistically different at the 5% level (Fisher’s exact:
p = 0.057). Thus, the Krupka-Weber model performs well in accounting
for the behaviour of our subjects in the RED state of the lying game.
We next turn to state BLUE, where the most socially appropriate
report is also an equitable one. We can form the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. In state BLUE of the lying game no player should report
GREEN, irrespectively of the value of her/his γi parameter.
We can draw predictions for 54 out of the 63 people that found them-
selves in this state. Out of these 54 subjects, 24% reported RED and 76%
reported BLUE. Thus, hypothesis 8 is confidently confirmed. None of our
subjects reported GREEN in this state.
It is particularly encouraging that no one opted for GREEN, unless it
was the truthful report. This is a further indication that people understood
how the game works and were not choosing randomly. Additionally, the
very low frequency of BLUE reports in the RED state is an indication that
the Krupka-Weber model is, to some extent, able to account for the way
in which people make choices.
We now proceed to test the model’s consistency in accounting for our
participants’ behaviour. As before, we exclude the people who reported
BLUE when the true outcome was RED, as well as those who made dom-
inated choices in the dictator game, from the analysis. This brings our
initial sample size of 178 down to 147 subjects. Table 4.5 outlines the dis-
tributions of choices and parameter values in each state. Notice that it
only include subjects with non-dominated dictator-game choices.
With respect to state RED, the performance of the model is tested
by hypothesis 7 itself. Given that this hypothesis cannot be rejected, the
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Table 4.5Parameter values and returns in the trust game - Total of subjects with no dominated choices in the dictator and lying
game
State γi Frequency % Predicted choice
Frequency % of observed choice Total frequency % of
RED BLUE GREEN choices per colour
R
E
D
γi ≤ 1.389 36.7% RED 100% 0% 0% RED: 100%
γi ∈ [1.389, 2.439] 2% RED 100% 0% 0%
γi ∈ [2.439, 4.545] 18.4% RED 100% 0% 0% BLUE: 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 4.545] 0% RED 0% 0% 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] 20.4% RED 100% 0% 0% GREEN: 0%
γi ∈ [5.682, 5.725] 14.3% RED 100% 0% 0%
γi ≥ 5.725 8.2% RED 100% 0% 0%
B
L
U
E
γi ≤ 1.389 27.8% RED 46.7% 53.3% 0% RED: 24.1%
γi ∈ [1.389, 2.439] 5.6% RED 66.7% 33.3% 0%
γi ∈ [2.439, 4.545] 5.6% RED 0% 100% 0% BLUE: 75.9%
γi ∈ [4.545, 4.545] 3.7% RED 0% 100% 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] 27.8% RED/BLUE 13.3% 86.7% 0% GREEN: 0%
γi ∈ [5.682, 5.725] 22.2% BLUE 8.3% 91.7% 0%
γi ≥ 5.725 7.4% BLUE 25% 75% 0%
G
R
E
E
N
γi ≤ 1.389 27.3% RED 75% 16.7% 8.3% RED: 29.6%
γi ∈ [1.389, 2.439] 6.8% RED 66.7% 0% 33.3%
γi ∈ [2.439, 4.545] 4.6% RED 100% 0% 0% BLUE: 31.8%
γi ∈ [4.545, 4.545] 0% RED 0% 0% 0%
γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] 22.8% RED 0% 60% 40% GREEN: 38.6%
γi ∈ [5.682, 5.725] 31.8% RED 0% 28.6% 71.4%
γi ≥ 5.725 6.8% RED/BLUE/GREEN 0% 66.7% 33.3%
The table lists the relative frequencies of actual choices in the lying game, as well as the prediction(s) of the Krupka-Weber model for each
γi group, per state. The percentage frequency of each group is relative to the total within the respective state. The percentage reported in
each cell of the last three columns is relative to the corresponding γi group. The table includes our 147 subjects that made non-dominated
choices in both the dictator and the lying game. The modal choice within each group is highlighted in boldface.
model performs quite well in predicting our subjects’ choices. Notice that
this is not a case of relative social appropriateness. That is, it is not that
reporting RED is so much more appropriate than all other options that
even agents will low γi values are compelled to choose it. Instead, RED
is unequivocally the optimal report, irrespectively of one’s γi value. Thus,
the total conformity predicted by the Krupka-Weber model is due to the
alignment of incentives. Indeed, our data support this prediction.
In state BLUE the situation is different. Here own-payoff consider-
ations and concerns about social appropriateness point towards different
directions. As a result, we can form the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9. Player i in state BLUE of the lying game should report:
• RED (£17.00 , £0.00), iff γi ≤ 5.17
• BLUE (£8.50 , £8.50), iff γi ≥ 5.17
Recall that we can form predictions for 54 subjects in this state. With
respect to their parameter values, 42% of them exhibit γi ≤ 4.545 and 30%
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feature γi ≤ 5.682. The former group is expected to have reported RED
and the latter BLUE. These expectations are definite. The remaining 28%
is characterised by γi in the range [4.545, 5.682]. In the absence of a finer
classification, we have to consider both RED and BLUE reports as con-
sistent with their parameter values. However, even under the assumption
that these people should all report BLUE,22 the observed distribution of re-
ports appears significantly different from the expected one (χ2(1) = 4.167,
p = 0.041, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.065). Additionally, the distribution of
RED and BLUE reports does not seem to differ significantly across the
parameter groups (χ2(2) = 4.972, p = 0.083, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.101).
That is, the proportions of reports appear more or less stable across the
relevant γi intervals. We conclude that in spite of correctly predicting the
absence of GREEN reports, the Krupka-Weber model cannot account for
the behavioural variation we observe in this state of the lying game.
Lastly, we turn to state GREEN. This was the true colour of the wheel-
spin for 54 of our participants, 44 of whom are eligible for our analysis based
on their decisions as dictators. The truthful report is the most socially
appropriate option in this state too. In addition, every report is explicable
by some γi values. Consider the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10. Player i in state GREEN of the lying game should report:
• RED (£17.00 , £0.00), iff γi ≤ 12.143
• BLUE (£8.50 , £8.50), iff 12.143 ≤ γi ≤ 18.64
• GREEN (£0.00 , £0.00), iff 18.640 ≤ γi
Of our 44 participants here, 29% reported RED, 32% BLUE, and 39%
GREEN. Yet, 93% exhibited γi ≤ 5.725 and should, according to the model,
22This is the most favourable interpretation for the model. It involves characterising
all people with γi in the interval [4.545, 5.682] as featuring γi ≥ 5.17.
125
ONE
£18.00
£0.00
TWO
£17.80
£1.80
THREE
£17.40
£3.40
FOUR
£16.80
£4.80
FIVE
£16.00
£6.00
SIX
£15.00
£7.00
TEN
£9.00
£9.00
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.44
0.49
0.57
0.69
0.81
0.9
0.96
Dictator’s choice
P
r
of
b
ei
n
g
co
n
si
st
en
t
Lying game (State BLUE) - Predicted probabilities of consistency
ONE
£18.00
£0.00
TWO
£17.80
£1.80
THREE
£17.40
£3.40
FOUR
£16.80
£4.80
FIVE
£16.00
£6.00
SIX
£15.00
£7.00
TEN
£9.00
£9.00
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.85
0.41
0.15
0.08 0.08
0.16
Dictator’s choice
P
r
of
b
ei
n
g
co
n
si
st
en
t
Lying game (State GREEN) - Predicted probabilities of consistency
Figure 4.7: Lying game - States BLUE and GREEN - Estimated rela-
tionship between one’s γi value and the probability that one’s decision is
consistent with the Krupka-Weber model
report RED. Moreover, we cannot make any more specific statements about
the people that comprise the other 7%. That is, they have manifested γi
values larger than 5.725, but we have no way of knowing whether their
values are such, that they should have reported RED, BLUE, or GREEN.
Therefore, in principle any report is consistent with the parameter values
of those people.
Nevertheless, the model does not perform well, even given this inde-
terminacy. To start with, the distribution of the actual reports is markedly
different from that predicted by the model (χ2(2) = 37.627, p = 0.000,
Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000). Furthermore, if we focus on the group of people
who were expected to have reported RED,23 we see that only 32% of them
did so. In fact, most of them (39%) opted for truthfully reporting GREEN
instead. Thus, once more, the Krupka-Weber model appears unable to
account for the behaviour of our participants.
Are the consistency rates in the lying game suggestive of a pattern
similar to that we found in the trust game? From what we can infer, this
does not appear to be the case. We ran logistic regressions within each
state24 to try and estimate how the probability of being consistent with
23Here we refer to all participants with γi ≤ 5.725, for whom the model gives a definite
prediction.
24This excludes state RED, where all eligible subjects are consistent by construction:
Reporting RED is the only non-dominated option.
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the model’s prediction varies with one’s γi value. Our results, depicted in
Figure 4.7, indicate that the relationship between degrees of consistency
and parameter values differs markedly across states.
Interestingly, in state BLUE people appear more compelled to report
truthfully than in state GREEN (as indicated by the aggregate percent-
age frequencies of reports in Table 4.5). The difference in the proportions
of true reports across the two states is highly significant (χ2(1) = 13.956,
p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000). This finding is consistent with the
pattern of average ratings that we get from our other subject pool in the
normative experiment. Specifically, reporting BLUE seems to be always
socially appropriate to some extent, at least on average, irrespectively of
the true outcome of the wheel-spin.25 By contrast, reporting GREEN (and,
interestingly, RED) is only appropriate when it is truthful. We can there-
fore argue that, in general, there is more normative support for reporting
BLUE than there is for any of the other two options. The behaviour of our
subjects in the BLUE and GREEN state of the behavioural experiment is
in line with this observation.
Notice that the Krupka-Weber model does not perform badly in ac-
counting for people’s behaviour. Indeed, 70% of the 147 eligible subjects
make choices that are consistent with the γi groups they are classified in
by the model. This rate of ‘success’, however, comes at the expense of de-
terminacy: The hypotheses we test are such, that quite often the model’s
predictions are, to a varying extent, vague. As an example, consider the
subjects with γi ≥ 5.725 in the GREEN state. From the point of view of
the model, any report is, in principle, consistent with the parameter value
each of these subjects may have. But then the model affords us no new
insight about the way they make their decisions. Another example is the
25What we mean here is that reporting BLUE has a positive average score in terms
of social appropriateness in all states of the lying game.
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case of those with γi ∈ [4.545, 5.682] in the BLUE state. Here the model
informs us that none of them will report GREEN, which is true, but not
very interesting. On the proportions of choices of RED and BLUE reports,
however, the model is silent. It cannot distinguish between the two types
in that parameter group.
Finally, note that there are 31 people the behaviour of whom is inex-
plicable by the model. These are the ones who made dominated decisions.
If we consider their cases too, then the proportion of consistent subjects
falls to 58%.
4.4.3 Normative disagreement and inconsistent be-
haviour
So far we have taken each action’s average score in the Krupka-Weber task
as an accurate indicator of how socially appropriate that action is. There
are, however, substantial differences in the dispersion of valuations across
actions. That is, there are variations in the degree of normative disagree-
ment: For some actions we observe a much higher percentage of ratings in
our normative experiment favouring the same option than for others. One
can see this by noticing the varying degrees of standard deviation around
the mean assessments. Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 present these differences for
our three games. Each table contains the distribution of assessments across
the six judgement categories for each action in the corresponding game.
This variation is important, because it can have a direct bearing on
behaviour. The reason is that apart from one’s propensity to choose what is
socially appropriate, an equally important determinant of behaviour is one’s
judgement of how social appropriateness varies across the different actions.
In the language of the model, knowing γi is not enough; to determine i’s
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Table 4.6Distributions of assessments on social appropriateness - Dictator game
Very Socially Somewhat Somewhat Socially Very
Socially Inappropriate Socially Socially Appropriate Socially Mean
Inappropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Appropriate
ONE 87% 6% 5% 0% 1% 1% -0.9
TWO 57% 34% 4% 2% 2% 1% -0.756
THREE 31% 49% 13% 2% 4% 1% -0.592
FOUR 17% 45% 30% 3% 4% 1% -0.46
FIVE 14% 24% 37% 20% 4% 1% -0.284
SIX 8% 19% 27% 36% 8% 2% -0.108
SEVEN 4% 12% 23% 36% 22% 3% 0.076
EIGHT 3% 4% 21% 21% 47% 4% 0.268
NINE 3% 2% 11% 17% 50% 17% 0.44
TEN 0% 0% 3% 1% 4% 92% 0.94
Note: The table presents the relative frequencies of the degrees of social appropriateness and the mean score
for each action. The modal response is shaded.
Table 4.7Distributions of assessments on social appropriateness - Trust game
Very Socially Somewhat Somewhat Socially Very
Socially Inappropriate Socially Socially Appropriate Socially Mean
Inappropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Appropriate
IN 1% 1% 6% 21% 40% 31% 0.564
OUT 1% 9% 17% 22% 25% 26% 0.356
ONE 91% 7% 0% 1% 0% 1% -0.94
TWO 19% 47% 27% 5% 1% 1% -0.5
THREE 9% 10% 29% 33% 18% 1% -0.024
FOUR 0% 0% 0% 2% 7% 91% 0.956
Note: The table presents the relative frequencies of the degrees of social appropriateness and the mean score
for each action. The modal response is shaded.
Table 4.8Distributions of assessments on social appropriateness - Lying game
Very Socially Somewhat Somewhat Socially Very
Socially Inappropriate Socially Socially Appropriate Socially Mean
Inappropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Appropriate
S
ta
te
R
E
D
RED 2% 3% 9% 11% 22% 53% 0.628
BLUE 14% 4% 9% 14% 25% 34% 0.336
GREEN 45% 19% 11% 13% 6% 6% -0.464
S
ta
te
B
L
U
E RED 63% 22% 5% 3% 6% 1% -0.72
BLUE 1% 0% 0% 0% 14% 85% 0.924
GREEN 65% 17% 11% 3% 2% 2% -0.736
S
ta
te
G
R
E
E
N RED 53% 18% 16% 7% 4% 2% -0.612
BLUE 19% 11% 11% 17% 22% 20% 0.088
GREEN 6% 2% 9% 14% 21% 48% 0.544
Note: The table presents the relative frequencies of the degrees of social appropriateness and the mean score for each
action. The modal response is shaded.
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behaviour, we also need to know the exact value of the N(.) function (s)he
assigns to every action.
In this respect, a problem arises for our testing approach for actions
that exhibit high variances in their normative assessments (high degrees
of normative disagreement). For such actions we cannot immediately de-
termine whether a person’s behaviour disputes the model’s prediction or
it should rather be attributed to their perception of how appropriate each
action is. In addition, some actions that are deemed dominated based on
the average assessments may not be so based on the assessments of each
particular individual. In other words, if there is a large variance in how
people assess an action, focusing on a test of consistency based on devia-
tions from the average may be misleading. The reason is that a person’s
behaviour may appear to invalidate the model’s prediction simply because
their normative evaluation of a relevant action is far away from the average.
To see the problem raised by normative disagreement for our analysis,
consider the case of reporting BLUE when the true outcome is GREEN
in the lying game (Table 4.8).This is one of the extreme cases in our sam-
ple, where different norms appear to be in conflict. Notice, in particular,
that 20% of our subjects in the normative experiment view this report as
Very Socially Appropriate, while 19% of them judge it as Very Socially
Inappropriate. The normative disagreement between these two groups is
not merely a quantitative mis-coordination. Their assessments are qualita-
tively different: The first group seems to be strongly driven by a norm of
pro-social payoff-equality,26 while the second one disregards it completely
(perhaps in the name of honesty).
It is thus obvious that in the presence of normative disagreement our
26By pro-social payoff-equality we mean the principle of attaining the most socially
efficient payoff-equality. The characterisation is necessary, because, strictly speaking,
reporting GREEN also achieves payoff-equality, albeit in a very inefficient way.
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arguments about the performance of the Krupka-Weber model are com-
promised: An agent may be behaving according to the model’s rationale,
but based on normative judgements that are substantially different from
those of our average subject. Of course, we do not know the appropriate-
ness judgements of each of our participants in the behavioural experiment.
However, we take the normative ratings elicited through the Krupka-Weber
task to be representative of people’s judgements in aggregate. Thus, we can
try to account (at least in part) for the problem of normative disagreement
by examining the patterns of deviation from the model’s predictions.
To start with, we can immediately point out that normative disagree-
ment should have no effect on the behaviour of people with very low γi
values (in our behavioural experiment, those with γi ≤ 1.389). These peo-
ple should choose the payoff-maximising option in every game. Of course,
people are classified based on the normative assessments in the first place.
However, the assessments pertaining to actions ONE and TWO in the dic-
tator game were relatively decisive: 87% of our normative subjects judged
ONE as Very Socially Inappropriate and a total of 91% evaluated TWO
as either Very Socially Inappropriate or Socially Inappropriate (see Table
4.6). It is, thus, highly unlikely that people in our behavioural experiment
who chose that action did so thinking that it was socially appropriate to do
so. Therefore, their deviations from the model’s predictions can be seen as
indicative of its inability to account for their behaviour. Out of the 46 peo-
ple who chose action ONE in the dictator game, 15 made an inconsistent
choice in at least one of the other two games, while one made a dominated
choice (reported BLUE in state RED of the lying game).27 That is, we
can confidently state that around a third of our subjects with γi ≤ 1.389
behaved in ways that were not anticipated by the model.
27Although the extent to which this choice is dominated can be disputed (the social
appropriateness of reporting BLUE is difficult to determine due to the pull of the payoff-
equality norm), this only affects one of the 46 subjects.
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On the other side of the parameter-value spectrum, people with γi ≥
5.725 can hardly be erroneously classified as avid norm followers. As Table
4.6 indicates, action TEN in the dictator game was perceived as Very So-
cially Appropriate by 92% of our normative subjects. Thus, we can at least
claim that people in our behavioural experiment who chose that action are
characterised by relatively high γi values. Normative disagreement should
affect the behaviour of these people in predictable ways. For example, they
should not be expected to report RED or GREEN in the BLUE state of
the lying game.28 We can form predictions for most of these people29 and,
indeed, as we have already pointed out, their behaviour is largely consistent
with the Krupka-Weber model (81% of those eligible confirm the model’s
predictions in both the trust and the lying game).
Let us now turn to the people with γi values that are most likely
to have been estimated imprecisely. To what extent can we expect their
observed deviations from the predictions we have generated to be due to
their differing opinions on social appropriateness? Consider actions FIVE
and SIX, which exhibit the highest degrees of normative disagreement in
our dictator game.30 As table 4.6 informs us, in our normative experiment
most of the assessments (81% for action FIVE and 82% for action SIX)
are concentrated between Socially Inappropriate and Somewhat Socially
Appropriate. In our behavioural experiment 35 people chose action FIVE
and 34 chose action SIX. For simplicity, ignore those who made a choice that
we previously deemed dominated in either the trust or the lying game.31
28One can see in Table 4.8 that the highest degree of normative agreement in the lying
game is attained in state BLUE.
29Specifically, 11 out of the 14 people with γi ≥ 5.725 made non-dominated choices in
all games.
30The social appropriateness of action SEVEN is equally ambiguous, but recall that it
is dominated based on the average assessments (and, thus, we cannot form predictions
for those who chose it).
31With respect to action THREE in the trust game, notice that, according to Table
4.7, it is highly likely to be deemed a dominated choice by a given individual. The reason
is that most of the assessments that deviate from the modal one are lower. Thus, the
marginal gain in terms of social appropriateness one receives by switching from action
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We are left with 38 subjects whose choices we can evaluate in terms of
their consistency with what the model had predicted. Of them, 84% have
violated at least one of those predictions.
How can this finding be interpreted? Consider the possibility that
the apparent violations of the model’s predictions are in fact instances of
normative disagreement. That is, that the behaviour of these subjects is
actually consistent with the model and it is their normative assessments
that are different from the average ones. We do not have data on the nor-
mative assessments of the participants in our behavioural experiment (as
they are the ones that actually played the games). However, we can get
an idea of how the distribution of those assessments would look like by
looking at the responses in our normative experiment. In other words, we
can attempt to infer the aggregate distribution of assessments our partici-
pants in the behavioural experiment are likely to exhibit by examining the
aggregate distribution of the assessments in our normative experiment.
In Appendix C.2 we offer a full analysis of this approach and outline
of our results. Here we present our findings in a rather intuitive way.
Our analysis focuses on the subjects who chose action FIVE or SIX in
the dictator game, as they are the ones who exhibit the highest rates of
deviation from the model’s predictions and their number is adequate for
this type of analysis. Recall that the prediction of the Krupka-Weber model
for those people is that they will choose action FOUR in the trust game.
We combine the assessment patterns in the normative experiment with the
choices made in the behavioural experiment. This allows us to infer that
among those who chose FIVE or SIX in the dictator game about 44% could
have been expected to choose actions ONE or TWO in the trust game, on
the grounds of normative disagreement. In our behavioural experiment,
TWO to action THREE is likely to be small.
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on the other hand, this proportion is equal to 74%. Simply put, we find
significantly higher rates of deviation that what normative disagreement
alone can account for.
We repeat the analysis for the same group of people in state GREEN
of the lying game. Here too we find that the rates of deviation do not
match the pattern of assessments in Table 4.8. Intuitively, there are far
fewer RED, and more BLUE and, especially, GREEN reports than what
should be expected solely due to normative disagreement. To see this, note
that virtually none of the people in this state reported RED (the model’s
prediction). One could argue that this is because they perceived reporting
RED as too inappropriate compared to the other two options. However,
this argument is problematic: Given the range of γi values these people
can have based on their dictator-game choices, their perceived difference
between the social appropriateness of RED and that of BLUE or GREEN
reports would have to be very high. It is immediately obvious in Table
4.8, though, that this can hardly be the case for all these people. The
assessments on the social appropriateness of each option in state GREEN
are quite dispersed. As a result, it should have been the case that some
of them had not judged RED as too inappropriate to be chosen. Thus,
even given the imprecision in estimating people’s perceptions on the social
appropriateness of each of the available actions, the model cannot account
for the behavioural patterns we observe.
We conclude that the Krupka-Weber model of social conformity does
not perform well in anticipating the behaviour of our subjects, even when
normative disagreement is taken into account. Moreover, it falls short in
different dimensions. Specifically, it sometimes precludes actions that turn
out to be quite popular, and generates predictions that are often inaccurate
and/or inconsistent with people’s actual behaviour.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we evaluate the ability of the Krupka-Weber model of nor-
mative preferences to consistently account for the behaviour of our par-
ticipants. For this purpose, we use an experiment involving three games
that share some important qualitative characteristics: They do not in-
volve strategic uncertainty and they are likely to be relevant to this model
(based on previous studies with similar games). We find little support for
the model’s predictive power. The proportions of people characterised by
certain degrees of sensitivity towards norm-compliance are not stable across
our games. In addition, individual sensitivities also tend to vary from one
game to the other.
In contrast to the narrative of the normative model, we find that most
of the people who are either very selfish or very egalitarian exhibit sta-
ble preferences. Those who are very selfish try to maximise their personal
material payoffs. The egalitarian ones, on the other hand, seek to achieve
payoff equality. Their common element is that they are consistent in pur-
suing their respective goals across the three games. If we take the average
normative assessments as indicative of how socially appropriate the actions
in our games are, the behaviour of the egalitarian group is hard to recon-
cile with the Krupka-Weber model. In the face of normative conflict, where
payoff equality is at odds with honesty, people who strongly value the for-
mer choose to lie, in order to stick to their principle. Due to the dominance
of the honesty norm, however, they appear as norm-violators.
It is this feature that may highlight the main problem with the norma-
tive account. It may be true that people adhere to particular principles or
behavioural rules due to a desire for conformity, in the fist place. However,
this still does not imply that they hold all principles equally. To the ex-
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tent that their perceptions about which ones dominate are different, some
narrowly-focused normative agents will appear as deviants. Additionally,
if we are to view them as moral agents instead, we may be able to ac-
count for their behaviour, in these games at least, more efficiently, with a
more parsimonious model. Moreover, subjects who do not appear strongly
motivated by selfish or pro-social principles are also unpredictable. Their
propensities to abide by norms vary substantially across the three games.
The behaviour of these people does not lend itself to straightforward classi-
fication. What we can conclude is that it cannot be consistently tracked by
the Krupka-Weber model. Perhaps it will be fruitful for future research to
use different games, in order to try and explain these people’s preferences.
It can be argued that the shortcomings of the model may have re-
sulted from differences in perceptions about social appropriateness. Over-
all, our analysis indicates that this is unlikely to be the case. That is,
the behavioural variation is not sufficiently explicable by differences in the
individual-specific values of the N(.) function. Therefore, assuming that
our testing procedure is valid, we can interpret the model’s failure in two
ways. The first is that the people in our sample are not driven by concerns
about social appropriateness, but by some other motives. Each of these
motives may (or may not) be specific to some, but not all of our games.32
According to this narrative, in order to explain behaviour, we need a com-
pletely different framework altogether. The second interpretation is that
people’s preferences for complying with what is socially appropriate are
not stable across games. In other words, each person i is characterised by
different γi values, depending on the situation (s)he faces. In this case, if
behaviour is still explicable, then there must be a way in which we can
associate the various situations with these different γi values. However,
32For example, concerns about payoff equality are relevant to all games, while a desire
for maximising social efficiency is only relevant to the dictator and the trust game.
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in doing so, we may end up with a model that is isomorphic to the one
based on separate motives. We will then have to consider the epistemic
conditions imposed by each to determine which one is superior.
Finally, it may simply be the case that the norm-elicitation task does
not work very well for an analysis of this level of detail. For example, our
assumption that people perceive the rating ‘Very Socially Inappropriate’
in the same way in all three games may not be valid. If people interpret
‘Very Socially Inappropriate’ differently across our three games, then we
have no basis for computing the relevant parameter thresholds. In this
case, it is the shortcomings of the elicitation mechanism that are causing
the problem. To the extent that this is true, however, we are at an impasse,
since it is hard to imagine how this mechanism can be improved.
Our data suggest that some people are strongly motivated by notions
that are irrelevant to social appropriateness. A very high proportion of
those who choose the options that maximise their own material payoffs do
so consistently across our games. The same is true for those who choose the
most egalitarian options. On the other hand, some people do not manifest
strong concerns of this kind. It might be tempting to assume that these
are the ones who are driven by concerns about social appropriateness, but
this does not seem to be the case.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The three studies reported in this thesis investigate different aspects of pro-
social behaviour, using game-theoretic tools and experimental methods.
The first of these studies (reported in chapter 2) explores the potential for
moral preferences to arise as optimal correction mechanisms that eliminate
the effects of time-inconsistency in preferences. The other two (reported
in chapters 3 and 4) examine whether social behaviour as it is manifested
in the experimental laboratory can be consistently accounted for by two
exemplary models of social preferences.
Chapter 2 proposes a game-theoretic account of the emergence of moral
preferences. Adopting a consequentialist viewpoint, the study links the in-
culcation of such preferences into an individual’s utility function to their
potential in improving her/his material situation. At a first glance, this
might appear a very narrow conception of morality. However, it can be
useful in at least three distinct ways. To start with, the issue of how moral
rules may arise and survive selection processes based on material outcomes
(which is how we think that evolution operates) is a very important one,
indeed. If anything, the moral content of an action or a particular type of
behaviour may turn out to be complementary to its material consequences,
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and if this is the case, it is worth being pointed out. The same analysis may
also be used to caution against cases where these two aspects are (at least
seemingly) contradictory and in those cases it is not clear why one should
prevail over the other (see e.g. Dawkins, 2016 on the discrepancy between
genes and humans). On a separate, methodological note, accounting for a
variety of behavioural determinants within a single framework may prove
to be a useful exercise (see Dietrich and List, 2013 for a larger-scale classifi-
cation). Finally, the fact that morality can be examined from a materialist
perspective in the first place is worth being put forward in its own right,
because it highlights an aspect of the notion that is worth considering,
particularly with respect to how it is construed in the first place. These
three lines of inquiry are areas where the research reported in chapter 2
can be expanded. Another project of great interest is an expansion of the
existing model that considers the interplay among the agents in a more
comprehensive manner.
Chapters 3 and 4 report studies that investigate the potential of two
seminal accounts of social preferences to accurately and consistently track
behaviour in an experimental setting. The first of these two accounts is the
model of inequality aversion, proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The
second is the model of adherence to social norms, advanced by Krupka and
Weber (2013). While the separate examination of the performance of each
model is interesting and informative in its own right, a comparative view
of their relative strengths and shortcomings affords some profound insights
on the determinants of behaviour.
The evaluation of the inequality-aversion model is reported in chapter
3. The setup involves three one-shot, two-player games, aimed at distin-
guishing among people with varying degrees of aversion to advantageous
payoff inequality (also referred to as guilt). Each participant is asked to
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provide a decision for every decision node of every player in each of these
games. The results indicate that the behaviour of the participants in gen-
eral cannot be consistently accounted for by the model. However, most of
those who exhibit either particularly selfish or very egalitarian preferences
are also consistently doing so. That is, while the model appears unable to
account for the whole of the behavioural variation that we observe in our
data, it does seem to be able to capture some of it. That is, it does seem
to be able to account for the behaviour of certain types of people. A useful
test of the robustness of this claim would be an experimental investigation
involving games with payoff structures that expand progressively towards
both directions. Such a setup would allow for a finer distinction between,
e.g., selfish and status-quo preferences, as well as between egalitarian and
altruistic ones.
Chapter 4 reports the evaluation of the norm-adherence model. The
experimental setup is the same one used for the study in chapter 3, with the
addition of an experiment aimed at determining the degree of social appro-
priateness pertaining to each action available in the games. The model’s
performance is not supported by the results. It appears that the only peo-
ple the behaviour of whom can be explained by it are those who choose the
payoff-maximising option every time, whether it is socially appropriate to
do so or not. Thus, it does not appear to afford any additional interpre-
tative power relative to the standard materialist account, while it imposes
further epistemic requirements. An element of interest in the fallibility of
some of the model’s predictions is that they appear to be driven by people’s
tendency to adhere to their particular motives even when the actions they
prescribe are not the most socially appropriate.
When comparing the two models in terms of their performance this
particular feature stands out, not least because it is the opposite of what
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one might expect. The dependency of choices on the context within which
they are expressed is a well-documented regularity in the wider experi-
mental literature (see e.g. Krupka and Weber, 2013 for a review). The
norm-adherence model aims to account for this dependency by providing a
more nuanced and flexible concept for the determinants of behaviour, which
is also more demanding: In addition to the individual-specific propensities
for norm-following, one also needs to know the ratings of social appropri-
ateness that pertain to all the actions involved in the choice problem at
hand in order to draw predictions. What this comparative evaluation sug-
gests, however, is that the more nuanced account may in fact be worse at
anticipating people’s behaviour. At the very least, it appears that there are
some individuals who are strongly motivated by particular principles (here
payoff equality) and they tend to adhere to them even when they compare
unfavourably, in society’s view, to other principles. This finding suggests
that at least some individuals can be classified as conforming to certain
types, defined according to some principles that are independent of con-
text. It thus reinforces the conclusions reached by Fischbacher and Ga¨chter
(2006), who find clear evidence in support of the existence of heterogeneous
types in public-good games.
In this sense, the findings of the two experimental studies provide
some empirical support for the way moral preferences are construed in the
game-theoretic model proposed in this thesis. Given that some agents ap-
pear to exhibit preferences for particular moral rules, an interesting avenue
for further research involves the analysis of interactions of distinct moral
doctrines. To some extent, this ‘battle of ideas’ scenario already features
in many formal conceptualisations of social preferences, since the princi-
ple of maximisation of one’s own material standing can itself be thought
of as one such doctrine. Thus, for example, the analyses in Bisin and
Verdier (2001), Adriani and Sonderegger (2009), and Alger and Weibull
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(2012, 2013) already incorporate this feature. However, the consideration
of a wider variety of moral rules, with different behavioural prescriptions,
offers a richer structure that can afford deeper insights about the ways in
which societies determine their moral codes. This potential is enhanced
by the incorporation of elements of network theory in the game-theorist’s
tool-kit.
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that attempts to theoretically
expand and empirically evaluate notions of individual preferences can con-
tribute towards the integration of viewpoints prevalent in different social
science disciplines. This integration, if at all feasible, may provide the sci-
entific community not only with a unified account of social behaviour, but
also with a more profound understanding of the factors that determine it.
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Appendix A
A.1 P ’s problem
Consider the objective function of P as defined by 2.2.4.2. Upon satisfac-
tion of the first-order condition:
F.O.C. : − 1
βδ
(
b1 − δ b1 − n
βδ
)
f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
− C
′
(n)
δ
= 0⇒
⇒ [(1− β)b1 − n] = β2
f( b1−n
βδ
)
C
′
(n)⇒
⇒ n∗ = (1− β)b1 − β
2
f( b1−n
∗
βδ
)
C
′
(n∗) (A.1.0.1)
The second-order condition for a strict maximum suggests that:
− 1
βδ
[
(1− β)b1 − n∗
]
f
′
(
b1 − n∗
βδ
)
− f
(
b1 − n∗
βδ
)
− β2C ′′(n∗) < 0
(A.1.0.2)
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Notice that inequality A.1.0.2 is not necessarily satisfied for every n∗
that satisfies A.1.0.1. Assumption 2.2.6 ensures that the n∗ that satisfies
A.1.0.1 maximises P ’s utility function. Assumption 2.2.5 guarantees that
this maximum point is unique.
A.2 Parameter variations
We now investigate how variations in the parameters of the model affect
the level of n and the rate of Y ’s adherence to P ’s preference. We focus
firstly on b1. Recall that according to A.1.0.1:
[
(1− β)b1 − n
]
f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
− β2C ′(n) = 0 (A.2.0.1)
Deriving A.2.0.1 with respect to b1 we find:
∂F.O.C.
∂b1
=
1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n]f ′
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
+ (1− β)f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
(A.2.0.2)
Deriving A.2.0.1 with respect to n we find:
∂F.O.C.
∂n
= − 1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n]f ′
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
− f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
− β2C ′′(n)
(A.2.0.3)
Consider an exogenous shift from b¯1 to bˆ1, where |b¯1| < |bˆ1|. Let
db1 ≡ |bˆ1|− |b¯1| and dn∗ ≡ nˆ∗− n¯∗. Note that P will respond to the change
in b1 by adjusting n according to A.2.0.1. Therefore, A.2.0.2 and A.2.0.3
together add up to:
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[
1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n]f ′
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
+ (1− β)f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)]
db1−
−
[
1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n]f ′
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
+ f
(
b1 − n
βδ
)
+ β2C
′′
(n)
]
dn = 0
Thus, it is true that:
dn∗
db1
=
1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n∗]f ′
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
+ (1− β)f( b1−n∗
βδ
)
1
βδ
[(1− β)b1 − n∗]f ′
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
+ f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
+ β2C ′′(n∗)
(A.2.0.4)
The sign of dn
∗
db1
depends on the sign and magnitude of f
′( b1−n
βδ
)
. To see
this, recall firstly that from equation A.1.0.2 f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
has a lower bound:
f
′
(
b1 − n∗
βδ
)
> −βδf
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
+ β3δC
′′
(n∗)
(1− β)b1 − n∗
This means that the denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side
of equation A.2.0.4 is positive for every n∗ that constitutes a maximum.
The numerator, on the other hand, will be negative if:
f
′
(
b1 − n∗
βδ
)
< −βδ(1− β)f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
(1− β)b1 − n∗
Taking the above into account, we can discern the following cases:
dn∗
db1
=

y > 0, if
f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) > − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗
y < 0, if
f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) < − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗
y = 0, if
f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) = − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗
(A.2.0.5)
It is worth noting that when dn
∗
db1
< 0, n∗ will fall to zero following an
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increase in b1. The reason is that from 2.2.6 it can be seen that f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
)
is decreasing more rapidly than C(n). Thus, as is the case in our baseline
scenario, in response to an increase in b1 P will either increase n
∗, or
eliminate it altogether. We can describe the relationship between changes
in b1 and changes in n
∗ in a general proposition. Consider game G with
b¯1, b¯2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ¯2), and n¯∗. Suppose that b¯1 is replaced with bˆ1, where
|bˆ1| > |b¯1|. Such a change will, ceteris paribus, lead to:
• nˆ∗ > n¯∗, if f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) > − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗ .
• nˆ∗ < n¯∗, if f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) < − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗ .
• nˆ∗ = n¯∗, if f
′( b1−n∗
βδ
)
f
(
b1−n∗
βδ
) = − βδ(1−β)
(1−β)b1−n∗ .
The first of these cases corresponds to corollary 2.2.8. It suggests
that so long as the percentage change in the frequency of the cut-off point
is above a certain threshold, P will have an incentive to increase n∗ in
response to increases in b1.
Changes in b1 also have a bearing on compliance, which, according
to corollary 2.2.8, may be negative. Following our definition of compli-
ance (2.2.2), we can measure its variations as changes in the cumulative
probability that Y ’s choice wil not conform with P ’s preference. As this
probability dwindles, the degree of compliance increases.
Let NC be the cumulative probability that the choice of Y will be
different from P ’s preference. Then, NC = CF( b1−n∗
βδ
) − CF( b1
δ
)
, where
CF(.) is the cumulative distribution function of distribution F(.). Consider,
then, the change in this difference in response to a change in b1.
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∂
(CF( b1−n∗
βδ
)− CF( b1
δ
))
∂b1
=
(
1− ∂n
∗
∂b1
)
1
βδ
f
(
b1 − n∗
βδ
)
− 1
δ
f
(
b1
δ
)
(A.2.0.6)
Given that ∂n
∗
∂b1
< 1 (from equation A.2.0.4), the first term of the
right-hand side of A.2.0.6 is always positive. Therefore, for a sufficiently
low f
(
b1
δ
)
an increase in b1 will lead to a lower degree of compliance.
To clarify this argument further, we also provide a numerical ex-
ample. Consider game G with b¯1 = 4, bˆ1 = 6, C(n) = 4n, δ = 1, β =
0.25,F(b2, σ2) = N (14, 2), where N (µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with
mean µ, variance σ2, and probability density function g(x | µ, σ2) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
( − (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
. Let n¯∗ be the equilibrium level of n corresponding
to b¯1 and nˆ
∗ the one corresponding to bˆ1. Then, from A.2.0.1, solving for
n¯∗:
n¯∗ = (1− β)b¯1 − β
2
f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)C ′(n¯∗) =
= 3− 0.0625
f
(
4−n¯∗
0.25
)4 =
≈ 1
On the other hand, solving for nˆ∗:
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nˆ∗ = (1− β)bˆ1 − β
2
f
(
bˆ1−nˆ∗
βδ
)C ′(nˆ∗) =
= 4.5− 0.0625
j
(
4−nˆ∗
0.25
)4 =
≈ 2.875
We see that P has increased n∗ in response to the rise in b1. With
respect to compliance, it is easy to see that the cumulative probability of
disagreement between the two agents has increased. In particular, under
b¯1 this probability is equal to:
CF
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
− CF
(
b¯1
δ
)
= CF(12)− CF(4) ≈ 0.159 (A.2.0.7)
Under bˆ2, on the other hand, it becomes:
CF
(
bˆ1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
− CF
(
bˆ1
δ
)
= CF(12.5)− CF(6) ≈ 0.227 (A.2.0.8)
Thus, compliance decreases following the increase of b1 from b¯1 to bˆ1.
We now turn to variations in b2 and their effect on the equilibrium level
of morality. In what follows, b1 = b¯1. In accordance with assumptions 2.2.5
and 2.2.6, let b2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ¯2), where F(.) is quasi-concave. To start with,
suppose that a variance-preserving shift occurs, from F(b¯2, σ¯2) toH(bˆ2, σ¯2),
where bˆ2 > b¯2 > 0. In other words, the distribution shifts towards higher
values of b2, making option B less appealing than before. Let n¯
∗ denote
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the equilibrium n under F(.) and nˆ∗ that under H(.). In addition, let f(.)
denote the probability density function of distribution F(.) and h(.) that of
distribution H(.). It is straightforward to verify from equation A.2.0.1 that
an increase (decrease) of the density of the cut-off point that has resulted
from a change in the distribution will lead to an increase (decrease) in n∗.
The reason is that such a change adjusts the importance of C
′
(n∗) in the
determination of n∗. In other words, it is true that if h
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)
> f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)
,
then nˆ∗ > n¯∗, while if h
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)
< f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)
, then nˆ∗ < n¯∗. In addition,
from A.2.0.1, the following two equations are true.
(1− β)b¯1 − n¯∗ − β
2
f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)C ′(n¯∗) = 0
(1− β)b¯1 − nˆ∗ − β
2
h
(
b¯1−nˆ∗
βδ
)C ′(nˆ∗) = 0
Therefore, it follows that:
n¯∗ − nˆ∗ = β
2
h
(
b¯1−nˆ∗
βδ
)C ′(nˆ∗)− β2
f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)C ′(n¯∗) (A.2.0.9)
Then, comparing n¯∗ with nˆ∗, one can see that:
n¯∗ > nˆ∗ ⇒ f
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
> h
(
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
C
′
(n¯∗)
C ′(nˆ∗)
The converse is also true:
n¯∗ < nˆ∗ ⇒ f
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
< h
(
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
C
′
(n¯∗)
C ′(nˆ∗)
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Suppose, now, that d
2C(n)
dn2
≥ 0, that is, that the cost function is either
convex or linear in n. In this case n¯∗ > nˆ∗ ⇒ C
′
(n¯∗)
C′ (nˆ∗) > 1 and vice-versa.
Thus:
n¯∗ > nˆ∗ ⇒ f
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
> h
(
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
n¯∗ < nˆ∗ ⇒ f
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
< h
(
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
It, thus, becomes apparent that equation A.2.0.9 implies an upper and
a lower bound for the density of the new cut-off point, h
(
b¯1−nˆ∗
βδ
)
. That is,
the density of a cut-off point that has resulted from an increase in n can
never be lower than that of the initial cut-off point. Conversely, the density
of a cut-off point that has resulted from a reduction in n will never surpass
that of the initial cut-off point. This result implies that a parallel (variance-
preserving) shift in the distribution of b2, such as the one described above,
always enhances compliance.
To see why this is the case, consider such a change, whereby rule
f : R+ → R+ is replaced by h : R+ → R+ such, that h(b2) = f(b2−∆) ∀b2,
where ∆ > 0. Recall that n¯∗ is the equilibrium level of morality under f(.)
and nˆ∗ that under h(.). Then, it is true that:
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
≤ b¯1 − n¯
∗
βδ
+ ∆ (A.2.0.10)
To see this, one can start from nˆ = n¯∗− βδ∆ and show that this is, in
fact, not equal to nˆ∗.1 Recall that if nˆ was an equilibrium level under h(.),
1If it were, the cut-off point b¯1−nˆ
∗
βδ would be in the same relative position given h(.)
with that of b¯1−n¯
∗
βδ under f(.).
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then it would need to satisfy A.2.0.1. However:
[
(1− β)b¯1 − nˆ
]
h
(
b¯1 − nˆ
βδ
)
− β2C ′(nˆ) =
=
[
(1− β)b¯1 − n¯∗ + βδ∆
]
h
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
+ ∆
)
− β2C ′(n¯∗ − βδ∆) =
=
[
(1− β)b¯1 − n¯∗ + βδ∆
]
f
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
− β2C ′(n¯∗ − βδ∆) =
= β2
[
C
′
(n¯∗)− C ′(n¯∗ − βδ∆)]+ βδ∆f( b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
> 0
It is obvious that A.2.0.1 is not satisfied by nˆ = n¯∗− βδ∆. Therefore,
P has an incentive to further increase n, thereby increasing the probability
that Y will make her preferred choice in the next period.
We can organise our findings with respect to variance-preserving dis-
tributional shifts in another general proposition. Consider game G with b¯1,
b¯2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ¯2), and n¯∗. Consider a shift from F(b¯2, σ¯2) to H(bˆ2, σ¯2), where
0 < b¯2 < bˆ2. Let f(.) denote the probabilty density function of distribution
F(.) and h(.) denote the probability density function of distribution H(.).
Then, such a change will, ceteris paribus, lead to:
• nˆ∗ < n¯∗, if h( b1−n¯∗
βδ
) < f( b1−n¯
∗
βδ
).
• nˆ∗ > n¯∗, if h( b1−n¯∗
βδ
) > f( b1−n¯
∗
βδ
).
• nˆ∗ = n¯∗, if h( b1−n¯∗
βδ
) = f( b1−n¯
∗
βδ
).
If additionally b1
δ
< b¯2, then, ceteris paribus, the probability that Y ’s choice
will comply with P ’s preference increases as E[b2] grows larger.
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b¯2 bˆ2
b¯1−n∗
βδ
b¯1
δ
b¯1
βδ
b2
Figure A.1: bˆ2 > b¯2: The expected future consequence is relatively larger,
but the level of n∗ is the same.
A.3 Example of a distributional shift
What if both the mean and the variance increase as a result of the dis-
tributional shift? This is the case pertaining to proposition 2.2.10, which
states that such a change may decrease both n and compliance. We show
how this can be the case through an example situation. Consider game G
with b1 = 4, C(n) = 2n, δ = 1, β = 0.5,F(b¯2, σ¯2) = N (5.5, 0.4),J (bˆ2, σˆ2) =
N (7, 1), where N (µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ, variance
σ2, and probability density function g(x | µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
. Let
n¯∗ be the equilibrium level of n under distribution F(.) and nˆ∗ that under
J (.). Then, from A.2.0.1, solving for n¯∗:
n¯∗ = (1− β)b¯1 − β
2
f
(
b¯1−n¯∗
βδ
)C ′(n¯∗) =
= 2− 0.25
f
(
4−n¯∗
0.5
)2 =
≈ 1.38
On the other hand, solving for nˆ∗:
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nˆ∗ = (1− β)b¯1 − β
2
j
(
b¯1−nˆ∗
βδ
)C ′(nˆ∗) =
= 4− 0.25
j
(
4−nˆ∗
0.5
)2 =
≈ 0.67
Thus, the level of n∗ has decreased as a result of the distributional
shift. Regarding compliance, let CN (.) denote the cumulative distribution
function of N (.). Then, under F(5.5, 0.4) the share of b2 values for which
Y would conform with P ’s preference in the case of conflict was:
CF
(
b¯1
βδ
)
− CF
(
b¯1 − n¯∗
βδ
)
≈ 1− 0.258 = 0.742
Under J (7, 1) the share of b2 values for which Y will conform with P ’s
preference in the case of conflict becomes:
CJ
(
b¯1
βδ
)
− CJ
(
b¯1 − nˆ∗
βδ
)
≈ 0.841− 0.345 = 0.496
Thus, both morality and compliance decrease as a result of the dis-
tributional shift. The results are illustrated in figure 2.10, in sub-section
2.2.4. In general terms, the proposition may be stated as follows. Consider
game G with b¯1, b¯2 ∼ F(b¯2, σ¯2), and n¯∗. Consider a shift from F(b¯2, σ¯2) to
J (bˆ2, σˆ2), where 1δ < b¯2 < bˆ2 and σ¯2 < σˆ2. Let f(.) denote the probability
density function of distribution F(.) and j(.) denote the probability density
function of distribution J (.). Then, ∃f, j : R+ → R+ such, that nˆ∗ < n¯∗
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and the degree of compliance is lower.
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Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment on decision making. This 
experiment is run by the “Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and 
has been financed by various research foundations. For your participation you will receive a 
show-up fee of £2. In addition, you may receive some more money, based on your choices 
and the choices of others. 
 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this experiment. Everyone 
is participating for the first time, and all participants are reading the same instructions. During 
the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain quiet, and do not 
attempt to communicate with other participants. If you have a question at any time, please 
raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to your desk to answer it. Participants 
not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving payment.  
 
There will be three tasks for all participants to perform in this experiment. In each task you 
will be asked to make one or more decisions, and will have a chance to earn money. You will 
not receive feedback on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and 
decisions that will be made in one task will not affect decisions or earnings in the other tasks. 
You will not receive any instructions for or information about a task until you have 
completed all previous tasks. After the third task, there will also be a questionnaire. The 
anonymity of your responses to all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
 
Only one task will be used for determining your earnings from the experiment. At the end 
of the experiment, we will roll a fair six-sided die. If we roll a 1 or a 2, all participants in this 
experiment will be paid according to their earnings from Task 1 only. If we roll a 3 or a 4, all 
participants will be paid according to their earnings from Task 2 only. And if we roll a 5 or a 
6, all participants will be paid according to their earnings from Task 3 only. As you will not 
know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive payment for, please make 
your decisions in each task carefully. Your earnings will be paid out to you in private and in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Shortly, you will receive detailed instructions about Task 1. You will receive detailed 
instructions about Task 2 once everyone in the room has completed Task 1, and instructions 
about Task 3 once everyone in the room has completed Task 2. 
 
If you have a question now, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your 
desk to answer it. 
  
B.1 Experimental instructions
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Task 1 - Instructions 
 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be paired with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual A" or "Individual B", 
with equal probability. Individual A must choose one of ten possible actions, while Individual 
B has no action to take. The action taken by Individual A determines the final earnings for 
Individual A and Individual B in Task 1 of the experiment. 
 
The ten possible actions that Individual A can take are listed in the table below. For each 
action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual A and Individual B.  
 
Individual A’s  
action 
Individual A’s 
earnings 
 Individual B’s 
earnings 
ONE £18.00 £0.00 
TWO £17.80 £1.80 
THREE £17.40 £3.40 
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 
SIX £15.00 £7.00 
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 
NINE £10.80 £8.80 
TEN £9.00 £9.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual A chooses action FOUR. Then, Individual A's final 
earnings from Task 1 are £16.80 and Individual B's final earnings are £4.80. 
 
Exactly who takes the role of Individual A in your pair will not be revealed until the end of 
the experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to make a decision as if you are Individual A.  
 
At the end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you or the person you are paired with take the role of Individual A.  
• If you are selected as Individual A, then your choice will be implemented, and you 
and the other person will be paid according to your decision.  
• If the other person in the pair is selected as Individual A, then his or her choice will be 
implemented, and you and the other person will be paid according to his or her 
decision.  
 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 1 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. You will decide who takes the role of Individual A in your pair. 
b. The experimenter will toss a coin to decide who takes the role of Individual A 
in your pair. You and the other person will be informed of the outcome of the 
coin toss before you make any decision in the task.  
c. The experimenter will toss a coin to decide who takes the role of Individual A 
in your pair. You and the other person will only be informed of the outcome of 
the coin toss at the end of the experiment.  
 
 
2. Suppose that you choose action THREE and the other person in your pair chooses 
action SIX. If this task is selected for payment, and you are selected as Individual A: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
3. Suppose that you choose action TEN and the other person in your pair chooses action 
SEVEN. If this task is selected for payment, and the other person is selected as 
Individual A: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 1 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please make a decision in the role of Individual A. Please choose one of the ten actions below 
and indicate your choice in the space provided below. 
 
Individual A’s  
Action 
Individual A’s earnings  Individual B’s earnings 
ONE £18.00 £0.00 
TWO £17.80 £1.80 
THREE £17.40 £3.40 
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 
SIX £15.00 £7.00 
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 
NINE £10.80 £8.80 
TEN £9.00 £9.00 
 
 
I choose action 
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 2 - Instructions 
 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be matched with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual X" or "Individual Y", 
with equal probability. Individual X can choose between two actions: “IN” or “OUT”. 
 
If Individual X chooses OUT, Individual Y has no action to take, and both Individual X and 
Individual Y earn £4.50 each. 
 
If Individual X chooses IN, then Individual Y must choose one of four possible actions, listed 
in the table below. For each action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual 
X and Individual Y.  
 
Individual Y’s 
action 
Individual Y’s 
earnings 
Individual X’s 
earnings 
ONE £16.60 £1.10 
TWO £15.75 £4.50 
THREE £13.75 £7.50 
FOUR £10.00 £10.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual X chooses IN and Individual Y chooses action TWO. 
Then, Individual Y's final earnings from Task 2 are £15.75 and Individual X's final earnings 
are £4.50. 
 
Exactly who in your pair takes the role of Individual X or Individual Y will not be revealed 
until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to make a decision for each 
role. That is, we ask you to make two decisions: one decision as if you are Individual X, and 
one decision as if you are Individual Y.  
 
At the end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you take the role of Individual X (and thus the other person in your pair 
takes the role of Individual Y), or Individual Y (and thus the other person in your pair takes 
the role of Individual X).  
• If you take the role of Individual X, then your decision in the role of Individual X and 
the other person’s decision in the role of Individual Y will be used to compute 
earnings.  
• If you take the role of Individual Y, then your decision in the role of Individual Y and 
the other person’s decision in the role of Individual X will be used to compute 
earnings. 
 Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 2 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. You are paired with another person in this task. You do not know whether you 
will be assigned the role of Individual X or Individual Y until the end of the 
experiment. Therefore, you are asked to make two decisions: one in the role of 
Individual X and one in the role of Individual Y.  
b. You have been assigned the role of Individual Y in this task. 
c. You are paired with another person in this task. You do not know whether you 
will be assigned the role of Individual X or Individual Y until the end of the 
experiment. You are asked to make a decision in the role of Individual X and 
the other person is asked to make a decision in the role of Individual Y. 
 
2. Suppose that you choose IN in the role of Individual X, and action THREE in the role 
of Individual Y. Suppose that the other person in your pair chooses IN in the role of 
Individual X, and action ONE in the role of Individual Y. If this task is selected for 
payment, and you are selected as Individual X: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
3. Suppose that you choose IN in the role of Individual X, and action ONE in the role of 
Individual Y. Suppose that the other person in your pair chooses OUT in the role of 
Individual X, and action FOUR in the role of Individual Y. If this task is selected for 
payment, and you are selected as Individual Y: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
 
 
Task 2 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please make a decision in the role of Individual X, and a decision in the role of Individual Y.  
Please indicate your choices in the spaces provided below. 
 
 
 
Individual X: 
Please choose between IN and OUT. 
 
As Individual X, I choose  
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Y: 
Please choose one of the four actions below. 
 
Individual Y’s 
action 
Individual Y’s 
earnings 
Individual X’s 
earnings 
ONE £16.60 £1.10 
TWO £15.75 £4.50 
THREE £13.75 £7.50 
FOUR £10.00 £10.00 
 
 
As Individual Y, I choose action    
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 3 - Instructions 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be paired with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual J" or "Individual K", 
with equal probability. Only Individual J has an action to take in this task, and this action will 
determine the final earnings for Individual J and Individual K in Task 3 of the experiment. 
 
On his or her computer screen, Individual J will see a “spinning wheel”, divided in three 
different-coloured sections of equal size: RED, BLUE, and GREEN. A screenshot of the 
spinning wheel is provided below.  
 
Individual J activates the wheel by clicking the START button. The wheel will spin for a few 
seconds and then will stop. The screen will then go blank. Individual J must report on the 
decision sheet the outcome of the wheel spin. The final earnings from Task 3 for Individual J 
and Individual K depend on this outcome. In particular:  
• If the wheel stops on RED, Individual J earns £17.00 and Individual K earns £0.00 
• If the wheel stops on BLUE, both Individual J and Individual K earn £8.50 each 
• If the wheel stops on GREEN, both Individual J and Individual K earn £0.00 each 
Note that each colour has an equal chance of being selected.  
 
Exactly who takes the role of Individual J in your pair will not be revealed until the end of the 
experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to spin the wheel as if you are Individual J. At the 
end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you or the person you are paired with take the role of Individual J.  
• If you are selected as Individual J, then we will use the outcome of the wheel spin 
reported on your decision sheet to compute your earnings for Task 3.  
• If the other person is selected as Individual J, then we will use the outcome of the 
wheel spin reported on his or her decision sheet to compute your earnings for Task 3. 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 3 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. If you are Individual J and the wheel stops on GREEN: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
2. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will certainly not be used to 
compute earnings in this task. 
b. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will certainly be used to compute 
earnings in this task. 
c. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will be used to compute earnings 
in this task only if you are randomly assigned the role of Individual J at the 
end of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 3 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please report the outcome of the wheel spin that you saw on your computer screen. 
 
 
The outcome of the wheel spin was 
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C
C.1 Experimental instructions
C.1.1 Behavioural experiment
170
  
Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment on decision making. This 
experiment is run by the “Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and 
has been financed by various research foundations. For your participation you will receive a 
show-up fee of £2. In addition, you may receive some more money, based on your choices 
and the choices of others. 
 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this experiment. Everyone 
is participating for the first time, and all participants are reading the same instructions. During 
the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain quiet, and do not 
attempt to communicate with other participants. If you have a question at any time, please 
raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to your desk to answer it. Participants 
not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving payment.  
 
There will be three tasks for all participants to perform in this experiment. In each task you 
will be asked to make one or more decisions, and will have a chance to earn money. You will 
not receive feedback on the outcome of any task until the end of the experiment, and 
decisions that will be made in one task will not affect decisions or earnings in the other tasks. 
You will not receive any instructions for or information about a task until you have 
completed all previous tasks. After the third task, there will also be a questionnaire. The 
anonymity of your responses to all parts of all tasks and questions is guaranteed. 
 
Only one task will be used for determining your earnings from the experiment. At the end 
of the experiment, we will roll a fair six-sided die. If we roll a 1 or a 2, all participants in this 
experiment will be paid according to their earnings from Task 1 only. If we roll a 3 or a 4, all 
participants will be paid according to their earnings from Task 2 only. And if we roll a 5 or a 
6, all participants will be paid according to their earnings from Task 3 only. As you will not 
know until the end of the experiment which task you will receive payment for, please make 
your decisions in each task carefully. Your earnings will be paid out to you in private and in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Shortly, you will receive detailed instructions about Task 1. You will receive detailed 
instructions about Task 2 once everyone in the room has completed Task 1, and instructions 
about Task 3 once everyone in the room has completed Task 2. 
 
If you have a question now, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your 
desk to answer it. 
  
Task 1 - Instructions 
 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be paired with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual A" or "Individual B", 
with equal probability. Individual A must choose one of ten possible actions, while Individual 
B has no action to take. The action taken by Individual A determines the final earnings for 
Individual A and Individual B in Task 1 of the experiment. 
 
The ten possible actions that Individual A can take are listed in the table below. For each 
action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual A and Individual B.  
 
Individual A’s  
action 
Individual A’s 
earnings 
 Individual B’s 
earnings 
ONE £18.00 £0.00 
TWO £17.80 £1.80 
THREE £17.40 £3.40 
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 
SIX £15.00 £7.00 
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 
NINE £10.80 £8.80 
TEN £9.00 £9.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual A chooses action FOUR. Then, Individual A's final 
earnings from Task 1 are £16.80 and Individual B's final earnings are £4.80. 
 
Exactly who takes the role of Individual A in your pair will not be revealed until the end of 
the experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to make a decision as if you are Individual A.  
 
At the end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you or the person you are paired with take the role of Individual A.  
• If you are selected as Individual A, then your choice will be implemented, and you 
and the other person will be paid according to your decision.  
• If the other person in the pair is selected as Individual A, then his or her choice will be 
implemented, and you and the other person will be paid according to his or her 
decision.  
 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 1 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. You will decide who takes the role of Individual A in your pair. 
b. The experimenter will toss a coin to decide who takes the role of Individual A 
in your pair. You and the other person will be informed of the outcome of the 
coin toss before you make any decision in the task.  
c. The experimenter will toss a coin to decide who takes the role of Individual A 
in your pair. You and the other person will only be informed of the outcome of 
the coin toss at the end of the experiment.  
 
 
2. Suppose that you choose action THREE and the other person in your pair chooses 
action SIX. If this task is selected for payment, and you are selected as Individual A: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
3. Suppose that you choose action TEN and the other person in your pair chooses action 
SEVEN. If this task is selected for payment, and the other person is selected as 
Individual A: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 1 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please make a decision in the role of Individual A. Please choose one of the ten actions below 
and indicate your choice in the space provided below. 
 
Individual A’s  
Action 
Individual A’s earnings  Individual B’s earnings 
ONE £18.00 £0.00 
TWO £17.80 £1.80 
THREE £17.40 £3.40 
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 
SIX £15.00 £7.00 
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 
NINE £10.80 £8.80 
TEN £9.00 £9.00 
 
 
I choose action 
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 2 - Instructions 
 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be matched with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual X" or "Individual Y", 
with equal probability. Individual X can choose between two actions: “IN” or “OUT”. 
 
If Individual X chooses OUT, Individual Y has no action to take, and both Individual X and 
Individual Y earn £4.50 each. 
 
If Individual X chooses IN, then Individual Y must choose one of four possible actions, listed 
in the table below. For each action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual 
X and Individual Y.  
 
Individual Y’s 
action 
Individual Y’s 
earnings 
Individual X’s 
earnings 
ONE £16.60 £1.10 
TWO £15.75 £4.50 
THREE £13.75 £7.50 
FOUR £10.00 £10.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual X chooses IN and Individual Y chooses action TWO. 
Then, Individual Y's final earnings from Task 2 are £15.75 and Individual X's final earnings 
are £4.50. 
 
Exactly who in your pair takes the role of Individual X or Individual Y will not be revealed 
until the end of the experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to make a decision for each 
role. That is, we ask you to make two decisions: one decision as if you are Individual X, and 
one decision as if you are Individual Y.  
 
At the end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you take the role of Individual X (and thus the other person in your pair 
takes the role of Individual Y), or Individual Y (and thus the other person in your pair takes 
the role of Individual X).  
• If you take the role of Individual X, then your decision in the role of Individual X and 
the other person’s decision in the role of Individual Y will be used to compute 
earnings.  
• If you take the role of Individual Y, then your decision in the role of Individual Y and 
the other person’s decision in the role of Individual X will be used to compute 
earnings. 
 Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 2 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. You are paired with another person in this task. You do not know whether you 
will be assigned the role of Individual X or Individual Y until the end of the 
experiment. Therefore, you are asked to make two decisions: one in the role of 
Individual X and one in the role of Individual Y.  
b. You have been assigned the role of Individual Y in this task. 
c. You are paired with another person in this task. You do not know whether you 
will be assigned the role of Individual X or Individual Y until the end of the 
experiment. You are asked to make a decision in the role of Individual X and 
the other person is asked to make a decision in the role of Individual Y. 
 
2. Suppose that you choose IN in the role of Individual X, and action THREE in the role 
of Individual Y. Suppose that the other person in your pair chooses IN in the role of 
Individual X, and action ONE in the role of Individual Y. If this task is selected for 
payment, and you are selected as Individual X: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
3. Suppose that you choose IN in the role of Individual X, and action ONE in the role of 
Individual Y. Suppose that the other person in your pair chooses OUT in the role of 
Individual X, and action FOUR in the role of Individual Y. If this task is selected for 
payment, and you are selected as Individual Y: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
 
 
 
Task 2 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please make a decision in the role of Individual X, and a decision in the role of Individual Y.  
Please indicate your choices in the spaces provided below. 
 
 
 
Individual X: 
Please choose between IN and OUT. 
 
As Individual X, I choose  
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Y: 
Please choose one of the four actions below. 
 
Individual Y’s 
action 
Individual Y’s 
earnings 
Individual X’s 
earnings 
ONE £16.60 £1.10 
TWO £15.75 £4.50 
THREE £13.75 £7.50 
FOUR £10.00 £10.00 
 
 
As Individual Y, I choose action    
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 3 - Instructions 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. At the end of this 
task the pair will be dissolved, and you will not be paired with this person again during this 
experiment.  
 
Each person in the pair will be randomly assigned a role: "Individual J" or "Individual K", 
with equal probability. Only Individual J has an action to take in this task, and this action will 
determine the final earnings for Individual J and Individual K in Task 3 of the experiment. 
 
On his or her computer screen, Individual J will see a “spinning wheel”, divided in three 
different-coloured sections of equal size: RED, BLUE, and GREEN. A screenshot of the 
spinning wheel is provided below.  
 
Individual J activates the wheel by clicking the START button. The wheel will spin for a few 
seconds and then will stop. The screen will then go blank. Individual J must report on the 
decision sheet the outcome of the wheel spin. The final earnings from Task 3 for Individual J 
and Individual K depend on this outcome. In particular:  
• If the wheel stops on RED, Individual J earns £17.00 and Individual K earns £0.00 
• If the wheel stops on BLUE, both Individual J and Individual K earn £8.50 each 
• If the wheel stops on GREEN, both Individual J and Individual K earn £0.00 each 
Note that each colour has an equal chance of being selected.  
 
Exactly who takes the role of Individual J in your pair will not be revealed until the end of the 
experiment. In the meantime, we ask you to spin the wheel as if you are Individual J. At the 
end of the experiment, if this task is selected for payment, we will toss a fair coin to 
determine whether you or the person you are paired with take the role of Individual J.  
• If you are selected as Individual J, then we will use the outcome of the wheel spin 
reported on your decision sheet to compute your earnings for Task 3.  
• If the other person is selected as Individual J, then we will use the outcome of the 
wheel spin reported on his or her decision sheet to compute your earnings for Task 3. 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how their earnings from Task 3 are calculated, we ask you to answer the 
questions below. The experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone 
has answered all questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. If you are Individual J and the wheel stops on GREEN: 
a. What are your earnings?     ___________ 
b. What are the other person’s earnings?    ___________ 
 
2. Which of the following statements is true (circle your answer): 
a. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will certainly not be used to 
compute earnings in this task. 
b. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will certainly be used to compute 
earnings in this task. 
c. Your report of the outcome of the wheel spin will be used to compute earnings 
in this task only if you are randomly assigned the role of Individual J at the 
end of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 3 – Decision Sheet  
 
Please report the outcome of the wheel spin that you saw on your computer screen. 
 
 
The outcome of the wheel spin was 
 
 
 
 
Once you have made your decision, fold the paper in half and put it in one of the envelopes 
that are placed on your desk. Shortly, the experimenter will come around to collect your 
envelope. 
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Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment on decision making. This 
experiment is run by the “Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and 
has been financed by various research foundations. For your participation you will receive a 
show-up fee of £5. In addition, you may receive some more money, based on your choices 
and the choices of others. 
 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this experiment. Everyone 
is participating for the first time, and all participants are reading the same instructions. During 
the experiment, we request that you turn off your mobile phone, remain quiet, and do not 
attempt to communicate with other participants. If you have a question at any time, please 
raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to your desk to answer it. Participants 
not following this request may be asked to leave without receiving payment.  
 
In this experiment, you will read descriptions of three situations. In these situations one or 
two person(s) must decide how to act. For each situation, you will be given a description of 
the various possible actions that each person can choose to take.  
 
After you read the description of each situation, you will be asked to evaluate the various 
possible actions that each person can take. You must indicate, for each of the possible 
actions, whether taking that action would be “socially appropriate” and “consistent with 
moral or proper social behaviour”, or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with 
moral or proper social behaviour”. By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that most 
people agree is the “correct” or “ethical” thing to do. Another way to think about it is that if a 
person were to select a socially inappropriate action, then someone else might be angry at 
him or her for having done so. 
 
In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on 
your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour. 
 
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, on the next pages we will go 
through an example situation and show you how you will indicate your responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example situation 
Individual Z is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Individual Z notices that 
someone has left a wallet at one of the tables. Individual Z must decide what to do and can 
choose one of four possible actions: take the wallet; ask others nearby if the wallet belongs to 
them; leave the wallet where it is; or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
The table below presents the list of the possible actions that Individual Z can choose. For 
each of the actions, you would be asked to indicate whether you believe choosing that action 
is very socially inappropriate, socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, 
somewhat socially appropriate, socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate 
your response, you would click on the corresponding button. 
 
If this was one of the situations for this study, you would consider each of the possible 
actions and, for that action, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would 
be “socially appropriate” or “socially inappropriate”. Recall that by socially appropriate we 
mean behaviour that most people agree is the “correct” or “ethical” thing to do.  
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, 
asking others nearby if the wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, 
leaving the wallet where it is was socially inappropriate, and giving the wallet to the shop 
manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your responses as follows: 
 
If you have any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your 
responses, please raise your hand now. 
 
Your task in today's experiment 
You will next be given a description of three situations where one or two participants in an 
experiment have to choose among various possible actions. After you read each description, 
you must consider the possible actions and indicate on your computer screen how socially 
appropriate these are in tables similar to the one shown above for the example situation. 
 
How your earnings are determined 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the three situations. 
For this situation, the computer will also randomly select one of the persons involved in the 
situation (if applicable) and one of the possible actions that this person could choose.  
 
The computer will then pair you randomly with another person participating in the 
experiment here today. Your evaluation of the selected action will be compared with that of 
this randomly selected participant. If your evaluation is the same as theirs, you will receive 
£7 for this task; otherwise you will receive zero. 
 
For instance, imagine the example situation above was the actual situation and the possible 
action "Leave the wallet where it is" was selected by the computer. If your evaluation had 
been "somewhat socially inappropriate" then your task earnings would be £7 if the person 
you are paired with also evaluated the action as “somewhat socially inappropriate”, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Before we continue with the experiment we want to check that each participant understands 
how their earnings will be calculated. To do this we ask you to answer the questions below. 
In a couple of minutes the experimenter will check your answers. When each participant has 
answered all questions correctly we will continue with the experiment.  
 
If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your 
desk to answer it. 
Questions 
 
• For the action selected for payment, if your rating is "Very socially appropriate" and 
the rating of the person who is randomly matched with you is "Very socially 
appropriate", your earning is: _________________ 
 
• For the action selected for payment, if your rating is "Very socially appropriate" and 
the rating of the person who is randomly matched with you is "Socially 
inappropriate", your earning is: _________________ 
Situation 1 
 
Description of the situation 
Suppose that Individual A, a participant in an experiment, is randomly paired with another 
participant, Individual B. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever 
know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired.  
 
In the experiment, Individual A must choose one of ten possible actions, while Individual B 
has no action to take. The action taken by Individual A determines the final earnings for 
Individual A and Individual B in the experiment. 
 
The ten possible actions that Individual A can take are listed in the table below. For each 
action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual A and Individual B.  
 
Individual A’s  
action 
Individual A’s 
earnings 
 Individual B’s 
earnings 
ONE £18.00 £0.00 
TWO £17.80 £1.80 
THREE £17.40 £3.40 
FOUR £16.80 £4.80 
FIVE £16.00 £6.00 
SIX £15.00 £7.00 
SEVEN £13.80 £7.80 
EIGHT £12.40 £8.40 
NINE £10.80 £8.80 
TEN £9.00 £9.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual A chooses action FOUR. Then, Individual A's final 
earnings from the experiment are £16.80 and Individual B's final earnings are £4.80. 
 
After Individual A has chosen an action, both participants are informed of the action 
chosen and are paid accordingly in private and in cash. 
 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how Situation 1 works, we ask you to answer the questions below. The 
experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone has answered all 
questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
 
1. Suppose that Individual A would choose action THREE: 
a. What would be the earnings of Individual A?  ___________ 
b. What would be the earnings of Individual B?   ___________ 
Your task in today's experiment 
On your computer screen you will see a table where you must indicate, for each of the ten 
possible actions available to Individual A, whether you believe that choosing that action is 
very socially inappropriate, socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, 
somewhat socially appropriate, socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. Recall that 
by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people agree is the ‘’correct’’ or 
‘’ethical’’ thing to do. To indicate your response, please choose one option in each row. 
At the end of the experiment, if Situation 1 is selected for payment, the computer will select 
one possible action by Individual A at random. If your response matches the response of 
another randomly selected participant, you will receive £7; otherwise you will receive zero. 
Please now look at your computer screen and indicate your responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situation 2 
Description of the situation 
Suppose that Individual X, a participant in an experiment, is randomly paired with another 
participant, Individual Y. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever 
know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired.  
Individual X can choose between two actions: “IN” or “OUT”. 
If Individual X chooses OUT, Individual Y has no action to take, and both Individual X and 
Individual Y earn £4.50 each. 
If Individual X chooses IN, then Individual Y must choose one of four possible actions, listed 
in the table below. For each action, the table shows the corresponding earnings for Individual 
X and Individual Y.  
 
Individual Y’s 
action 
Individual Y’s 
earnings 
Individual X’s 
earnings 
ONE £16.60 £1.10 
TWO £15.75 £4.50 
THREE £13.75 £7.50 
FOUR £10.00 £10.00 
 
For instance, suppose that Individual X chooses IN and Individual Y chooses action TWO. 
Then, Individual Y's final earnings from the experiment are £15.75 and Individual X's final 
earnings are £4.50. 
After Individual X and Individual Y have chosen their actions, both participants are informed 
of the actions chosen and are paid accordingly in private and in cash. 
Before we continue with the experiment, in order to make sure that each participant 
understands how Situation 2 works, we ask you to answer the questions below. The 
experimenter will check your answers in a few minutes. Once everyone has answered all 
questions, we will continue with the experiment.  
1. Suppose that Individual X would choose IN and Individual Y would choose action 
THREE: 
a. What would be the earnings of Individual X?  ___________ 
b. What would be the earnings of Individual Y?   ___________ 
 
2. Suppose that Individual X would choose OUT and Individual Y would choose action 
FOUR:  
a. What would be the earnings of Individual X?  ___________ 
b. What would be the earnings of Individual Y?   ___________ 
Your task in today's experiment 
On your computer screen you will see two tables, one listing the actions available to 
Individual X, and another listing the actions available to Individual Y. For each table, and for 
each action, you must indicate whether you believe that choosing that action is very socially 
inappropriate, socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially 
appropriate, socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. Recall that by socially 
appropriate we mean behaviour that most people agree is the ‘’correct’’ or ‘’ethical’’ thing to 
do. To indicate your response, please choose one option in each row. 
At the end of the experiment, if Situation 2 is selected for payment, the computer will 
randomly select one of the two tables. For the selected table, the computer will also randomly 
select one action. If your response matches the response of another randomly selected 
participant, you will receive £7; otherwise you will receive zero. 
Please now look at your computer screen and indicate your responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situation 3 
 
Description of the situation 
Suppose that Individual J, a participant in an experiment, is randomly paired with another 
participant, Individual K. The pairing is anonymous, meaning that neither individual will ever 
know the identity of the other individual with whom he or she is paired.  
 
Individual J is seated at a visually separated computer workstation, like yours. On his or her 
computer screen, Individual J sees a “spinning wheel”, divided in three different-coloured 
sections of equal size: RED, BLUE, and GREEN. A screenshot of the spinning wheel is 
provided below.  
 
 
 
Individual J activates the wheel by clicking the START button. The wheel spins for a few 
seconds and then stops. The screen then goes blank. Individual J must report on a decision 
sheet the outcome of the wheel spin. The final earnings from the experiment for Individual J 
and Individual K depend on this outcome. In particular:  
• If the wheel stops on RED, Individual J earns £17.00 and Individual K earns £0.00 
• If the wheel stops on BLUE, both Individual J and Individual K earn £8.50 each 
• If the wheel stops on GREEN, both Individual J and Individual K earn £0.00 each 
 
After Individual J has reported the outcome of the spin, the experimenter collects the decision 
sheet and pays Individual J and Individual K in private and in cash according to Individual J’s 
report. 
 
Your task in today's experiment 
On your computer screen you will see a list of the actions available to Individual J. These will 
be presented in three tables, each containing three rows: 
1. In the first table you will evaluate Individual J’s choice to report RED after having 
observed the wheel stopping on RED, BLUE, or GREEN. 
2. In the second table you will evaluate Individual J’s choice to report BLUE after having 
observed the wheel stopping on RED, BLUE, or GREEN. 
3. In the third table you will evaluate Individual J’s choice to report GREEN after having 
observed the wheel stopping on RED, BLUE, or GREEN. 
For each table and each row, you must indicate whether you believe that choosing that action 
is very socially inappropriate, socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, 
somewhat socially appropriate, socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. Recall that 
by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people agree is the ‘’correct’’ or 
‘’ethical’’ thing to do. To indicate your response, please choose one option in each row. 
 
At the end of the experiment, if Situation 3 is selected for payment, the computer will 
randomly select one of the three tables. For the selected table, the computer will also 
randomly select one row. If your response matches the response of another randomly selected 
participant, you will receive £7; otherwise you will receive zero. 
Please now look at your computer screen and indicate your responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.2 Normative disagreement and preference
consistency
In this section we examine whether what we interpret as inconsistent be-
haviour on the part of our subjects in the behavioural experiment can be
simply due to the fact that their judgements about social appropriate-
ness are different from the average ones in the normative treatment. To
start with, notice that what determines the behaviour of the a normative
agent are not the normative scores that they assign to the available actions
themselves, but rather the differences between these scores (along with the
actions’ material payoffs and the agent’s parameter value). Suppose, then,
that for a given agent, i, we do not know her/his parameter value and
her/his perceptions on the normative appropriateness of each of the avail-
able actions. What we do know (assume, to be exact), however, is that
the agent is characterised by a stable parameter value and that (s)he is
consistently rational. That is, for any pairs of actions, α1 and α2 in game
1, and α3 and α4 in game 2, it is true that:
α1  α2 ⇒ γi ≤ pi(α1)− pi(α2)
Ni(α2)−Ni(α1)
α3  α4 ⇒ γi ≤ pi(α3)− pi(α4)
Ni(α3)−Ni(α4)
Stability of γi implies that if i exhibits the following preferences:
α1  α2 α4  α3,
then it must be the case that:
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pi(α1)− pi(α2)
Ni(α2)−Ni(α1) ≥ γi ≥
pi(α3)− pi(α4)
Ni(α4)−Ni(α3)
Notice that this expression (in particular, the Ni(.) function) is person-
specific and does not depend on aggregate measures. We can investigate,
then, whether the patterns of deviation from the model’s predictions that
we observe in our behavioural treatment are similar to the structures of
deviations from the mean responses in our normative treatment. That
is, consider the ratio of the people within each group in our behavioural
experiment that deviate from the model’s predictions. We can examine if
this ratio is statistically similar to the ratio of the people in our normative
experiment whose assessments are consistent with such behaviour, in the
manner described above.
For our analysis, we focus on the people in our behavioural experiment
who chose actions FIVE and SIX in the dictator game. These groups
exhibit the highest rates of deviation from the model’s predictions and are
sufficiently populated for such an analysis. Consider, firstly, their behaviour
in the trust game. The prediction of the Krupka-Weber model, based on
the average assessments in the normative experiment, is that they will
all choose action FOUR as second movers (recall that action THREE is
dominated). Those that do not can switch either to action ONE or to
action TWO. There are, thus, four possible combinations of choices, given
these deviations:
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1.1.a. {FIV E,ONE} : pi(ONE)−pi(FOUR)
Ni(FOUR)−Ni(ONE) ≥ γi ≥
pi(FOUR)−pi(FIV E)
Ni(FIV E)−Ni(FOUR)
1.2.a. {FIV E, TWO} : pi(TWO)−pi(FOUR)
Ni(FOUR)−Ni(TWO) ≥ γi ≥
pi(FOUR)−pi(FIV E)
Ni(FIV E)−Ni(FOUR)
1.3.a. {SIX,ONE} : pi(ONE)−pi(FOUR)
Ni(FOUR)−Ni(ONE) ≥ γi ≥
pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E)
1.4.a. {SIX, TWO} : pi(TWO)−pi(FOUR)
Ni(FOUR)−Ni(TWO) ≥ γi ≥
pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E)
Given the payoff structures in the two games, cases 1.1.a-1.4.a. imply,
respectively, that:
1.1.b. Ni(FOUR) − Ni(ONE) ≤ 8.25[Ni(FIV E) −
Ni(FOUR)]
1.2.b. Ni(FOUR) − Ni(TWO) ≤ 7.1875[Ni(FIV E) −
Ni(FOUR)]
1.3.b. Ni(FOUR)−Ni(ONE) ≤ 6.6[Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E)]
1.4.b. Ni(FOUR) − Ni(TWO) ≤ 5.75[Ni(SIX) −
Ni(FIV E)]
That is, given these relations in the relevant pairs of normative as-
sessments, the related choices can be rationalised within the context of the
Krupka-Weber model. In our normative experiment 46% of the partici-
pants satisfy 1.1.b. and 1.2.b. (no one satisfies one and not the other) and
40% of them satisfy 1.3.b. and 1.4.b. (again, no one satisfies one and not
the other). In our behavioural experiment there are 38 people who chose
FIVE or SIX in the dictator game and something other than THREE in
the trust game (and, thus, we can form predictions about their behaviour).
Of them, 22 chose FIVE and 16 SIX in the dictator game. Based on this
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composition and the patterns of ratings in our normative experiment, we
would expect 43.5% of them to choose either ONE or TWO as second-
movers in the trust game. What we find instead is that 73.7% of them
made such choices. The difference between the expected and the observed
absolute frequencies of choices is significant at the 1% level (χ2(1) = 6.592,
p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.009).
To replicate the analysis in the lying game, we focus on each state
separately. We star with state GREEN and consider, again, only those who
chose action FIVE or SIX in the dictator game. We can infer, at the very
least, that if the Krupka-Weber model is to track behaviour consistently,
then the following four conditions need to hold (noting that the prediction
of the model for all these people is that they will choose to report RED in
this state):
2.1.a. {FIV E,BLUE} : pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(BLUE)
Ni(BLUE|GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
2.2.a. {FIV E,GREEN} : pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(GREEN)
Ni(GREEN |GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
2.3.a. {SIX,BLUE} : pi(SIX)−pi(SEV EN)
Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(BLUE)
Ni(BLUE|GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
2.4.a. {SIX,GREEN} : pi(SIX)−pi(SEV EN)
Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(GREEN)
Ni(GREEN |GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
Recall that the rating of social appropriateness attached to each report
depends on the actual state. Thus, Ni(R|S) represents agent i’s judgement
about the social appropriateness of report R conditional on state S having
occurred. Notice that here action SIX is compared to action SEVEN in
terms of social appropriateness. It can equally be compared to action TEN
(given that SEVEN is one of those dismissed as dominated). That may
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render the test more or less favourable to the model, depending on the
convexity of the Ni(.) function relative to that of the payoff structure.
Since this is ultimately an empirical matter, we examine both versions.
Given the payoff structures in the two games, cases 2.1.a.-2.4.a. imply,
respectively, that:
2.1.b. Ni(BLUE|GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥ 8.5[Ni(SIX) −
Ni(FIV E)]
2.2.b. Ni(GREEN |GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥ 17[Ni(SIX) −
Ni(FIV E)]
2.3.b. Ni(BLUE|GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥
7.083[Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX)]
2.4.b. Ni(GREEN |GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥
14.167[Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX)]
Our normative assessments indicate that 59% of our normative group
satisfy 2.1.b. and 57% of them satisfy 2.2.b. (there is a negligible propor-
tion that satisfies each one and not the other). In addition, 49% of these
participants satisfy 2.3.b. and 45% of them satisfy 2.4.b. (again, there is
a negligible proportion that satisfies each one and not the other). There
are 24 people in our behavioural experiment who chose either FIVE or SIX
in the dictator game and then found themselves in state GREEN of the
lying game. Of them, 10 chose FIVE and 14 chose SIX in the dictator
game. Based on this composition of choices in our behavioural experiment
and the pattern of ratings in our normative experiment, we would expect
at most 55% of them to choose either BLUE or GREEN in the GREEN
state of the lying game. What we find instead is that all of them in fact
chose one of these two options. The difference between the expected and
the observed absolute frequencies of choices is significant at the 1% level
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(χ2(1) = 12.632, p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.001).
If we instead compare action SIX to action TEN in the dictator game:
3.1.a. {FIV E,BLUE} : pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(BLUE)
Ni(BLUE|GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
3.2.a. {FIV E,GREEN} : pi(FIV E)−pi(SIX)
Ni(SIX)−Ni(FIV E) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(GREEN)
Ni(GREEN |GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
3.3.a. {SIX,BLUE} : pi(SIX)−pi(TEN)
Ni(TEN)−Ni(SIX) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(BLUE)
Ni(BLUE|GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
3.4.a. {SIX,GREEN} : pi(SIX)−pi(TEN)
Ni(TEN)−Ni(SIX) ≥ γi ≥
pi(RED)−pi(GREEN)
Ni(GREEN |GREEN)−Ni(RED|GREEN)
Cases 3.1.1.-3.1.4. in turn imply, respectively, that:
3.1.b. Ni(BLUE|GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥ 8.5[Ni(SIX) −
Ni(FIV E)]
3.2.b. Ni(GREEN |GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥ 17[Ni(SIX) −
Ni(FIV E)]
3.3.b. Ni(BLUE|GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥
1.4167[Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX)]
3.4.b. Ni(GREEN |GREEN) − Ni(RED|GREEN) ≥
2.833[Ni(SEV EN)−Ni(SIX)]
Our normative experiment indicates that 59% of the participants sat-
isfy 3.1.b. and 57% of them satisfy 3.2.b. (noting, again, that a small
proportion satisfies each one and not the other). We also find that 18%
satisfy 3.3.b. and 10% satisfy 3.4.b. (here the proportions of those that
satisfy one and not the other are even smaller). Based on these propor-
tions and the distribution of participants across actions FIVE and SIX of
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the dictator game in our behavioural experiment, we would expect at most
40% of them to choose either BLUE or GREEN in the GREEN state of
the lying game. As it has already been mentioned, all of them actually re-
ported either BLUE or GREEN. The difference between the expected and
and the observed absolute frequencies of choices is even more pronounced
than before(χ2(1) = 19.765, p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact: p = 0.000).
The above evidence suggests that the discrepancy between the be-
haviour we observe in the laboratory and that which is predicted by the
Krupka-Weber model cannot be solely attributed to a disagreement among
the subjects about how socially appropriate each option is. It may well
be the case that some confusion of this kind is present, but that alone
can only account for part of the behavioural variation we observe in our
subjects’ choices. Our results instead appear to be in favour of the argu-
ment that people’s preferences cannot be consistently accounted for by the
Krupka-Weber model.
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